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A PREFACE TO PAUL TILlich

By R. H. DAUBNEY

I. INTRODUCTION

A MAN'S work is always bound up with his life in one way or another, either by integration or by separation, so that an inquiry into the former requires some knowledge of the latter. And yet the biographical details of a living writer are not usually regarded as a suitable subject for investigation, since the search for them may often betray an undue curiosity about the realm of purely private and personal concerns. When, however, such a writer has published an interpretation of his own life, we may be duly grateful for the light which it sheds upon his thought, and adopt it as the starting-point for an inquiry without uneasiness.

Paul Tillich has published an autobiographical sketch of a rather novel and attractive character. It is entitled "On the Boundary", and serves as an introduction to *The Interpretation of History*, the book by which he is best known and, until a short time ago, the only one by which he is known in this country. In this document he claims that "the border line is the truly propitious place for acquiring knowledge". He goes on to explain that "the concept of the border line might be the fitting symbol for the whole of my personal and intellectual development. It has been my fate", he says, "in almost every direction, to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be completely at home in neither, to take no definite stand against either. As fruitful as such a position is for thought, since thinking presupposes receptiveness to fresh possibilities, it is difficult and dangerous for life, which steadily demands decisions and thus exclusion of alternatives. From this disposition and these tensions have come both destiny and task".¹ This passage immediately reveals

¹ P. Tillich, *The Interpretation of History*, p. 3. These notes are mainly limited to page references to Tillich's writings. I have included a bibliographical list at the end of this article which will enable the reader to trace them if he so desires.

the writer's concern with the problem of human existence, and places him among the existential philosophers. A further study of the document from which it is taken reveals something, not only of the range of his interests and activities, but also of the variety of contexts in which he has tried to interpret this problem. Thus, he considers, for example, the boundary situation between two temperaments, between city and country, between social classes, between reality and imagination, between theory and practice, between heteronomy and autonomy, between theology and philosophy, between church and society, between religion and culture, between Lutheranism and Socialism, and between Idealism and Marxism. In all these considerations, he reveals aspects of heredity and parentage, geographical and social environment, religious and emotional concerns, artistic and intellectual allegiances which have exercised a formative influence in his life and thought, and woven them closely together into a single pattern.

It will not be out of place, therefore, to mention certain details of his career. Paul Johannes Tillich is the son of a Lutheran pastor, and was born at Starzedel in Prussia on August 20, 1886. He was educated at the local school and at the *gymnasium* in a nearby city. He characterizes his fourteenth to his seventeenth year as a period in which imaginative worlds constituted the true reality for him; but at the end of that period "the romantic imagination was ultimately transmuted into the philosophical imagination" which has stayed with him ever since. Tillich subsequently pursued his studies in the universities of Berlin, Tübingen and Halle between 1904 and 1908. At Halle he came under the influence of two teachers who determined the character of his later thinking to a large extent: namely, Fritz Medicus in philosophy and Martin Kahler in theology. He has spoken of the former as giving the first impulse "to the rediscovery of Fichte's philosophy in the first decade of the present century, which soon broadened out to a renaissance of German idealism in general"²; and of the latter as "a man who in his personality and theology combined traditions of Renaissance humanism and Ger-

² *Ibid.* p. 31.

man classicism with a profound understanding of the Reformation and with strong elements of the religious awakening of the middle of the nineteenth century".³

Tillich's academic career was interrupted by two years' active church work, and by four years as a field chaplain in the German army during the first world war. In 1924 he was appointed professor of theology in the university of Marburg, and later to the chair in the same subject at Dresden and Leipzig. In 1929 he became professor of philosophy at Frankfurt, and held this chair until 1933, when his connexion with the Religious Socialist movement made it necessary for him to leave Germany. He was offered the professorship of philosophical theology at the Union Theological Seminary in New York, the position which he still holds, and became an American citizen in 1940. These details of his academic career reflect another aspect of the boundary situation which it is important to notice because it characterizes the specific type of his intellectual activity as a philosophical theologian. "The boundary line between philosophy and theology is the centre of my thought and work", he says;⁴ while his teaching work has involved "a constant change of faculties and yet no change in the subject! As a theologian I tried to remain a philosopher, and conversely so. To have left the border and decided on the one or the other would have been less difficult. But inwardly it was impossible; and external fate met the need of the inward necessity with peculiar opportuneness".⁵ Moreover, as an exile he has experienced the situation on the boundary between a home and an alien land which, he says, "is not merely the external boundary, drawn by nature and history, but is likewise the border of two inner forces, two possibilities of human existence".⁶ The experience of an alien land is the "metaphysical experience of strangeness in our world, which the philosophy of existence takes as an outstanding expression of human finiteness"⁷; while the experience of attachment to a home and a country brought the

³ *The Protestant Era*, p. xiii.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 83.

⁵ *The Interpretation of History*, pp. 40-41.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 67.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 69.

vision of "European nationalism as only a means for the tragic self-destruction of Europe".⁸ He claims to have found in his American citizenship a symbol of the unity of mankind, a liberation from European provincialism, a sense of belonging to the future in which the fuller meaning of temporal existence is disclosed and both the privilege and the calling to participate in the freedom and creativeness of historical action without which man is no longer man.⁹ It is an anticipation of the truth implied in the belief in the Kingdom of God, "a symbol of that which lies beyond history, in which the border between home and alien land has ceased to be a border".¹⁰

This symbol of the boundary situation is the primary clue to the whole range of Tillich's work in interpreting "the dialectical character of existence, that each of its possibilities drives on its own accord to its border line and to the limiting power beyond the boundary. To stand on many border lines means to experience in many forms the unrest, insecurity, and inner limitation of existence, and to know the inability of attaining serenity, security, and perfection".¹¹ But, as he has argued elsewhere, "the border-situation of man is possible because he is not identical with his vital existence".¹² He has in a sense broken away from it, and is free from himself, so that ultimately he must accept an unconditional demand or his life will be driven into discord. Such a demand makes it necessary to view the whole of existence in terms of the boundary situation, because at no time can existence be endowed with absolute security, either by submersion in the vital processes or by spiritual and intellectual activity.¹³ There is ultimately "a boundary of human activity which is no longer the dividing line between two possibilities, but a limitation".¹⁴

But even with this clue, which leads us immediately to the

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 70.

⁹ "I am an American" in *The Protestant*, Vol. 3, No. 12, July 1941.

¹⁰ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 72.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 72.

¹² *The Protestant Era*, p. 197.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

¹⁴ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 73.

heart of Tillich's work, it is not altogether easy to assess it completely and accurately at the present moment. On the one hand, the reputation and influence which he acquired as a philosophical theologian in Germany before his exile did not, so far as I have been able to discover, make any particular impression in this country; and one has, therefore, only personal testimony on which to base the statement that it was considerable, coupled with the fact that the character of his views and the power with which they were expressed made it necessary for the National Socialist party to get rid of him when they came into power. The bibliography of his German writings runs to four closely typed pages, and so far only a small proportion of them has been translated into English. On the other hand, there is the reputation and influence which his work has acquired in America to be assessed also; and here again one must rely upon personal testimony up to a point. Two recent visitors to the United States, whose judgement one would be disposed to respect, remark that Tillich is probably the greatest philosophical theologian in America today. Demant described him as "one of the great theological figures of the non-Catholic world"¹⁵; and some would go further, and regard him as one of the few genuinely creative minds of our time. When he arrived in America, his way had been prepared to some extent by the work of the Niebuhr brothers: Richard Niebuhr had translated *Die Religiöse Lage der Gegenwart* in 1932, a small book originally published in 1926; and the more widely-known contributions of Reinhold Niebuhr expound a number of themes which are to be found in a more concentrated form in Tillich's writings. Indeed, one suspects that while Reinhold Niebuhr has always commanded a wider audience, at least in this country, the fructification of his work owes a great deal to his association with Tillich at the Union Theological Seminary.

Apart from the Atlantic Ocean, however, there are other and more serious obstacles which stand in the way of a thorough appreciation of Tillich's work. The first of these is its admittedly fragmentary character, and the fact that even the fragments are not easy to come by without a certain amount of research; indeed,

¹⁵ V. A. Demant, "A Theologian on Historical Existence," p. 283.

one suspects that only a comparatively few people know its whole range. The second difficulty lies in the strangeness of the work itself. The reader makes contact with a richly-stored and deeply-moving mind, offering a crystallization of thought over a vast range of material carried out through many years, involving a severe compression of language and the formulation of a new terminology. The experience of strangeness almost becomes one of apprehension on the encounter with terms like the Unconditional, the Kairos, the Demonic, the New Being, the Gestalt of Grace, and the distinction of theonomy from heteronomy and autonomy. To a large extent the reader has to wrestle with the meaning of these terms for himself, and work them out along with a growing appreciation of the pattern of Tillich's thought. Therefore we need not be surprised when we find Tillich himself speaking in one of his essays of "the tragic fate of the systematic theologian: he must say everything in order to say anything completely"; and going on to confess that he has "deliberately omitted many of the traditional terms in which Christian theology is usually expounded". He maintains that any attempt to reinterpret Christian thought, such as is required in our time, "must begin with concepts which do not belong to its traditional form; because otherwise it becomes mere repetition and not reinterpretation". The concepts "are simply tools, just as the Greek terms used by the early Church were tools; and if they prove useless, they can be discarded".¹⁶

For the moment, then, Tillich remains a rather enigmatic figure on the contemporary theological scene; but the time is not far distant when English theology will have to reckon with his work seriously and in detail. The large-scale work in systematic theology in our time seems to have been confined mainly to the Protestant world; and Tillich, along with Barth and Brunner, is nearing the completion of such a study which he regards as his

¹⁶ "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. 148. Cp. "But there is a mysterious fact about the great words of our religious tradition: they cannot be replaced. All attempts to make substitutions, including those I have tried myself, have failed to convey the reality that was to be expressed." *The Shaking of the Foundations*, p. 153. See further *The Interpretation of History*, p. 46-47.

magnum opus, and which will allow us to see his work as a whole for the first time. In these circumstances, the most we can hope to do is to provide some sort of a preface to it, which can indicate some of its main themes as a guide to the complete pattern when it appears, and to make it a little less strange.

One line of approach to this task is to suggest Tillich's affinities in the theological field. When he first went to America, he was generally classed as a Barthian, but this is a facile comparison. Tillich is deeply rooted in the Lutheran tradition, and behind that in the tradition of Paul and Augustine, which immediately separates him from the Calvinistic foundations of Barth's theology. Again, Tillich has always remained too much of a philosopher to be at home in the Barthian camp, a point which is illustrated particularly by his handling of the question of transcendence and immanence, and in his conception of a theology of mediation. Tillich insists upon the perfect transcendence of the Unconditional, but at the same time the absolute demands are expressed in the various spheres of conditioned existence, and he is severely critical of the principle of immanence which has been influential in modern philosophy and liberal theology generally. "*The task of theology is mediation*", he says, "between the mystery which is *theos*, and the understanding, which is *logos*".¹⁷ This immediately cuts him off from the thorough-going transcendentalism of Barth, and in actual fact the exchange of criticism and counter-criticism has been carried on between them as severely as the more widely-known debate between Barth and Brunner.

We must therefore look elsewhere for his theological affinities. His best known book, *The Interpretation of History*, was published in the same year as the English version of another book on the same theme and with a similar title by Nicolas Berdyaev, called *The Meaning of History*; and Berdyaev provides the nearest and most significant parallel to Tillich that I can find. The similarity between them rests not only on the external circumstances of their lives, but also on the internal exigencies of their thinking, and to some extent on the structure and concepts

¹⁷ *The Protestant Era*, p. xiii.

of their thought. They are both thinkers whose work lies on the border line between theology and philosophy; and they have both held academic positions, but neither was content to remain a purely academic philosopher because their understanding of human life brought with it a compulsion to change it. They were both political radicals in their own countries, and they became exiles because their radicalism proved to be unorthodox and unacceptable to the revolutionary movements in which they were involved. They were both nurtured by German idealism and Kantian criticism, and subsequently came under the influence of Marxism which gave concreteness to their social analysis, although neither of them was able to accept orthodox Marxism as a whole. They both betray a mystical tendency which can be traced to a common root in Boehme and Schelling.¹⁸ They are both concerned with the philosophy of existence, and in particular with the conflict which lies at the heart of human existence, and owes much to the influence of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In view of this, they are much occupied with the philosophy of history, not simply with the epistemological problem of historical method, but with human history in its cosmic setting in terms of which alone it can be made intelligible. Moreover, in their interpretation of history they both lay a marked stress on its eschatological significance, the disclosure of the eternal in the temporal order, which Tillich expresses in his doctrine of the Kairos and which Berdyaev designates as existential time.¹⁹ In this context the proper understanding of man's creative freedom assumes a peculiar importance because his personal decisions in time are seen to embody his eternal

¹⁸ Tillich wrote his theses for the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy and Licentiate of Theology on Schelling. The latter was published as *Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung*. It is the later phase of Schelling's thought which influenced him most profoundly. Cf. Schelling: *The Three Ages of the World*, translated with an introduction by F. de Wolfe Bolman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).

¹⁹ Compare: Tillich, *The Interpretation of History*, p. 57, and the essays "Kairos and Logos" and "The Kingdom of God and History" with Berdyaev, *Slavery and Freedom*, p. 260-262; *Solitude and Society*, p. 148 sq.

destiny.²⁰ It would be possible to document these points of contact in considerable detail;²¹ but it would be unwise to belabour them unduly, since there are also equally significant differences between them which would have to be taken into account in any thorough comparison. There is a marked difference in the style and movement of their thought. Berdyaev is slow, diffuse and repetitive; Tillich more precise, concentrated and systematic. Berdyaev also has his roots in a different culture, and was subjected to specifically eastern influences such as Soloviev, Dostoyevsky and Leontiev, which Tillich escaped. Nevertheless, the reader who is acquainted with Berdyaev will find himself to some extent on familiar territory when he approaches Tillich for the first time.

This approach can usefully be made, I think, along three lines: by a consideration of the meaning of religion in Tillich's thought, and the two complementary problems which this implies: namely, the religious attitude and the different forms of its manifestation; and the challenge of religion and the different areas of life in which it is made. The first of these problems can be stated quite briefly. The second leads us immediately into the realms of theology and philosophy. The third is concerned with the theological analysis of man's social and historical existence in the contemporary situation.

II. THE MEANING OF RELIGION

In spite of his wide range of interests and activities, and indeed one might equally say because of it, Tillich is primarily a religious philosopher. It is important, therefore, to gain some insight into the meaning of religion as he understands it. He does, in fact, interpret the meaning of religion in three ways; and the manner in which they are woven together in the pattern of his thought always provides the point of departure from which he proceeds to more specific problems.

²⁰ Cf. Tillich's essays "Freedom in the Period of Transformation."

²¹ Compare: "On the Boundary" with the first chapter of Berdyaev's *Slavery and Freedom*: "Concerning Inconsistencies in my Thought."

On the one hand, he uses the word religion in a broad and inclusive sense, and says quite simply that religion is direction towards the Unconditional,²² or that religion is man's ultimate concern beyond all his immediate and particular concerns.²³ The word *Unconditional* is one of the strange terms in Tillich's language, and probably sounds peculiar to modern ears, although it has occupied an important place in philosophical discussion in the western tradition. It is to be found in Plato, and recurs in the idealist thinkers with Kant, Schleiermacher and Schelling. Tillich sometimes uses Schelling's word *Das Unvordenkliche*, meaning that which comes before all thought as its ground, and yet that which thought cannot penetrate: it is "the originally given, the ground and abyss of everything that is".²⁴ Sometimes he uses the term *Das Unbedingte* which connotes "the majestic and the awful, the ultimate and the intimate, the sovereign, the commanding, that which cannot be tampered with, that which makes demands that cannot be ignored with impunity".²⁵ The Unconditional also has affinities with Boehme's *Ungrund* as that which negates and transcends all descriptions. Therefore it cannot be identified with the eternal forms of Platonism, or the *ipsum esse subsistens* of scholasticism, or the absolute of German idealism, because all these terms imply that it is a being about whose existence we can argue, whereas any discourse about it always implies its prior existence. Thus Tillich says that "the ground of being is at the same time the abyss of any definite being; and conversely that the abyss of being is at the same time the creative ground of all forms of existence. They are all conditioned by it; but it itself is not conditioned by anything; they all are contained in it but it itself is not exhausted in their infinity".²⁶ The nearest Tillich comes to explaining the meaning of this term in traditional scholastic language is the assertion that "the Un-

²² *The Religious Situation*, p. 50.

²³ "Trends in Religious Thought that affect Social Outlook," p. 17.

²⁴ *The Protestant Era*, p. 76. Cp. p. 32.

²⁵ Quoted from J. L. Adams, *The Protestant Era*, p. 300.

²⁶ "Symbol and Knowledge," p. 203.

conditional cannot be conditioned by a difference between its essence and its existence".²⁷

It is this term, nevertheless, which enables Tillich to conceive religion in the broad sense as "the expression of the meaning of our life as a whole" and as "related to every realm of human existence." In consequence, it cannot be conceived as "a province beside other provinces of the human mind". It is never beside or above or below any of the particular concerns of human living because it is involved in all of them. "It is the ultimate concern of all preliminary concerns", he says, "the centre of all theoretical and practical activities, the inexhaustible meaning of everything that has meaning".²⁸ It is important to emphasize this aspect of Tillich's thought, because otherwise we shall miss the significance of his inquiry into the essentially religious meaning of atheistic and secular movements. The secular is not merely something alongside the sacred, since it is often the precondition of the sacred manifesting itself in a new form; and it is also the precondition of understanding the way in which secular movements have arisen because specifically religious forms, in the narrower sense of the word, have lost their power and no longer fulfil their appropriate function, so that new religious forms must be wrought out in the conflict between them. This general concept of religion is therefore of immediate importance in any discussion of the "relation" between religion and culture, as we shall see in a moment.

On the other hand, Tillich recognizes that religion has also a narrower, derivative and particular meaning, which is most frequent in common use, when it denotes a set of symbols, actions, beliefs and institutions which is organized in some form of community, in the attempt to give meaning to human existence. In this narrower sense, religion may represent one particular realm of human living alongside other realms. It may claim authority and allegiance in its own sphere; but it may not exercise a heteronomy over other spheres, such as art, politics or economics,

²⁷ "Existential Philosophy," p. 47.

²⁸ "Trends in Religious Thought that affect Social Outlook." p. 17.

because it will drive these realms into revolt if it does so. Nevertheless, in view of the wider meaning of religion, these realms cannot be understood properly in terms of their own autonomy, because this will mean that they become enclosed in their own finitude, so that they manifest no reference to the Unconditional which underlies them as immediate human concerns pointing to an ultimate concern.

Therefore it is necessary to consider the meaning of religion in a third sense which mediates between these two conceptions by showing "the ultimate meaning of human existence and the presupposition of its realization in human nature and destiny".²⁹ It is at this point that the doctrine of man is shown to be of peculiar importance for religious thought, because it requires a philosophical understanding of "human finiteness and tragedy, of historical time and the nature of the historical process, of the interdependence of personality and community, of the relation between nature and history, between body and mind, between reason and irrationality".³⁰ The way in which religion influences and informs the structure of society and the pattern of culture can be analysed in terms of various types of anthropological doctrine: namely, the type which concerns itself with man's essential nature and under-estimates its existential distortion rests in some conception of a pre-established harmony between human freedom and the development of society; the type which emphasizes the existential distortion of man's nature and loses sight of his essential goodness will involve the acceptance of some form of the power principle to preserve the cohesion of society; the third type attempts a dialectical interpretation of the relation between man's essential nature and its existential situation. It does not regard man's essential goodness as being completely destroyed, or as a mere ideology, or as a transcendental possibility; and at the same time it recognizes the distortion of man's nature under the conditions of existence, so that it cannot regard the processes of society and history as being simply redemptive in themselves. Tillich believes that this dialectical type is preserved in catholicism in an ambiguous form.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 18.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 18.

and that it is given a more satisfactory expression in religious socialism.

III. THE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE

The three conceptions of religion which are woven into the pattern of Tillich's thought point in each case to a corresponding religious attitude which now requires some exposition. The conception of religion as direction to the Unconditional which is the impenetrable ground of rational thought and meaning has a corollary in the symbolic character of religious knowledge. Tillich admits, however, that there is also a non-symbolic element in religious knowledge which "is the experience of the unconditioned as the boundary, ground, and abyss of everything conditioned. This experience is the boundary-experience of human reason and therefore expressible in negative-rational terms".³¹ Therefore, we must also investigate the relation between theology and philosophy in respect of the second and third concepts of religion.

(A) *The Religious Symbol*: There are certain general characteristics of a symbol which remain valid when it assumes a religious function: it has a figurative quality in pointing beyond itself in such a way that the reality symbolized may in turn become a symbol for something else; it has also a quality of perceptibility which enables an invisible, ideal or transcendent reality to become perceptible and be given objectivity; it has an inherent power and necessary character which distinguishes it from a mere sign, and as such can only be created; while in order to be a symbol a particular reality must find some root and support in the life of a community in such a way that the process of becoming a symbol and being accepted as such belong inherently together. Religious symbols, however, "are distinguished from others by the fact that they are a representation of that which is unconditionally beyond the conceptual sphere, they point to the ultimate reality implied in the religious act, the unconditioned transcendent . . . an object that by its very nature transcends everything in the empirical order".³² The religious symbol is

³¹ "Symbol and Knowledge," p. 203.

³² "The Religious Symbol," p. 15.

strictly speaking an object of faith, and as such it has two levels of significance whereby it may be regarded as an objective symbol or as a self-transcending symbol. Thus, "the word *God* involves a double meaning: it connotes the unconditioned transcendent, the ultimate, and also an object somehow endowed with qualities and actions".³³ The second is strictly the figurative and symbolic meaning as the object of which the religious consciousness is aware; but it also points to a non-figurative reality which is represented by this idea, so that "it has the peculiarity of transcending its own conceptual content".³⁴ Tillich will not therefore identify God and the Unconditional. Rather the word *God* is "the affirmative concept pointing beyond the boundary of the negative-rational terms and therefore itself a positive-symbolic term. . . The symbolic, affirmative concepts about God, his qualities and actions, express the concrete form in which the mysterious ground and abyss of being has become manifest to a being as his ultimate concern in an act which we call *revelation*".³⁵

There is also another class of objective symbols which are natural or historical objects or particular objects that have been incorporated into the religious realm and thereby become religious symbols; and "the special symbols are dependent on the concrete situation and configuration in which the mystery of the ground appears to us".³⁶ This may give us a true knowledge of God, but it is an existential truth to which we must surrender in order to grasp it, and not a theoretical truth to which we can adopt a spectatorial attitude; and from this it follows that "it may be a relative, preliminary or distorted truth".³⁷ Tillich has performed a valuable service in his analysis of the religious symbol,³⁸ particularly in an age when technology has cut man off from his

³³ *Ibid.* p. 27.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 28.

³⁵ "Symbol and Knowledge," p. 203.

³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 203.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 204.

³⁸ It includes an analysis of negative and positive theories of the symbol: the former in their psychological and sociological types deriving from Nietzsche and Marx; the latter deriving from the morphology of culture and critical idealism. Cf. "The Religious Symbol," pp. 15-26.

roots in nature which is the rich source of symbols; but we are equally on uncertain ground in this analysis, as Tillich admits implicitly when he says that it might well be the highest aim of theology "to find a point where reality speaks simultaneously of itself and of the Unconditional in an unsymbolic fashion".³⁹ In particular, his insistence upon the symbolic character of religious knowledge under our present conditions does not allow us to evade the perennial question of religious thought concerning the relation between reason and revelation and between philosophy and faith.

(B) *Philosophy and Theology*: Tillich regards his present chair in philosophical theology as an accurate index to the essential character of his work, and claims that the boundary line between philosophy and theology is the centre of his life and thought. He is clear that they are both manifestations of man's religious attitude and that they cannot be separated from one another without the impoverishment of each one; while the fact that they have actually been separated in Protestantism is a fundamental cause of its weakness. It is his purpose to show, therefore, the philosophical character of theology as well as the theological character of philosophy; and that there is a convergence as well as a divergence between them both in respect of the questions they raise as well as in respect of the answers they give. At the same time it is important to notice that they cannot be simply identified without obscuring their proper functions.

Philosophy asks the ultimate question concerning the meaning of being; and it is a welcome sign that Tillich vindicates the primacy of ontology against the prevailing epistemological trend in modern philosophy which has contented itself with sharpening the knife of thought and is afraid of cutting towards the truth. The question of the meaning of being is at the same time the framework within which the question of the relations between God, man and the world must be posed, since they all participate in being according to analogical modes; and from this point of view there can be no division between philosophy and theology, since the philosophical formulation of the problem of being de-

³⁹ "The Religious Symbol," p. 33.

termines the theological interpretation of the relation of God, man and the world. But "the meaning of being manifests itself in the logos of being, that is, in the rational word that grips and embraces being and in which being overcomes its hiddenness, its darkness, and becomes light and truth".⁴⁰ Theology, however, asks the question of the meaning of being in a particular existential situation. "In asking for the meaning of being, theology asks for God. In asking for the powers and structures constituting the being of self and the world, their interrelation and their manifoldness, theology asks for the appearance of the ground, power, norm, and aim of being in these realms of being".⁴¹ In effect, it asks for the revelation of essential being in the kairos of existence, in which the cleavage between essence and existence is transformed and overcome. Thus Tillich interprets the picture of Jesus as the Christ given in the gospels as the manifestation of the New Being.⁴² Thus, the substance of theology is drawn from the *kerygma*, the Christian message, which declares the mystery which is *theos*. Revelation, for Tillich, is given in an existential situation of question and answer: "revelation is an answer which is understandable only if there has been a question. Answers without preceding questions are meaningless. Therefore the questioning for revelation must precede revelation, but this questioning is not possible without a certain knowledge of the subject for which the question is asked. This means: the questioning for revelation presupposes the revelation, and conversely; they are dependent on each other".⁴³

In this process, it is the task of philosophy to ask the questions, "to provide the concepts and categories and the problems implied in them, to which theology gives the answers drawn from the Christian message." Tillich sums up the work of philosophical theology in the following passage: "Philosophical theology deals with the concept of reason and the categories be-

⁴⁰ *The Protestant Era*, p. 90.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 88.

⁴² Cf. "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation" and *The Shaking of the Foundations*, sermon 17.

⁴³ "Natural and Revealed Religion," p. 169.

longing to it and leads to the existential problem implied in reason, to which the answer is: revelation. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of being and the categories belonging to it, and leads to the existential problem implied in being, to which the answer is: God. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of existence and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in existence, to which the answer is: the Christ. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of life and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in life, to which the answer is: the Spirit. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of history and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in history, to which the answer is: the Kingdom of God".⁴⁴

In the history of Christian thought, philosophical theology has developed in two forms. The first form rests on Augustine's identification of God with being and truth, *esse* and *veritas*, and persists in Anselm, Bonaventure and the Franciscans. It insists upon the immediacy of the knowledge of God, since, according to Bonaventure, "God is most truly present to every soul and immediately knowable". The second form derives from Aquinas, for whom the rational knowledge of God is mediated by way of inference which may be correct in itself, although it does not give an unconditional certainty and requires to be completed by authority. Tillich argues for the primacy of the first form, and believes that the second leads to the dissolution of religion. If, however, the ontological principle of the first form is adopted, then "man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, both theoretically as well as practically".⁴⁵ It is then both possible and legitimate to make use of the cosmological idea which prevails in the second type in order to investigate the way in which the Unconditional manifests itself and makes its demands in the universe of nature and culture.⁴⁶ This has actually

⁴⁴ *The Protestant Era*, pp. 92-93.

⁴⁵ "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," p. 10.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 12.

been done in two ways, particularly by medical psychology, and the doctrine of man in existential philosophy, which are concerned with an analysis of the finitude of the finite, and employ such concepts as contingency, insecurity and transitoriness with their psychological counterparts in anxiety, care and meaninglessness. A more positive approach is also given by such principles as wholeness, structure and concretion, and by a religious interpretation of autonomous forms of culture. The first derives more specifically from the cosmological idea itself, while the second derives from its counterpart in the teleological idea; both of which imply an unconditional element in all conditioned realities.

It was remarked that Tillich was nurtured in the school of German idealism, and he confesses that he can never forget what he learned there. "I have remained an idealist as far as the method of procedure is concerned in a theory of knowledge", he says, and "I am an idealist if idealism means the assertion of the identity of thinking and being as the principle of truth".⁴⁷ But at the same time the development of his philosophy has moved towards an existential conception of truth as bound to the situation of the knower, to the individual situation of the knower as he learned from Kierkegaard, as well as to the social situation as he learned from Marx. This introduces a realistic element into his philosophy, and is combined with an understanding of the necessity of faith in making personal decisions in the light of unconditional demands.

(C) *Realism and Faith*: In this development, Tillich formulates the conception of "self-transcending realism" which is central in his thought, and which he regards as a universal attitude towards reality. Realism is a weasel word which cannot be easily pinned down among the variety of its epistemological and religious connotations; and it is worth noting that the meaning which Tillich gives to the word derives from his life-long study of art, and particularly the expressionists who broke up the natural forms in order that their spiritual significance might be made transparent.

⁴⁷ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 60.

"Self-transcending realism," he says, "combines two elements, the emphasis on the real and the transcending power of faith. There seems to be no wider gap than that between the realistic and the belief-ful attitude. Faith transcends every conceivable reality; realism questions every transcending of the real, calling it utopian or romantic".⁴⁸ The tension between these two attitudes is profoundly difficult to maintain, and it may be dissolved in two directions: either by an attitude which is realistic, but has no capacity for self-transcendence, and therefore limits itself to the finite order which Tillich sees deriving from "the critical and ethical schools of Greek philosophy, transmitted through late nominalism to modern technical science and the technocratic world view";⁴⁹ or by an attitude which is capable of self-transcendence but is idealistic and not realistic, and so fails to "see the gap between the unconditional and the conditioned which no ontological or ethical self-elevation can bridge".⁵⁰ The first way out of the tension is characterized as technical reason while the second is described as mystical realism which is typical of the Middle Ages. As means of escape technical and mystical realism have one common feature: "they do not look at concrete existence to discover the power of things. They abstract from it—technological realism for the sake of means and ends, mystical realism for the sake of essence and intuition".⁵¹ It is precisely this weakness which historical realism overcomes because it knows that reality really appears in the structures created by the historical process; it knows, moreover, the principle of contemporaneity which demands penetration into the depth of personal and social being, and must therefore repudiate any attempt "to escape from the present" into an unreal past or an unreal future.

Historical realism, in effect, knows the *kairos*, the moment of the fullness of time, and is therefore the ground of self-transcending realism which shows the religious depth of the

⁴⁸ *The Protestant Era*, p. 67.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 69.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 68.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 71.

kairos. "The ultimate power of being, the ground of reality, appears in a special moment, in a concrete situation, revealing the infinite depth and the eternal significance of the present. But this is possible only in terms of a paradox, that is, by faith, for, in itself, the present is neither infinite nor eternal".⁵² Faith therefore contains elements of certainty and uncertainty: the whole personality is grasped in the centre of consciousness, freedom and responsibility by the ultimate power which is the ground of personal existence; but there is also an element of uncertainty and risk because the Unconditional can only become a question of ultimate concern in so far as it appears in some concrete situation. The tension between the ontological certainty of the Unconditional and the uncertainty about every conditioned reality points to the task of theology and its criterion in maintaining this tension. "The criterion of every concrete expression of our ultimate concern is the degree to which the concreteness of the concern is in union with its ultimacy".⁵³

The rise of the historical consciousness in the nineteenth century has brought to light in our time a genuine concern with the metaphysics of history; and it seems to me to be one of the chief values of Tillich's work that he has shown how the metaphysics of history can be rescued from becoming a purely epistemological problem about historical knowledge by the way in which it reacts upon the metaphysics of being.⁵⁴ For Tillich, the interpretation of the meaning of historical existence is the central problem of our time, and has taken the place of the problem of the control of nature which dominated the immediately preceding period. History is the realm in which revelation is given, and historical existence is the situation in which man asks the questions of his ultimate concern because there he encounters reality. It is the presupposition of theology, he says, that religion denotes a particular encounter with reality which does concern man ultimately as an inescapable challenge.⁵⁵

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 78.

⁵³ "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," p. 13.

⁵⁴ *The Religious Situation*, pp. 50-53.

⁵⁵ "The Problem of Theological Method," p. 17.

IV. THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGION

The relation between the finite temporal order and the eternal is, in Przywara's words, one which is "open upwards";⁵⁶ and in this assertion Tillich, the Lutheran, agrees with the Jesuit. From this, Przywara deduces the principle of the *analogia entis* that, on the one hand, "the totality of the creation is a revelation of God from above hitherwards", while, on the other hand, deity is "the mysterious meaning to which the totality of the creation points in parable fashion through the network of its strivings".⁵⁷ Tillich accepts the traditional doctrine of the *analogia entis*, but with the reservation that he is not prepared to employ it as a basis for rational construction.⁵⁸ He regards the Unconditional as an identity of essence and existence,⁵⁹ just as conditioned beings possess their essence in a state of tension with their existence, in much the same way as Przywara; although Tillich introduces a much greater and, it seems to me, an unwarrantable discrepancy between essence and existence in the case of contingent beings which fails to attach due significance to the individual essence.

It follows from this, however, that "there are two lines by which the meaning of human existence can be symbolized: the vertical and the horizontal, the first pointing to the eternal meaning as such, the second to the temporal realization of the eternal meaning. Every religion necessarily has both directions, although different religions over-emphasize the one or the other".⁶⁰ This in turn points to the fact that different periods of history, different social structures and patterns of culture, and different estimations of individual life can be characterized by the

⁵⁶ E. Przywara, *Polarity* (Trans. by A. C. Bouquet, Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 29.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 30.

⁵⁸ "Symbol and Knowledge," p. 203. Cp. E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (London: Longmans, 1949), pp. 95-96 and the quotation from Penido given there; also I. Trethowan, *Certainty: Philosophical and Theological*, p. 46 sq. (London: Dacre Press, 1948).

⁵⁹ "Existential Philosophy," p. 47.

⁶⁰ *The Protestant Era*, p. 186.

relative degree of significance which is attached to the vertical or horizontal dynamism of human existence. Thus, "the relation of the conditioned to the Unconditional, in individual as well as in social life, is either an openness of the conditioned to the dynamic presence of the Unconditional or a seclusion of the conditioned within itself. The finite life is either turned toward the infinite or turned away from it toward itself"⁶¹ This conception rests upon an analysis of the threefold mystery of time, which is a recurring theme in Tillich's thought, and which he sums up briefly in one of his sermons when he speaks of the power of time "to devour everything within its sphere; its power to receive eternity within itself; and its power to drive toward an ultimate end, a new creation".⁶² Such a framework of thought makes it clear that the presupposition of the meaning of temporal existence is the manifestation of the eternal meaning as such, which overcomes the distortions, clarifies the ambiguities and completes the partial structures of meaning which emerge in history. The human soul, or the soul of a culture, cannot maintain themselves without the dynamic presence of the eternal, just as the historical process cannot be endowed with its directional character without this eternal ground. But it is nevertheless true that the entry of the eternal into time involves a situation of mutual distortion: the significance of the eternal may be appropriated to the temporal process itself, as in the religion of progress, or the significance of the temporal may be evacuated of meaning, as in various forms of mysticism. There is, in effect, a conflict in historical existence between the creation and destruction of form in individual and social life; and in terms of this conflict, Tillich analyses the meaning of the Demonic,⁶³ which is one of the

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 43.

⁶² *The Shaking of the Foundations*, p. 35.

⁶³ *The Interpretation of History*, Part Two. He regards it as one of the forgotten concepts of New Testament theology, and central in the thought of Paul and Luther. It is "the structural, and therefore inescapable, power of evil . . . beyond the power of good will, producing social and individual tragedy precisely through the inseparable mixture of good and evil in every human act" (*The Protestant Era*, p. xx-xxi).

central concepts in his thought, as well as the meaning of the Protestant Principle and the formative power of Protestantism, in which the challenge of religion is perpetually expressed.

(A) *The Protestant Principle*: Tillich's roots, it has been noted, are embedded in the soil of the Lutheran tradition to which he acknowledges an allegiance "by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection", from which he has never turned aside. To this source he owes an insight into the principle of justification by faith which he interprets not only in relation to the religious-ethical life, as is most commonly done, but also in relation to the religious-intellectual life in terms of justification by doubt. "Not only he who is in sin but also he who is in doubt", he says, "is justified by faith. The situation of doubt, even of doubt about God, need not separate us from God. There is faith in every serious doubt, namely, the faith in the truth as such, even if the only truth we can express is our lack of truth".⁶⁴ The depth of seriousness in doubt and despair is paradoxically the expression of the meaning in which man lives; it is an unconditional seriousness, the expression of the presence of the divine in complete separation from it, and if it is valid it means that no realm of life can exist without a relation to the Unconditional.

In this situation, Protestantism is declared to have a principle which is above and beyond any specifically religious forms in which it may be only partially realized or expressed. Such a principle cannot be confined with any definition any more than it can be completely expressed in any historical structure: it cannot be identified with the Reformation protest against Catholicism, or with primitive Christianity, or with any particular religious or cultural form.⁶⁵ It is in fact the protest against any form of conditioned reality to usurp the place of the Unconditional.

As the guardian of this principle, historical Protestantism has been the subject of an internal dilemma: the principle itself is a protest against every form of religious and cultural realization which always stands in the temptation of being endowed with an

⁶⁴ *The Protestant Era*, p. xiv. *The Interpretation of History*, p. 34.

⁶⁵ *The Protestant Era*, p. 163.

ultimate validity through pride in human achievement in both overt and disguised ways; and yet at the same time, if the principle is to be effective, it requires expression, and therefore embodiment in religious and cultural forms. The judgement of history on Protestantism in this dilemma is the declaration of its failure: its theological orthodoxy hardened into a rigid scholasticism, its religious expression was dominated by biblicism and pietism, while in its cultural relations it surrendered almost completely to the ideologies of capitalism and nationalism. Moreover, this failure in all its forms is intensified in confrontation with what Tillich calls "the proletarian situation", in the light of which the Protestant principle must again be vindicated in our time. In this task, it implies a total judgement about the distortion of human nature and existence, not only in terms of its individual, vital and psychological aspects, but also in terms of its sociological and historical predicament. But this judgement cannot rest on the equation of the distortion of human existence with its finite and creaturely character, because this is not the basis of guilt and tragedy. It is rooted specifically in man's power of self-determination by which, as a finite being with a particular kind of structure and status in the order of creation, he endeavours to usurp the status and functions which lie beyond the limits of his finitude in which the possibility of self-contradiction lies. The task requires, secondly, an interpretation of the action of God in history because the proletarian situation is concerned with the unveiling of ideologies, and is therefore characterized by a profound sense of anticipation in which it attempts to give meaning to its existence. All forms of anticipation are threatened by utopianism which weakens its dialectical character because it believes that the anticipated reality will be ultimately possessed, and therefore ignores the transcendent element in the Christian expectation of the Kingdom of God. It is therefore in confrontation with the proletarian situation, in its fundamental structure and in its many particular types of expression, that Protestantism must decide whether it will identify itself with any of its traditional forms of realization or whether it will achieve a renewed understanding of its formative power.

(B) *The Formative Power of Protestantism*: Thus Tillich raises "the question as to how formative power and protest against form can live together in a church, how form and protest against form can create a new, overarching form".⁶⁶ The answer to this question brings forward a new conception in his thought which he calls "the Gestalt of grace", a structure of sacred reality by which all conditioned existence is understood to participate in the Unconditional. He regards faith as the creation of grace, and "the reality of grace is the *prius* of all speaking and hearing about it; being moved by the Spirit is the *prius* of faith, not the reverse. But to be moved by the Spirit or to be grasped by the unconditional means to be drawn into the reality and the life of a Gestalt of grace".⁶⁷ This conception leads to a high sacramental doctrine, judged by traditional Protestant standards, in which the operation of the sacraments are interpreted in a most illuminating manner in terms of their relation to nature, history and the New Being in Christ. The conception is also intended as an alternative to the Catholic view of sacramentalism which, in Tillich's opinion, assume an unwarranted security because the finite form of particular sacraments is transmuted into a divine form, so that grace is regarded as a special reality alongside other realities in spite of its transcendent and therefore unconditional meaning. In this connexion it is clear that Tillich has been led astray by an undue concentration on the interpretation of individual sacraments in Catholicism, and he has failed to appreciate "the economy of the sacramental order" or "the economy of grace" in Catholicism which provides a very close analogy to his conception of the Gestalt.

It is nevertheless his conception of the Gestalt of grace which is the structure of sacred reality able to overcome the demonic structure of evil in existence, and which is also the presupposition of the formative power of Protestantism being able to maintain itself as a unity of form and protest. This leads to

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 206.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 211.

a consideration of the four main principles of the formative power of Protestantism. The first holds that "in every Protestant form the religious element must be related to, and questioned by, a secular element" which is due to the fact that every secular form, in art, politics, or morality, is a finite structure which is capable of being opened to the Unconditional, while at the same time every religious form must be safeguarded against the temptation to identify itself unqualifiedly with the Unconditional. Secondly, "in every Protestant form the eternal element must be expressed in relation to a present situation" in such a way that a realization of the depth of the present situation acknowledges its power to transform the past into the future, not simply as an inevitable forward movement, but as a matter of venture and decision. Such venture, however, is not merely a transition from one finite possibility to another because the form which the decision takes participates in the structure of sacred reality. This points to the third and fourth principles of Protestant form creation that "the given reality of grace must be expressed with daring and risk" and must therefore be an expression of "belief-ful" or "self-transcending realism", concepts which were mentioned above.

Tillich sums this up by saying that "Protestant formative power is at work wherever reality is interpreted with respect to its ground and ultimate meaning";⁶⁸ and he regards the cultus or liturgical action as the particular way in which this becomes apparent and in which the Gestalt of Grace is expressed. There are, of course, dangers to which he believes Catholicism is prone of identifying the Gestalt with particular expressions of grace; but he goes on to say that "it is not so important to produce new liturgies as it is to penetrate into the depths of what happens day by day, in labour and industry, in marriage and friendship, in social relations and recreation, in meditation and tranquillity, in the unconscious and the conscious life. To elevate all this into the light of the eternal is the great task of cultus".⁶⁹ When the liturgical life of the Church is conceived in this way, in the light

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 218.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 219.

of the cosmic meaning of redemption, the sense of which has been lost to a large extent by both Catholicism and Protestantism⁷⁰ although it is now being partially recovered from Eastern Orthodox sources, it is possible to see that finite, temporal and conditioned reality is being transformed "into an active expression of the Gestalt of Grace". If this fundamental conviction of the Christian faith, that the whole world is redeemed, is to be fully recovered and given renewed vitality in our time, it requires that the question of the relation of religion and culture must be dealt with in a realistic manner, since the formative power of Protestantism or Catholicism for that matter, must be expressed not only in the religious sphere, in the narrower sense of the world, "but also in the totality of the personal, social and intellectual existence in the whole of a civilization or culture". This is the last theme in Tillich's work on which I propose to offer some comment.

(C) *Religion and Culture*: Just as the internal dilemma of Protestantism, in maintaining its universal protest requires a form in which it may be expressed, is intensified by confrontation with the proletarian situation, so the dilemma is presented in a different way in the problem of the relation between religion and culture. When Tillich and his generation returned from the first world war they "found a deep gap between the cultural revolution and the religious tradition in central and eastern Europe".⁷¹ The Churches rejected the cultural and political revolutions as expressions of a secular autonomy, and at the same time the revolutionary movements rejected the Churches as expressions of a

⁷⁰ Modern theological doctrines "have mostly lost the original power of the idea of salvation, its cosmic meaning which includes nature, man as a whole, and society. Especially in modern Protestantism, salvation, and many related concepts such as regeneration, redemption, eternal life, are interpreted as descriptions of the spiritual situation of the individual man, in which special stress is laid on his moral transformation and the continuation of his personal life after death. But for biblical and early Christian thinking, salvation is basically a cosmic event: the *world* is saved." ("The Relation of Religion and Health," p. 348). Cf. "Redemption in Cosmic and Social History."

⁷¹ *The Protestant Era*, p. 55.

transcendent heteronomy. In this mutual rejection a problem was presented on two levels: on the open level it was a question how the gap could be bridged or closed; on the deeper level it was the question how a reality could be recovered by which both religion and culture lived. Tillich addresses himself to this problem and its theoretical formulation in a number of his essays;⁷² while his book *The Religious Situation* presents an analysis of one phase of it, just as his participation in the religious socialist movement is an attempt to find a practical solution.⁷³

In its theoretical formulation "the relationship must be defined from both sides of the border. Religion cannot relinquish the absolute, and therefore universal, claim which is expressed in the idea of God. It cannot permit itself to be forced into a special realm of culture or to a place beside it. . . . On the other hand, culture has a claim upon religion, which it cannot surrender without surrendering its autonomy".⁷⁴ Therefore, it can be said that "as the substance of culture is religion, so the form of religion is culture. There is only this difference, that in religion the substance which is the unconditioned source and abyss of meaning is designated, and the cultural forms serve as symbols for it; whereas in culture the form, which is the conditioned meaning is designated, and the substance, which is the unconditioned meaning becomes perceptible only indirectly throughout

⁷² "Religion and Secular Culture" (*The Protestant Era*, ch. 4); "On the Boundary between Religion and Culture" (*The Interpretation of History*, p. 49-53); and "Church and Culture" (*Ibid.* pp. 219-241).

⁷³ The political faith of religious socialism embraced three convictions: "the bourgeois period of history is coming to a catastrophic end and that a new period is at hand . . . ; the period to come will have a character for which the word socialism is a somewhat old-fashioned term . . . ; without the acceptance of a religious foundation and the symbols expressing it no system of a planned society can escape speedy self-destruction . . . ; the religion presupposed is rooted in the prophetic Christian tradition which alone of all world religions takes history and social justice seriously." ("Man and Society in Religious Socialism," p. 10).

⁷⁴ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 50.

the autonomous form".⁷⁵ The theoretical presentation is developed further in a later essay by distinguishing three ways in which the question of the law of life can be answered. "Autonomy asserts that man as the bearer of universal reason is the source and measure of culture and religion—that he is his own law"; and therefore an autonomous culture is an "attempt to create the forms of personal and social life without any reference to something ultimate and unconditional, following only the demands of theoretical and practical rationality:" such was the type of culture which prevailed in the capitalistic era and is characterized by its spirit of self-sufficient finitude. Tillich has analysed the revolts against this spirit which became manifest in the spheres of art and science, in politics and economics, as well as in sociology and theology, which in their development lead to an opposite extreme. "Heteronomy asserts that man, being unable to act according to universal reason, must be subjected to a law, strange and superior to him"; and therefore a heteronomous culture "subjects the forms and laws of thinking and acting to authoritative criteria of an ecclesiastical religion or a political quasi-religion, even at the price of destroying the structures of rationality".⁷⁶

The alternative to these opposing views is the conception of theonomy: it "asserts that the superior law is, at the same time, the innermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which is man's own ground: the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his own;" and therefore "a theonomous culture expresses in its creations an ultimate concern and a transcending meaning not as something strange but as its own spiritual ground".⁷⁷ Two consequences follow from these distinctions: it is possible to show, in the analysis of the style of a heteronomous form of culture in a particular ecclesiastical tradition, that its various institutions, rituals and symbols, doctrinal formulations and philosophical expressions, are partially derivative from the wider general culture which surrounds it; it is also possible "to show that in the depth of every autonomous culture

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 50.

⁷⁶ *The Protestant Era*, pp. 56-57.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* p. 57.

an ultimate concern, something unconditional and holy, is implied", and it is the task of interpreting the style of a culture to show its hidden religious significance, and to determine the degree to which it has become secularized by reference to an "ultimate centre of meaning".⁷⁸

It is not claimed that such a type of theoretical analysis can actually close the gap between religion and culture; but it points to a deeper level of penetration into the problem in periods when heteronomy and autonomy are at war with one another, and when the disintegration in both forms make it necessary to achieve a renewed understanding of their common roots and types of dependence and interaction. Nor is it claimed that any particular form of practical activity can bridge the gap between religion and culture; but it points to a deeper level of transition between them than that which can be achieved either by moral exhortation or intellectual analysis: it requires "the Bible, the dogma, the holy legend, the rites of the holy days as well as of daily life, the symbolic realities that give meaning to our existence, generally and specially, from birth to death".⁷⁹

V. CODA

There are a number of themes in Tillich's work which I have not considered: in particular, his discussion of the problem of theological method, his doctrine of man and human freedom, the general principles of his interpretation of history and his specific interpretation of the crisis of our time; but these would all require a fuller treatment than they can receive within the limits of an already overcrowded lecture. It was my intention to make no more than a preface to his work which would perhaps serve to draw attention to some of its salient features; and to this end I have tried to move from the centre to the circumference of its pattern.

On the basis of an incomplete knowledge of Tillich's work, one hesitates to make a premature evaluation and criticism. There are a number of his published writings which so far I have

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p. 58.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 228.

not been able to trace; there are clues and pointers to these in some of the essays to which I have had access, so that one is left with the feeling that a number of points which remain obscure or partially understood, might be clarified elsewhere. There is, however, the fact that Tillich is a thinker to live with for a period, so that thinking about him goes on when you are asleep as well as when you are awake; he is not just someone to read and then put back on the shelf. The germinating power of his thought is such that each time you go back to one of his writings there is something fresh to be found there and a new illumination to be received. Therefore, any evaluation must include the expression of a sense of personal indebtedness to a man who has proved to be a powerful influence in one's own thinking; and when such a situation is brought about, it is not altogether an easy question to determine where his influence ends and one's own thinking (such as it is) begins.

The same situation is also an indication that religious thought can and should transcend and penetrate denominational boundaries and allegiance to a particular ecclesiastical tradition. It is dangerous for any Church to claim that it possesses the whole truth in a cut and dried form amid the ambiguities of history and the insecurities of human existence; and Tillich is the kind of man who makes you ask how far the factors which predominate in your own tradition find a counterpart in his thought; just as it makes you ask how far the principles which he maintains find a counterpart in your own tradition. The question of the protestant elements in Catholicism and of the catholic elements in Protestantism is endowed with a new seriousness in the concern for the re-creation of the wholeness of the Christian tradition. This is but one signpost on the road into the depth of existence and the depth of truth of which Tillich speaks in one of his sermons. "All those who have been concerned—mystics and priests, poets and philosophers, simple people and educated people—with that road through confession, lonely self-scrutiny, internal or external catastrophes, prayer, contemplation, have witnessed to the same experience. They have found that they were not what they believed themselves to be, even after a deeper

level had appeared to them below the vanishing surface. That deeper level itself became surface, when a still deeper level was discovered." But there can be no depth in human life, he adds, without the depth of a common life, and "the name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all being is God".⁸⁰

The concern for wholeness in the depth of truth, however, is not confined to the Christian Church. There are also significant secular movements of thought and action in which it is expressed; and Tillich is possessed of the synoptic type of mind which can interpret with great insight both the convergence and the divergence between these concerns and the different ways in which they are formulated. Contemporary experience has been described as one of estrangement and alienation which is manifested in the self, in man's relation to nature and society and history, and ultimately in relation to the source and meaning of his existence. This experience has its counterpart in a desire for restoration and reconciliation, the reintegration of personality and community with their roots in nature, embodying a fulfilment of meaning in history. The experience of estrangement and the desire for reconciliation, which Tillich finds expressed in thinkers like Hegel and Marx, James and Jung, can be interpreted, he believes, "as autonomous developments of fundamental Christian principles". In all their various manifestations "the essential unity of life is consciously or unconsciously presupposed", which is a consequence of the Christian belief in the goodness of creation. The idea of estrangement itself is an interpretation of the Christian doctrine of original sin as a quality of distorted creaturely existence which underlies and infects all personal and social activities; just as the idea of reconciliation is an interpretation of the Person and Work of Christ, who participates in the suffering of the estranged world and overcomes its estrangement from the source of being, and provides the means whereby man and nature, society and history may participate in that victory. This points to the true character of a Christian apologetic in our time, which does not mean that Christianity apologizes for its

⁸⁰ *The Shaking of the Foundations*, p. 56.

weakness, or that it confronts man with an alien moral and intellectual authority; but that it speaks to man's condition, interprets and clarifies it at a more ultimate level than man can do for himself, and bridges the gap between theory and practice, between ideal and achievement, because it is doing the truth.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I append here a list of Paul Tillich's writings in English. It is not complete in respect of the contributions to periodicals; but it does include the more important papers which I have been able to obtain. I have thought it worth while to outline the contents of the books as an indication of the range of Tillich's thought. I have not, therefore, included in the periodical contributions those articles which have been reprinted in book form. The material listed here should provide the interested reader with a fairly complete introduction to Tillich's thought at the present stage, prior to its more definitive form in the *Systematic Theology*, which is nearing completion.

1. *Books.*

The Religious Situation. Translated with an Introduction by H. R. Niebuhr. (New York : Henry Holt, 1932.)

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THE METAPHYSICS OF

F. H. BRADLEY

By C. A. CAMPBELL

IT is common knowledge that one of the most conspicuous features of the philosophy of the last twenty-five years—certainly in the Western world—has been its hostility to metaphysics. The note of revolt, of course, was sounded, sometimes loudly, a good deal earlier. It was sounded in the first years of the present century in the Realism of Moore and Russell in this country, in the New Realism of Perry, Holt, Montague, and their colleagues in the United States, and in the Pragmatism of James, Schiller, and Dewey. For sharply as these groups of thinkers differed from one another (and sometimes among themselves) in points of positive doctrine, they were substantially at one in advocating a view of philosophical method highly unfavourable to the large-scale speculation of the metaphysician. All were agreed in emphasizing the importance of analysis as against synthesis, of empirical observation as against *a priori* reasoning, and of piece-meal attack upon isolated problems as against broad theorizing upon the nature of things in general. During the first two decades of the century this conception of the philosopher's task made steady, if unspectacular headway; and by the middle 'twenties it had created a philosophical climate in which only a very hardy species of metaphysician could hope to thrive. One had to wait until the rise of the School of Logical Positivism in the 'thirties, however, for the proposal to be seriously made that the metaphysician should be banished from philosophical society altogether. In the view of the Positivists (who accorded to their famous "Principle of Verifiability" something of the status of Holy Writ), a statement to have meaning must be either a tautology, or else an empirical hypothesis to the verification of which *sense experience*

is relevant. But the characteristic statements of metaphysics seem to fall into neither category. It follows that metaphysics is nonsense. And the peddling of nonsense, it was reasonably enough urged, ought not to be regarded as a branch of "philosophy."

One may surmise that historians of this period will express some astonishment that a Principle which—as surviving representatives of traditional philosophy were not slow to point out¹—seems itself so conspicuously open to the charge brought in its name against metaphysical, ethical, and theological statements, should have made more than a very ephemeral impression upon philosophic thought. Doubtless they will point to a number of extraneous factors which contributed to its success; and, of course, to the gradual preparation of the ground over many years by leading philosophers of empirical leanings. Be that as it may, the plain fact remains that the Positivist way of thinking did exert an immediate, a profound, and a widespread influence. The rising generation of philosophers seized upon and embraced it almost to a man; sometimes with a fervour that stopped little short of fanaticism. The fifth decade of the century opened with Positivism firmly in the saddle, and with the pitiful remnant of unregenerate philosophers who still believed in metaphysics virtually reduced to whispering their dark heresies to one another in quiet corners where they might hope to pass unnoticed.

Such being the temper of recent philosophical thought,² it is not altogether surprising that, until the publication of Dr. Lofthouse's study last autumn,³ not a single book had appeared in his own country on a thinker who was in his life-time acclaimed,

¹ See especially A. C. Ewing's article on "Meaninglessness" in *Mind*, July, 1937, p. 347-364.

² Lest it be supposed that the picture has been painted in too sombre colours, let me quote the recent words of a very judicious philosopher, Professor H. H. Price: "The word 'metaphysical' is now almost a term of abuse. Hardly any reputable philosopher nowadays would dare to produce a metaphysical system". (*Horizon*. Vol. XIX, p. 72.)

³ *F. H. Bradley*. By W. F. Lofthouse, M.A., D.D., (Epworth Press. Philosophers Library Vol. I. 10s. 6d.)

almost unanimously, as the most eminent British philosopher of the age—indeed as the greatest British philosopher since David Hume. It is not surprising; but it is surely, on any showing, deplorable. It is a naive view of philosophy indeed which supposes that it can prosper without a study of its own history. And, at the very least, an honourable place in the history of philosophy can hardly be withheld from F. H. Bradley. It is not given to many philosophers to influence so powerfully the current of the best contemporary thinking as Bradley did in the field of moral philosophy by his *Ethical Studies*, in the field of logic by his *Principles of Logic*, and, above all, in the field of metaphysics by his *Appearance and Reality*.⁴

Dr. Lofthouse's volume would therefore deserve a warm welcome, even if it were less well-informed and less attractively written than it in fact is, as a tribute long owed by his countrymen to a great historical figure.⁵ But F. H. Bradley is, in my opinion, as in Dr. Lofthouse's, very much more than a great historical figure. He is a philosopher who can only seem obsolete to those who refuse the philosopher's primary task of thinking seriously and systematically about first principles. Nothing could be further from the truth than that the present generation of philosophers has "seen through" Bradley. They have not even *read through* him. It is simple matter of fact that the metaphysical treatise which Edward Caird (by no means a Bradley disciple) described on its appearance as "the greatest thing since Kant" is for the majority of philosophers to-day as though it had never been written. Not even the sufficiently rare combination of philosophic genius with a superb gift for literary form has been able to prevail against the doctrinaire persuasion that a work on metaphysics *must* be nonsense.

⁴ *Ethical Studies* appeared first in 1876, *Principles of Logic* in 1883, *Appearance and Reality* in 1893. Copious notes have been added by the author to later editions of these works; and to the second edition (1922) of the *Principles of Logic* he has appended twelve invaluable "Terminal Essays".

⁵ Greater generosity has been shown by the United States. Good books on Bradley have appeared there by Rudolf Kagey (*The Growth of F. H. Bradley's Logic*) in 1931, by R. W. Church (*Bradley's Dialectic*) in 1940, and by R. G. Ross (*Scepticism and Dogma*) also in 1940.

Though there are to-day some signs that the anti-metaphysical trend in philosophy has passed its zenith,⁶ I fear that Dr. Lofthouse cannot yet expect to find many readers among the philosophers. But he is entitled, I think, to hold higher hopes of the theologians. For though a philosopher may abjure the traditional problems of metaphysics and still exercise himself in a way that bears some resemblance to philosophy, the theologian who has lost interest in *God, Freedom and Immortality* has just ceased to be a theologian. Not, indeed, that theology has by any means remained unaffected by the sceptical spirit of the times. But in theology, inevitably, the spirit has manifested itself in a different form: not in scepticism about the reality of the super-sensible; not even in scepticism about the possibility of man's getting to know important things about this reality; but rather in scepticism about the efficiency of human reason as an instrument of super-sensible knowledge. And here Dr. Lofthouse has a strong card to play. He can certainly urge that a scepticism of this sort will not prevent the theologian from finding in the philosophy of Bradley a great deal to interest and excite him. For Bradley was hardly less concerned than, say, Kierkegaard or Karl Barth, though admittedly on very different grounds, to set due limits to the pretensions of the human reason.

In point of fact, Dr. Lofthouse is prepared to go a rather surprisingly long way in recommending the study of Bradley to the Christian theologian. He is well aware, naturally, that Bradley thinks it necessary to draw a sharp distinction between his Absolute, the supreme reality, and the God of theology. But in Dr. Lofthouse's view Bradley is here being untrue to his own deepest thought. His Absolute, Dr. Lofthouse contends, so far from being intrinsically incompatible with the creative and redemptive attributes of the Christian God, can be seen, when adequately

⁶ It is encouraging, for example, that there should now be fairly general agreement among Positivist thinkers that the Principle of Verifiability is not a proven truth, but rather a useful methodological postulate of philosophical inquiry. It should follow that metaphysical statements should be examined each on its own merits, and not summarily dismissed simply because they are "metaphysical".

thought out, actually to require such attributes. The conclusion to which Dr. Lofthouse's reflections lead him is "that Bradley's Absolute implies the Christian conception of God: that he stopped at the very point where consistency with his own argument would have bidden him advance".⁷

I cannot for my own part endorse this verdict; though I am sure that theologians will find much that is suggestive in the discussions that lead up to it. Dr. Lofthouse seems to me wholly right in stressing that Bradley was by nature deeply sympathetic towards religion. And there is, in my judgement, nothing in the considered conclusions of his philosophical meditations which need conflict with a profound religious experience. But Bradley's community of spirit is, I think, with the great mystics of all religions rather than with the orthodox theologian of any one. On Dr. Lofthouse's interpretation, he is a sort of orthodox Christian manqué. It is clearly a hard task to maintain this view of the man who wrote in the introduction to his main metaphysical work (and left standing there in subsequent editions) that "our orthodox theology on the one side, and our commonplace materialism on the other side. . . vanish like ghosts before the daylight of free sceptical enquiry".⁸ I think that Bradley meant what he said here, and that what he said is what the whole tenor of his philosophical thinking obliges him to say.

But my purpose in this article is not at all to pick a quarrel with the author of a timely and useful book. On the contrary, I aspire to be Dr. Lofthouse's ally in his laudable endeavour to revive interest in a great and neglected British philosopher. So far as the interest of the theologian is concerned, it is, of course, Bradley's metaphysic that comes "nearest the bone". I shall therefore use the space at my disposal to give a brief account of Bradley's metaphysical system, in the hope that some of the thoughts to which attention is directed may seem to the reader important enough to call for a study of them in their original

⁷ p. 246.

⁸ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 5. The pagination of this and of all other quotations from *Appearance and Reality* is that of the *Seventh Impression*.

setting. Perhaps I should add that I shall concentrate upon bringing out what I take to be the generating principles of Bradley's system, rather than upon completing a comprehensive catalogue of his specific doctrines. This method of procedure seems to me imperative; for unless one can get right "inside" Bradley's thought, much of his specific doctrine is apt to appear almost wantonly paradoxical. And there is no way known to me of getting inside a philosopher's thought save patient research into the ideas which lie at its roots.

It is, in my opinion, not easy to exaggerate the importance of laying firm hold at the outset upon the right logical order of Bradley's thought. Criticisms of Bradley often fall ludicrously wide of the mark because the critic has never really succeeded in seeing why Bradley came to say what he did say. For this, the critics are not wholly to blame. The order of exposition in *Appearance and Reality* is not, I think, that most conducive to giving the reader a clear, and early, insight into the basic premises which underlie the argument. On the other hand—perhaps because he himself became aware of this defect—Bradley frequently goes out of his way in his later writings to give explicit directions concerning the real order of his metaphysical thought. I quote one of many such passages, taking it from *Note A* of the invaluable *Appendix* which Bradley added to later editions of *Appearance and Reality* :

And since I have been taken to build upon assumptions which I am unable to recognize, I will here repeat what it is I have assumed. I have assumed first that truth has to satisfy the intellect, and that what does not do this is neither true nor real. This assumption I can defend only by showing that any would-be objector assumes it also. And I start from the root idea of experience, which is at once positive and ultimate. Then I certainly do not go on to assume about being that it must be self-contained, simple or what not? — but I proceed in another manner. I take up certain facts or truths (call them what you please) that I find are offered to me, and I care very little what it is I take up. These facts or truths, as they are offered, I find my intellect rejects, and I go on to discover why it rejects them. It is because they contradict themselves. They offer, that is, a complex of diversities conjoined in a way which does not satisfy my intellect, a way which

it feels is not its way and which it cannot repeat as its own, a way which for it results in mere collision.⁹

Clearly what is all-important here — it is, indeed, the very Archimedes' lever on which his whole construction turns — is Bradley's view of what constitutes contradiction. Almost everyone is ready to accept in some form or another the authority of the law of contradiction. But in *what* form is another matter. The form in which Bradley interprets it in the *Note* just referred to (a *Note* entitled "Contradiction and the Contrary" which in a dozen close-packed pages comes near to giving the whole core of his philosophy) leads straight to the most momentous consequences. I must therefore, I fear, beg the reader to endure at the outset a considerable stretch of somewhat abstract and arid logical analysis. A clear comprehension of what Bradley means by the "contradictory", and of why he gives to it this specific meaning, seems to me quite indispensable to any real understanding of the central doctrines in his philosophy.

Bradley begins the *Note* by calling attention to the difficulty of formulating the Law of Contradiction in any way which will not "threaten us with an unmeaning circle". "A thing cannot be or do two opposite things at once and in the same respect". But what do we mean here by "opposite"? Are "opposites" not just differences which we find we cannot combine in our thought?—in fact, differences that *contradict* one another? If so, we are left just where we were, with the problem still on our hands of stating the law in terms of which differences *are* opposites, *cannot* be combined; i.e. with the problem of stating the Law of Contradiction.

But if the term "opposite" cannot enter helpfully into our definition, can the Law be formulated in terms of the combination of mere "differences"? At first sight this is not promising. For are we not in *every* judgement "combining differences"? Bradley agrees, indeed insists, that we are; that the tautological "A is A", since it involves no movement of thought whatsoever, is not even a possible form of judgement. Nevertheless we *can*,

⁹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 569-70.

Bradley believes, find a valid formulation in terms of mere "differences", and we can find one in no other way. He proceeds to state it as follows: "A thing cannot without an internal distinction be (or do) two different things, and differences cannot belong to the same thing in the same point unless in that point there is diversity. The appearance of such union may be fact, but is for thought a contradiction".¹⁰

The key words in this definition are "without an internal distinction". What Bradley is saying is that our thought can, indeed, unite differences in a subject, but not *simply*, not "in and as a bare conjunction". It can unite them only if the subject is taken as providing from itself, by distinction within itself, a *ground for their union*. "For thought demands to go *proprio motu*, or, what is the same thing, with a ground or reason". This demand for a "ground" for the connexion of differences is of the very essence of thinking, and forbids us to accept any connexion as in the end mere "brute fact". That the demand is intrinsic to the intellect is obscured for us in ordinary experience, since there our thinking is guided primarily not by the motive of theoretical satisfaction but rather by the needs of practical life, and we are content to stop where this end is adequately served. But it is plain enough in those activities of thought, such as science and philosophy, in which truth rather than practical convenience is our aim, and in which, therefore, if anywhere, we might expect to discover the authentic nature of the intellect's demands. In science and philosophy "brute facts" are not just "accepted". On the contrary, intellectual unrest persists so long as we see no way to deliver them from this status. "Brute facts" are for science and philosophy *problems*: problems not solved until we have mediated the "bare conjunction" through some apparently adequate "ground". The belief that "brute facts" (e.g. the greenness of this leaf) are ever just *given* to us, as direct self-revelations of the real about which there is nothing more to be said, is an illusion. Diversities are never presented to us in *bare* conjunction. "What is given is a presented whole, a sensuous total in which these characters are found; and beyond

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 562.

and besides these there is always given something else",¹¹ and these characters "are not, when there, as they are when you by an abstraction have taken them out". Always there is present this "background", which "must be taken as a condition of the conjunction's existence". The so-called "brute fact" is, in short, a mere abstraction.

Herein, then, in Bradley's view, lies the real essence of "contradiction"—in uniting differences *simply*, or *at a point without internal diversity*, or *in and as a bare conjunction* (the three expressions are equivalent). It is true, of course, that we often cannot (strictly speaking, as will appear later, we *never* can) find an adequate ground for their union within the subject. We seek for such a ground by attempting so to "enlarge" the subject that it expands into a system in which the differences may be seen to be intelligibly connected as mutually implicatory elements. But even if we find ourselves at a loss where precisely to look for a further ground, we are not on that account obliged to fall into sheer contradiction by affirming the differences in bare conjunction. We can avoid contradiction by affirming the conjunction not as bare, but as conditioned (we know not how) by the "unknown background". But we should not omit to recognize that when the unknown conditions have been completely filled in, the complex of terms-in-relation as we originally apprehended it may have undergone much modification, and indeed may have become radically transformed.¹²

The trouble is, however—and we begin to see at this point how pregnant with consequences for metaphysics is Bradley's analysis of the contradictory—that we *never can* logically escape from a reference to this "unknown background". We cannot in the end logically assert any connexion save as subject to this unknown conditioning. This follows directly if we accept Bradley's thesis that the intellect cannot, *qua* intellect, unite diversities as they stand, in bare conjunction, but must, to satisfy its own inherent demand, proceed "discursively", seeking some ground in which the terms may be seen to be related intelligibly. The

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 564.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 564.

importance of this implication — for what is being alleged is nothing less than the incurable incapacity of the intellect to apprehend the truly real—requires that we should attempt some elucidatory comment.

Confronted with a conjunction of differentials, the intellect, according to Bradley, feels impelled to seek some ground in terms of which the union is intelligible. This is its characteristic procedure. But, Bradley insists, the road which the intellect takes, and must take, is a road which never can lead to the full intellectual satisfaction craved. It is a road whose length is infinite. With the discovery of any sort of ground the intellect achieves, indeed, a partial satisfaction. But only *partial*. For the ground is never more than a *partial* ground. We can never get the kind of ground in which the intellect could rest — a self-explanatory system in which the differences are intelligibly related as mutually implicative elements. And the reason is not far to seek. Any ground we may appeal to will always, in the nature of the case, be something beyond, and so far other than, the differences to be connected through it. And if so, it is, from one point of view, but a *new* diversity, which “itself calls for synthesis in a fresh point of unity”. “Hereon, because in the intellect no intrinsic connexions were found, ensues the infinite process”.¹³ There is for the intellect no final halting-place. Every achievement of a ground is in the nature of the case the basis of a further problem.

The root difficulty (to repeat) is the intellect's incapacity to accept *any* union of differentials, no matter *what*, as it stands. A self-explanatory system, one which raised no further questions for the intellect about the grounding of the connexions within it, is an ideal that is unrealizable. Thus it would require (among other conditions) that the main structural principles of the system be self-evident truths; stateable in propositions in which subject and predicate, though different, are yet acceptable to the intellect in the bare conjunction in which they stand. But *are* there any such systems, or such propositions? Bradley is satisfied that the

¹³ *Ibid.* p 568.

answer is, No. And he would claim that in the text of his logical and metaphysical treatises he has justified this answer by showing ineradicable defects in even the most promising candidates for such a rôle.

Perhaps a concrete illustration (though it is bound to be inadequate to the complexities of a special case) may not be unwelcome in rounding off this very abstract discussion. Its purpose is to bring out the progressive, but in principle unending, character of the search for an explanatory ground that really does finally "explain." We find, let us say, that the sliding roof of our car is sticking, and we ask ourselves why?—what is the ground for this connexion of differentents? A first naive answer, which would satisfy only the most transient interest, might be, "Because it's been hot weather recently, and the roof generally sticks in hot weather." But why should hot weather make it stick? Because in hot weather some of the metal parts become enlarged and mis-shapen. But why should hot weather cause this to happen to the metal? Because metals tend to expand when subjected to heat. But why should heat expand metals? Because "heat" is a form of energy, and the livelier motions and more violent "jostlings" of the constituent molecules of the metal as it becomes "hotter" disturb the existing cohesions and create a "bulging" beyond the normal boundaries. But why—among innumerable "whys" that might here arise—should a moving body impinging upon a second moving body affect the motion of the second body at all? By this stage we are approaching the region of primary physical laws, and there is no point in our trying to push the illustration further. It is perfectly clear, whether with respect to "primary laws of motion" or with respect to any "para-mechanical" laws to which we might attempt a further appeal, that they are *not self-evident truths*; not propositions in which subject and predicate are intelligibly united. We have, in the course of our search after adequate ground, acquired a progressive intellectual satisfaction by seeing the coherence of our "given" connexion with a progressively wider range of connexions in the total field of our experience. But no matter how far we go, the complex system of differences before our mind fails to be self-explanatory: it sets

us in principle the same problem as faced us at the beginning. The only way to deal with the situation when we have reached the stage at which no further ground is visible is to affirm the complex then before us not as a bare conjunction, but as mediated by undiscovered conditions in the still unknown background of the real, and as subject to whatever modifications the filling in of these conditions may entail.

The worst is now over! Bearing these logical prolegomena in mind, we can proceed to a survey of Bradley's main metaphysical doctrines with reasonable hope of seeing them in their proper context in Bradley's thought.

Book I of *Appearance and Reality* is entitled "Appearance". Its object is to show that the ways in which we commonly try 'o understand the world, the leading concepts we employ, give us a world not of "reality" but of "mere appearances". It is in essence a criticism of our finite categories of thought. Substantive and Adjective, Space, Time, Change, Motion, Cause, Activity, Self-hood—all in turn are subjected to rigorous examination, and all without exception are found to be incapable of statement in any form which escapes self-contradiction. But their respective defects are not, for Bradley's diagnosis, unrelated to one another. They have a common root in the *relational form* that is inherent in our thinking. Whatever has meaning for our minds must wear the garb of "terms in relation". But "terms in relation", it turns out, on analysis, is a self-contradictory notion, involving us, when we try to think it out, in an infinite regress. Nothing presented in this form, therefore, can be "real": for what is real must at least be self-consistent. The objects of our ordinary, and also of our scientific, apprehension must one and all be relegated to the status of mere "appearance".

The chapter ("Relation and Quality") in which this basic thesis is argued has always been recognized as the key chapter of Book I. As is to be expected, it has been vigorously assailed from many quarters. But we find in these criticisms, it seems to me, perhaps the outstanding example of failure on the part of Bradley's opponents to recognize the dominating rôle in his thought played by his account of contradiction. It must suffice

here if I try to show this in reference to the passage in Bradley's argument which has excited the most violent objection.

Bradley has been arguing that relations without qualities are unintelligible, just as qualities without relations are unintelligible. He now propounds the view that even *with* qualities relations are unintelligible.

But how the relation can stand to the qualities is, on the other side, unintelligible. If it is nothing to the qualities, then they are not related at all; and, if so, as we saw, they have ceased to be qualities, and their relation is a nonentity. But if it is to be something to them, then clearly we now shall require a *new* connecting relation. For the relation hardly can be the mere adjective of one or both of its terms; or, at least, as such it is indefensible. And being something itself, if it does not itself bear a relation to the terms, in what intelligible way will it succeed in being anything to them? But here again we are hurried off into the eddy of a hopeless process, since we are forced to go on finding new relations without end. . . The problem is to find how the relation can stand to its qualities; and this problem is insoluble.¹⁴

The stock answer to this argument is that "how the relation can stand to its qualities", so far from being an insoluble problem, is not a problem at all. It is only made to seem so because Bradley treats a relation as though it were a kind of thing or quality. But the nature of a relation is simply to *relate*. That is its whole being and its whole business. And the answer to the question "how the relation can stand to its qualities" is just that it stands in the way of relating them. Bradley's problem is wholly factitious.

This is plausible. But I venture to think that it is also superficial. Bradley's argument does *not* require the treatment of a relation as though it were a kind of thing or quality. All it requires is the treatment of it (for the reasons given) as *something not resolvable into the terms* as the "mere adjective of one or both of them", but as something *other* than them, a third "somewhat". If it be conceded that the relation is at least *this* (and so much seems very difficult to dispute), then the law of contradiction in the form in which we have seen that Bradley interprets it gives him his conclusion straightway. For "being something itself",

¹⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 32-3.

the relation will be "a new diversity" which the intellect is required to hold in one with other diversities (the terms): and to unite these simply, as they stand, is to fall into the contradiction of asserting differences in bare conjunction. In other words, there is a problem as to how the "diversity" which is the relation is related to the "diversities" which are the terms related; and since the attempt to solve it sets the intellect upon an infinite regress, it is a problem which, as Bradley says, is insoluble.

Bradley's dialectic of terms and relations, in so far as its reasoning is valid, reduces to mere appearance the whole world of objects as we ordinarily come to know it, whether through perception or through science. Does this entail that, for our minds, "reality" is not knowable at all? Bradley rejects any such suggestion unhesitatingly. Book II (with the encouraging title "Reality") proposes to show that we can legitimately assert several propositions about the general nature of the real.

In the first place, Reality is *self-consistent*. That the real is non-contradictory, and thus self-consistent, has been the tacit presupposition of the whole destructive argument of Book I. The proof of the presupposition is simply the fact that no one can advance a step in reasoning of any kind without assuming its validity.

Secondly, Reality is *one*. For the notion of a plurality of self-contained reals involves a contradiction. If we consider any finite object (A), it must stand in some sort of relation (B) to what is outside it (X). Now if that relation is in any measure an *internal* one (i.e. grounded in the nature of the terms related), then, since it belongs to the very "being" of A to be related to X, A cannot be an independent entity, real *per se*. Suppose, on the other hand, that the relation in which A stands to X is a purely *external* one. Then (if we symbolize "related to X" by B) when we assert this situation, we are uniting the subject A with the predicate B as *brute fact*, as a "bare conjunction of different". And this, as we have seen, is for the intellect a contradiction. The denial of purely external relations, then, follows directly from Bradley's analysis of the contradictory, and leads with equal directness to the conclusion that there cannot be a plurality of

independent reals. There is but *one* reality; the infinite Whole, the "Absolute".

Thirdly, Reality is *supra-relational*. For we have seen that any relational complex is inherently inconsistent. Hence the self-consistent reality, while it must certainly *include* relations (where else could relations fall but "within reality"?), must include them absorbed and transformed in a harmony which transcends the relational pattern—a "supra-relational" harmony.

Fourthly, Reality is *experience*. For, Bradley suggests, "we perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist, must be to fall within sentience." This does *not* mean, he insists, that one can attach no meaning to the idea of a "real" which is not somehow a state of one's self. Bradley is not a Solipsist. The "sentience" (or sentient experience) within which what is real must fall is not "my" or "your" experience, an experience, as it were, *adjectival* to a self. It is "experience" in a sense in which experience is prior to the distinction of self from not-self, and thus prior to any experience which we know as "our" experience. For it is Bradley's view that "self" and "not-self" are distinctions which emerge for us only *within* the "felt unity" of an "immediate experience." This felt unity, whether or not it also *precedes* the relational consciousness in time, is at any rate, Bradley believes, a constant enviroing condition of that consciousness. Relations and distinctions, the whole "content" of our "intellectual" world — including the "self"—fall within this unity of immediate experience. When it is understood that it is in this sense of the term "experience" that Bradley contends that Reality is of the nature of experience, his doctrine, though still difficult and doubtful, acquires some plausibility.

Finally, not merely is Reality (as theoretically self-consistent) of such a nature as to satisfy our intellectual impulse. We are entitled to believe also, Bradley holds, "that reality satisfies our whole being" ¹⁵—our aspirations after beauty and goodness no

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 158-9. See Chs. XIII and XIV for Bradley's statement and defence of his main propositions about the general nature of reality.

less than our aspiration after truth. The perfect fulfilment of our aspirations after beauty and goodness we can see on reflection to be attainable in nothing short of the completely harmonious experience which pertains to the Absolute alone. We cannot, indeed, argue *directly* from these aspirations to their satisfaction in the real. But we can, Bradley thinks, argue *indirectly*, from the conditions needful for the satisfaction of the *theoretical* aspiration, whose satisfaction in the real *is* necessary. One such condition is that there should persist in the Absolute no unsatisfied desire. For it is of the essence of unsatisfied desire to involve a clash between "sensation" and "idea": and how could the intellect at once be conscious of such a clash, an "unresolved discord," and also find in the Absolute complete intellectual satisfaction? The presence of unsatisfied desires in the Absolute seems incompatible with its being harmonious even theoretically, even for the intellect. Bradley concludes that there is good reason to believe that our aspirations after beauty and goodness do find their fulfilment in the Absolute; that in the Absolute lies the perfect consummation not merely of man's thought but also of his will and feeling.

It is important, however, that we should not interpret this last thesis in a way which forgets that Reality is "supra-relational." In that "Absolute Experience" in which thought, will and feeling all find their perfect fulfilment, no one of them, on Bradley's theory, can exist in the form in which we enjoy them in finite experience. Bradley expends particular care, and advances several arguments, to show that this is so in the case of thought: thereby, incidentally, distinguishing his own metaphysic sharply from that of Absolute Idealism. For (to follow what is perhaps the simplest of many lines of argument) all thinking involves judging, and in judging we predicate an "ideal content" (e.g. what we mean by "Napoleon being defeated at Waterloo") of a reality beyond it. The ultimate subject about which we judge is always "reality," and in the "subject" there is always an aspect not fully comprehended in the ideal content, something *other than* ideal content to which the ideal content is "referred." But if thought (as essentially judging) involves this inextinguishable reference to an

"other-than-thought," we clearly cannot identify thought with Reality.¹⁶

It is true, indeed, that thought *seeks* to "be" Reality: for thought does aim at, and can find no final resting-place short of, that completely harmonious whole which is the Absolute. But though thought thus aims at transcending the otherness of the real and becoming one with it, thought could achieve this only at the cost of committing suicide. For the presence of an "other" to thought is indispensable to thought in the form in which we alone know thought. Hence it would be as improper to say that the Absolute is "Thought" as it would be to say that it is "Will" or "Feeling"—which are also present in, and find their perfect fulfilment in, the supra-relational harmony of the Absolute experience.¹⁷

Bradley has found it possible, then, to tell us a good deal about the general nature of reality. But let us glance back now at "appearances", about which we have been told little so far save that, since they are inconsistent, they are not "real." Can Bradley's metaphysic do no more with appearances than just lump them all together as illusions?

This brings us to the important doctrine by which Bradley tries to bridge the gap between appearances and reality, the doctrine of "degrees of truth and reality."¹⁸ Appearances are *not* all alike and equally illusory. We can grade them according to the measure in which they approximate to reality. The criterion of the real is "self-consistency": and appearances, though they never can attain perfect self-consistency, do approach it in very varying degrees. Through the activity of the intelligence in science and philosophy our world of objects becomes for us less and less a congeries of isolated "bits and pieces," and more and more a relatively coherent system of interrelated parts. In the degree that our knowledge advances along this path towards systematic unity, in that degree our apprehension of the world has "truth,"

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Ch. XV. See especially pp. 168-9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* See especially pp. 170 ff.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Ch. XXIV.

and in that degree the objects as we apprehend them have "reality." It is still the case, of course, that since there must always remain undiscovered conditions in the "unknown background" of the real, our objects always remain "appearances." Some "supplementation and rearrangement" will always be necessary before the object can reveal itself as it really is in the Absolute experience. But it is reasonable to suppose that the supplementation and rearrangement required will be slighter where objects as we apprehend them have already attained a high measure of coherence or self-consistency.

Through the doctrine of "degrees," then, Bradley believes himself able to rescue his Absolute from the jibe which Schelling's provoked—of being "a night in which all cows are black!" The world of the savant is far nearer to the reality than the world of the untutored savage.

Our space requires that this sketch of Bradley's metaphysic should draw rapidly to a close. There is, however, one in particular among the remaining topics of importance upon which it will be expected that something should here be said—the place of "God" in Bradley's system.

Bradley's fundamental thought in this matter can be most succinctly presented in the form of a dilemma. Either we mean by God the Absolute, or we mean by him something less than the Absolute. If we mean the Absolute, then we cannot conceive him as a Being who enters into relations with man and the world, for in so regarding him we necessarily imply that he is *finite*. Yet a God who does *not* so enter into such relations is not the God of religion. If, on the other hand, we mean by God something less than the Absolute, then God is not the Supreme Reality upon which all things depend. Yet a God who is not the Supreme Reality is not the God of religion—if only because the "peace of God" which the religious man enjoys is founded upon the conviction that all things are "in God's hands". Hence whether we think God as the Absolute or as less than the Absolute, consistent thinking will not give us the God of religion. Is then the God of religion intrinsically inconsistent? In Bradley's

opinion there is no way of escape from this conclusion. Religion wants for the object of its worship *both* certain characteristics predicable only of the finite, and *also* certain characteristics predicable only of the Absolute. Rather than abandon either—for it feels both sets of characteristics to be of paramount value—it is content to ignore theoretical inconsistency and assert both at once.

But there is another side to the picture: a side to which greater prominence is given in Bradley's later *Essays on Truth and Reality*.¹⁹ Perfect self-consistency is not attainable by our finite minds in *any* sphere. We can accept the inconsistency of the religious consciousness and still ask, Where does it stand in the scale of truth and reality? And to this question Bradley's answer is emphatic. "There is nothing more real than that which comes in religion." "The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness, seeks he does not know what."²⁰ It would be otherwise, indeed, if the essence of religion were *knowledge*. But it is not. Religion is a matter of the *whole man*, not of the intellect alone. We may describe it as "the attempt to express the supreme reality of goodness through every aspect of our being". And, he adds, "so far as this goes, it is at once something more, and something higher, than philosophy".²¹

In this article I have limited myself strictly to exposition and interpretation of Bradley's metaphysical thought. Room for critical comment could only have been spared (or so it has seemed to me) at the cost of leaving the outline of Bradley's doctrines so shadowy, and their rationale so vague, that criticism would have approached dangerously near to being criticism *in vacuo*. At the present time, in my judgement, some slight aid to the understanding of Bradley is likely to be more serviceable than any attempt to show where he went wrong. Certainly, in abstaining from criticism, I by no means intend to imply that Bradley seems

¹⁹ Published in 1914. See especially Chs. I and XV.

²⁰ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 449.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 453.

to me infallible. There is, for example, I should agree, much that is open to serious question in the argument Bradley advances to prove that Reality must be of the nature of "experience". Another, and a much more far-reaching, criticism which I should myself endorse is that a philosophy for which reality is *supra*-relational, and for which our thinking is *relational* through and through, has no right to maintain that our thinking can discern "degrees of truth and reality". The gulf between appearances and reality has been made too broad to be thus bridged. And again there are obvious difficulties (though they are not, I think, insurmountable) about the kind of "truth" which Bradley can fairly claim for the judgements in which he states his own cardinal metaphysical propositions. They may be, as he holds, "intellectually incorrigible"; but one would have supposed that they are still vitiated by the defects which he finds inseparable from the judgement form as such. And once more, it seems to me more than doubtful whether religion can really be as unconcerned as Bradley would have us believe about a contradiction in its conception of God—even if the contradiction is merely "theoretical". It is true that the essence of religion is not "knowledge". But knowledge, I should have thought, at least *belongs* (with other modes of experience) to the essence of religion, and its inherent demands cannot be flouted without serious injury to the religious consciousness itself.

But when all just criticisms of Bradley have been given their due, much, very much, remains with which contemporary philosophy has to make its accounts: above all, perhaps, his analysis of the nature of contradiction, and his discussion of the implications of that analysis for knowledge of the real. And even if, in the end, criticism were to leave standing hardly anything of Bradley's specific doctrines, I for my part cannot doubt that the depth, the subtlety, the range, and the sheer technical mastery of his thinking, and the wit, the elegance, and the at times moving eloquence with which it is expressed, must ensure for Bradley a permanent place among the great names in British philosophy.

HUMAN REASON BROADLY CONSIDERED

By A. E. MACDONALD

IN his *Aids to Reflection*, Samuel Taylor Coleridge deprecates the use of the phrase "Human Reason" on the ground that "there neither is nor can be but one reason, one and the same, even the light that lighteth every man's individual understanding (discursus), and thus maketh it a reasonable understanding, discourse of reason." With all deference to so great a poet and thinker, it is not easy to see anything very wrong with the expression. Despite discordant theories, we know something positive about the working of the human mind. The material of thought, if we can except purely mathematical reasoning (and as to that a doubt has arisen) is gathered from sense perception, and analysed and classified by the understanding with the result that the particular is caught up by reason into the universal. Human thought operates in time, and in all reasoning processes, the conclusion, right or wrong, is reached by a series of steps. No one would say, least of all Coleridge, that the divine thought is a temporal process proceeding in stages, and not the apprehension *uno intuitu* of all being in its complete and timeless reality. Processes disparate in mode are to be discriminated in language. Reason in man, though his crowning glory, is at an infinite remove from the divine *insight*. Hence there seems nothing repugnant in speaking of *human* reason.

But Coleridge never, as did the eighteenth-century deists, so exalted reason as to make it the jail instead of the free field of man's spirit, nor did he, as David Hume did, write of reason as "the slave of the passions", or, as later William James did, subordinate it to the will, or, as Henri Bergson did, depress it in favour

of intuition. He kept a mean. His conception of reason was not the narrow view of the geometer, or the experimental scientist; and it had nothing in common with the eccentricities of much modern thought. He found a place within the reasoning process for the emotional side of man's nature—for the imagination (his own superb endowment he called his "shaping spirit") for the will, for intuition, for faith, for revelation from on high, and he made religion both the foundation and the keystone of all his thinking. He saw more clearly than any other of his generation that bare reason is barren unless it be energized by the whole personality of the living thinker.

It is true, of course, that imagination can be disorderly, the will perverse, intuition prove illusory, faith be no more than credulity, and an alleged revelation be plainly incredible, but each of these activities, if integral, are concomitants of reason, operative in their varying degrees and in their own right. They furnish the dynamic of thought, inspiring it, and carrying it onward to the realization, in practice, of truth, beauty and moral excellence. Without these activities there could be no great poetry or prose, no masterpieces of music, or architecture, or sculpture, or pictorial art, or even any applied mechanics; and there could be no noble characters among men to inspire and lead.

Even in scientific investigation the emotions have an important part to play, for what is an hypothesis, or an intuition, though it originate in prior brooding over and experimenting with a particular problem, but an imaginative movement *per saltum* to be justified subsequently at the bar of reason?

Yet it is also true that *mere* reason (the adjective is Kant's) can with Plato reach to the conception of the supreme good, and with Aristotle to the thought of extra-territorial movers, over-arched by the one supreme unmoved mover, and with Kant himself to the moral imperative. But except for rare spirits these are sterile conceptions. Life is action, and the true end of all thinking is right action. Man in the mass will rally to a symbol, suffer for a cause, die for a person, but do none of these things for an abstraction. Hence Cardinal Newman could write: "when our Lord came the last traces of the religious know-

ledge of former times were all but disappearing from those portions of the world in which the intellect had been active and had had a career”.

If it were true as some contend that reason is always exercised by the intellect in isolation, and not by man in the completeness of his personality, that is to say if its sole function is to deduce valid conclusions from verified facts after the manner of the scientists, or by induction to form concepts as do the metaphysicians, both within a framework of strict logic, then for the generality of mankind it would be as difficult to deny as to affirm the existence of God however conceived, and we should be condemned to frisk or fret according to temperament in a state of agnosticism concerning the reality of any such being, save in so far as the hardier and more impatient would break out stupidly into a profession of atheism. But as man is that is not his state. For the most part he acknowledges with more or less certitude, more or less of lip or heart service, that God is. Why should this be if aboriginally he was not impelled thereto by the very constitution of his being?

It has been well said that no man is an atheist all his life long. The hound of heaven dogs our footsteps, and when intermittently the practical atheist—the merely *verbal* atheist can be ignored—feels its warm breath upon him he doubts and fears. “Of all points of faith”, wrote Newman, “the being of a God is to my own apprehension encompassed with most difficulty and borne in upon our minds with the most power”.

Consider but three world religions, the Jewish, the Christian and the Muhammedan, all three centred in the being of one only, personal God, and it must be admitted that half the earth’s inhabitants are real or nominal theists. Whatever be the degree of assurance with which the tenets of these religions are held, and whatever be the quality of the observance of the ritual in which they are expressed, it is certain that their adherents do not deny the one or completely ignore the other. Surely it follows, since belief in God’s supremacy is conformable to reason, that there must be something arbitrary in the attempt to confine reason within the narrow bounds of ratiocination, a process incapable of performance except by those, comparatively few in number, who

have been trained to that exercise in the schools. Be it observed that the objection to such a restriction is not that ratiocination is an unimportant part of the reasoning process, but that being important it is but one of the constituents of the process as exercised by that complex entity the living soul. As well identify soul with the five senses as imprison it in a syllogism.

But what has been said does not mean that we are not to repudiate, and utterly condemn, the gross aberration of such a writer as D. H. Lawrence, who, in revolt from his one-time mentor, Sigmund Freud, found in the dark depths of our sub-conscious being, not the cess-pool of hatred, lust and cruelty that that somewhat dubious sage had done, but the primal source of all creative effort; and contemptuously dismissed the tyrant reason in favour of instinct and the emotions. "We can go wrong in our minds," wrote Lawrence, "but what our blood feels and believes is always true. The intellect is only a bit and bridle".

Yes, we err in excess as in defect, and it is imperative that we preserve the *aureum mediocritatem* of sanity. Man is both body and mind. We know the first by outward observation, and apprehend the second by self-knowledge aided by reflection, and the play of our emotions. But body and mind are not two things but one indivisible whole, each acting and re-acting on the other. "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder".

In the second chapter of the Hebrew book "Genesis" we are given in a figure the origin of man. It has its counterpart in a myth of the creation widely circulated in the East, but in this book it is for the first time related to a specific deity, Jahweh, the God of Israel. Within the compass of exactly twenty-seven words of austere reticence befitting the subject, we are told what we all know, what, so far as our *historical* knowledge goes, the first beings to attain the stature of man also knew, however darkly, namely that we did not beget ourselves but were begotten by Another. No bounds can be set to the onward march of science, but it is a fairly safe guess that we shall never know much more of our origin than this passage tells us. It is brief, but sufficient as a beginning for the good life—and the good death. *And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed*

into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.

Is it mere fancy that inclines to detect in these words not an adumbration of the modern evolutionary hypothesis but a suggestion of the parallel doctrine of development? First man the animal, then, at whatever interval of time, required or conjectured, man the living soul. Assuredly, they lend no support, nor does any part of scripture, to the fantastic notion that man at his first appearance was endowed with every sort of perfection. It is not on record that Charles Darwin, who in his humility, and by implication, confessed himself a mere schoolboy to old Aristotle, had any quarrel with them. Alfred Russell Wallace, contemporary worker with Darwin in the evolutionary field, certainly had not, nor had any of the great galaxy of Christian men of science before and after his day.

Suppose a person to have found intellectual salvation in what is known as Logical Positivism, *chose difficile à croire*, and, trying his hand at emending the passage quoted, to go no further than suggest that for "soul" the word "intellect" should be read. Would it not be apparent that the redactor's suggestion amounted to nothing more novel than the fallacy of substituting a part for the whole?

It may be objected that here we are dealing with a mere matter of words. Well, as to that what more can we deal with? We know things only by their names, singulars by sense perception, plurals by ratiocination. Words are the currency for the inter-communication of thought with other selves, our medium of exchange and measure of value. They are living things. Homer's frequent epithet for them is "winged". But words are more significant still. They have a numinous quality as the Latin *nomen-numen* clearly suggests. "Tell me I pray thee thy name" besought wrestling Jacob of his ghostly visitant, as though to have known that would have made everything clear. The request was refused, but nevertheless the Ineffable blessed the dreaming patriarch.

Again, when Moses, who in founding a religion created a nation, inquired on behalf of Israel the name of the God under whose compulsion he was moved to act, the brief, majestic answer given him was, "I am that I am", precluding any argument as

to his existence or his attributes. He was, in Blaise Pascal's phrase, *Deus Absconditus*, and such he remains. But in course of time he has graciously and progressively revealed himself to man's finite comprehension, adding much to Israel's knowledge and a great deal more to ours. To the Jew as to the Christian, he is the all powerful, the all wise, the all just, the all merciful, the creator and sustainer of everything that is, and his short name is—Love.

So words should be used with precision, never equivocally, always in their true etymological signification within the same context. Much of the misunderstanding and hostility that vexes the world derives from the wilful misuse of words.

Of things we know only the phenomena. We can investigate the essence of things, but in the end explication eludes us. *Omnia exeunt in mysterium. Noumena*, things as they are in themselves, cannot be completely known. The tables we sit at are not to us laymen the whirling masses of electrons and protons that they are to the thought of the modern physicist. But who shall say that the picture the physicist now forms of a table is an abiding picture that will never fade?

Not only do we know little of things as they truly are, but we can give no account for their existence as things, unless with the Christian believer we postulate a creator, or, with the late Sir James Jeans and his deity-shy confrères, a force manifesting itself in the universe like some transcendent geometrician, as little able to aid our moral and spiritual aspirations as any impersonal force can be.

But we know much more about other selves. We know other selves by acquaintance, and we know them the more intimately as the emotion of love increasingly enlivens and clarifies our understanding of their characters. We do not want to be told the height, or weight, or any other physical characteristic of a friend, interesting as these particulars may be in themselves, but, loving him, no slander can for a moment stand against that perfect knowledge which love has engendered. Our knowledge of God comes to us much in the same way as does our knowledge of our bosom friends. *Cor ad Cor loquitur.*

We may go further. What is it, in the broad, that differen-

tiates the ornithologist, the botanist or the zoologist from the bird-lover, the horticulturist or the stockbreeder? What but the fact that the first set of men deal with specimens to be dissected, compared, described and classified, while the second care for these living creatures, study their wants sympathetically and with understanding, so that they thrive under their hands, and, so to speak, respond to their overlords' kindly interest in them.

Protagoras, perhaps the first Greek to name himself a sophist, is reported to have said: "As to the Gods I know not if they exist or do not exist. So many things hinder knowledge, the difficulty of the subject and the shortness of human life". It is not apparent why difficulty in the subject matter, or the fewness of man's years, should of themselves preclude knowledge. Difficulty is one thing, doubt another. Difficulty stimulates, doubt paralyses action; and as the forgotten Bailey wrote: "We live in thoughts, not years". The great German scientist Max Planck took almost half a lifetime to perfect his Quantum theory, and Keats, prematurely cut off at twenty-six, left all the world his debtor. Whether the fame of the scientist will outlive that of the poet remains to be seen; for in science the knowledge of to-day is the ignorance of to-morrow, or, if that be judged too harsh an observation, the knowledge of an earlier investigator is carried on into the more comprehensive synthesis of a later, as great Newton's *Principia* is the foundation of Einstein's theory of Relativity; whereas the shaped imaginations of a poet, if so be they are vehicles of beauty and truth, are, as Keats himself wrote, "a joy for ever".

As everyone knows, Protagoras was a professional teacher of the practical arts of life, and held in such esteem by his practically minded contemporaries that he could demand enormous fees from the pupils who swarmed upon him. Perhaps for that reason, and because he was of a wilfully sceptical cast of mind, he was unmoved by the revolution in thought that in his day was transforming the early amoral, but on the whole kindly nature religion of old Greece into an ethical monotheism. It remained for Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the great Greek poets, and later the neo-platonists, of whom Plotinus is undisputed chief, to dissipate on grounds of reason the scepticism of the sophist.

In the opening chapter of his great prophecy, the first Isaiah invites wayward Judah to a debate with Jahweh, Israel's God. "Come now let us reason together saith the Lord." But in truth the invitation is as old as man himself, for history has no record of a time when *un nommé Dieu* did not summon his devôtees and critics to his audience chamber. How does one debate with the Most High? What is the court etiquette to be observed, and what form does the argument take? As to etiquette, that will vary with the human disputant, and range all the way between a loutish insolence and offering the due civility of the bowed head and bent knee; but as to the form of debate we are fortunate to have in the dramatic poem entitled *Job* a fully detailed account of the procedure.

The subject set for debate in the drama, epic or dialogue of *Job* is the strange fact of unmerited human suffering. The problem was insoluble to the writer of that day, fixed as he was in the belief that all suffering is punishment for national or personal sin, and but darkly explicable to us even now in the additional light radiated from the cross of Christ. The prologue suggests that Job was selected as a sort of martyr witness to Jahweh's righteousness, but, if so, he was unaware of the rôle he was cast for.

Now nothing could be more unlike a Platonic dialogue, or a Euclidean solution of a geometrical problem, than the method and matter of this poem, except that its magnificent imagery and haunting verbal felicities surpass even Plato's own consummate artistry. There are but two axioms, Job's conviction of Jahweh's righteousness and his conviction of his own personal integrity. Of argument as the logicians understand it there is little or none.

Job argues with Jahweh as the common man argues, as any non-scholastic would argue, as anyone might argue if he were caught up in a fate beyond his understanding. He suggests the central figure of the Laocoön statuary with its visage distorted by pain, exerting all its ebbing strength to relieve itself of a constricting coil on one side only to suffer a worse constriction on the other. Job is in turn sarcastic and polite; rebellious and submissive; self-assertive, self-pitying and self-justificatory; angry and blasphemous, and, once, he pleads for sympathy; yet to the

central question there is no positive answer. But in the end there is an answer, and it is both surprising and satisfying. The answer came to Job not in the dust of verbal argument, but, as we may believe, in the stillness of the night when he was alone with the Alone. Suddenly he sees Jahweh in his unapproachable holiness and wisdom, and himself in all his imperfection and ignorance. His rectitude now appears as mere ritualism, and his good deeds as conventional morality; and he abhors himself in dust and ashes.

How came Job to that knowledge and attitude? By imagination, by intuition, by an up-surge from his unconscious self, in a dream? May be! but more certainly from his moral self, from that practical reason that "lighteth every man that cometh into the world", by which alone God can reveal himself to men. It came to Job as Jahweh's revelation to him in his dire need, and when it came it was final.

The arrangement of the poem is chaotic, and it lacks literary unity, but it would be psychologically fitting if at this point we supposed Job to break into his triumphant declaration of faith: I know . . . "I know that my Vindicator liveth . . ."

Now the exegesis of this passage (c. xix, vv. 25-27) is difficult, indeed the first half of v. 26 almost defies conjecture. We should therefore be grateful to the good and learned men who have been at pains to explain that the passage does not mean what it appears to mean. But the Catholic Church, looking backward from her high vantage ground, has garnered the fruit promised by the fine flower of Job's unconquerable faith in Jahweh's righteousness, and has long ago added to Job's words a meaning impossible to an Arabian sheik, *circa* 500 B.C.; and Christian faith being toughly resilient can take the clouts of the critics comfortably on its gloves, so to speak. Suppose one of the ultra-radical exegetes (no sarcasm is here intended) had encountered the late Louis Pasteur, and asked him what he understood the passage to mean, it would be quite in keeping with what we know of the mind and character of that towering scientific genius if we imagine him to have replied: "Yes, M'sieu—that passage. Why, M'sieu, it means to me what it means to our dear Breton peasant women."

And if, further, we suppose him to have been pressed to say exactly what the Breton peasants understood the passage to mean, to have replied banteringly, in Disraelian fashion: "Well, as to that, M'sieu, our Breton peasants never say"; or proudly to have dismissed his interlocutor in the words of the aged Polycarp: "If thou art worthy thou shalt know."

We are told that Communism, and its scotched but by no means destroyed variants, National Socialism and Fascism, exhibit all the characteristics of messianic religion, and are to be welcomed as superseding the outworn Christian faith. Certainly, they have brought colossal suffering in their train, as in the early days of its promulgation did Christianity itself, with the somewhat important difference that in the latter case the Christians themselves were the sufferers. It is truer to say that these *fin de siècle* creeds, the monstrous products of false philosophy, are imposed by a minority of amoral men for the satisfaction of their lust for place and power, and the enslavement of the millions caught up in their tyranny: "Where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty". What liberty remains to the congeries of peoples in the vast territory of the U.S.S.R.? Let the state police, the concentration camps, "thick as autumnal leaves . . . in Vallambrosa," the regimentation of the helpless masses, the sudden disappearance of those found inconvenient to the ruling oligarchy, the controlled press and radio, the censorship of thought, and the tortuous diplomacy of the now hydra-headed Czar, conducted with utter disregard to truth and the pledged word make answer. Surely, never since Satan fell

*From morn to dewy eve
A summer's day*

has unreason, and its progeny manifold evil, been enthroned as in the Kremlin now!

Our clamant need to-day is that reason should be loosed from its fetters howsoever and by whomsoever forged, and that all the peoples should be made free. Nothing can effect this deliverance in its completeness but a return *en masse* of mankind to the "faith once for all delivered to the saints"; but a true understanding of the scope and complexity of our reasoning

powers, and their uncontrolled exercise, will carry us some distance on the way to emancipation.

The writer is one of a great concourse of people spiritually kin throughout the world—and they not the least wise, or the least sensitive of mankind to world-movements—who believes that our Christian civilization, founded at such great cost, with such difficulty preserved, and still so precariously poised, is destined not long hence to face the severest test it has yet encountered. By Christian civilization he does not mean what it now is, though it be incomparably the best the world has yet known, but what under the providence of God it may become. There are those, mainly in the camp of our great Captain's foes, who insist that the Christian Church should eschew politics. For his own part he rejoices that the guardian on the watch-tower in Rome, darting his unscaled eyes over the universal dominion committed to him as *servus servorum Dei*, has, not for the first time, intervened with decisive effect, as in the recent Italian elections. Christ, like the Cominform, claims an absolute dominion, and, if his kingdom is to be preserved, it is not only the central citadel of faith that must be guarded, but also the far-flung outer breastworks — the God-given liberties of man in their pristine integrity. If the battle which he envisages with the gravest concern, knowing what it will mean of suffering and destruction, and endless night should ever be joined—and he prays that it never will—he does not doubt that the millions of great Rome's separated brethren will rally to her side, or that God's Englishmen, as our Milton called them, will lead the van; and so realize as never yet the Master's purpose of "one fold and one shepherd". Still a question, not of his own posing, insistently sounds in his ears: "Nevertheless when the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth"? And so he concludes with four great seminal pronouncements. They can never be recalled too often, or pondered too much, for, heeded, they will lead all mankind to life eternal.

"The thief cometh not, but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy, I am come that they might have life and have it more abundantly". (Our Lord Jesus Christ, per St. John the Theologian.)

“Not by dialectic has it pleased God to bring salvation to his people”. (St. Ambrose of Milan.)

“Thou has made us for thyself and our heart is restless till it rest in thee”. (St. Augustine of Hippo.)

“In his will is our peace”. (Dante Alighieri.)

THE HIGH CHURCH TRADITION IN CORNWALL, 1662—1831

By H. MILES BROWN

THAT ecclesiastical viewpoint we term to-day the High Church tradition lay in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in a period of relative obscurity and decline between the two great peaks of prosperity in the days of Anne and the Tractarian Revival. It forms for that reason a fascinating study, and Cornwall is an interesting area for such a research.¹

In quiet parsonages and secluded manor houses traditions of strong Churchmanship and seemly worship were maintained with sturdy loyalty to the Prayer-book, although indifference, coldly reasoned views of religion, or "enthusiasm" claimed the masses. The threads ran through, linking the Caroline divines with those of the days of Anne and with the leaders of the Oxford Movement.

It is possible to trace a strength in theology and practice which corresponds with the modern understanding of the term "High Church", finding the presence of this "Catholic" outlook particularly in the field of doctrine. It appears especially in the Arminian view of Christ's work (Cornish Evangelicals inclined towards a moderate Calvinism); in the appeal to the Fathers and to the Catechism rather than to the Reformers and the Thirty-Nine Articles; in the idea of Church authority and ministerial succession as derived from Christ's commission; in the attachment to the Liturgy, especially to daily or frequent service; in a view of the Sacraments which included Baptismal Regeneration and an objective gift in the Eucharist; in the observance of

¹ This article may be viewed as complementary to a former article in *The Church Quarterly Review* (No. 283, vol. CXLII, 78 f. Ap./June 1946) entitled "The Rise of Methodism in Cornwall".

rubric and sometimes in the use of ornament in a time of bareness and neglect, as well as in a personal piety modelled on ancient pattern and devotional literature.

The obscurity which covers the tradition so far as details are concerned is enhanced by the fact that the High Church outlook was reserved and impersonal, standing in vivid contrast to the later Methodist and Evangelical enthusiasm which produced such a spate of autobiographies and diaries of Methodistical "saints". Further the High Church clergy were, till a late date, prevented by their own tastes from anticipating or imitating the clerical associations such as the "Parsons' Club" inspired by Samuel Walker at Truro, 1750-1760.²

At the Restoration this school had been swept into a position of power on the full tide of reaction from Puritanism. Much rebuilding of Churchmanship and many problems faced the bishops of this period, it being sufficiently difficult to teach and to justify to the rank and file the principles of the Church and her practice, and to obtain the minimum of conformity to rubrical decency.³ The influence of the High Church view was forwarded by the appointments of Bishops of Exeter sympathetically inclined. Anthony Sparrow became diocesan in 1667 with a reputation for strong Churchmanship firmly established by his "Rationale" on the Prayer-book, and his primary charge to his new diocese is in the same tradition.

With the appointment of Jonathan Trelawny, bishop 1688-1707, Cornwall had one of her sons on the episcopal throne of Exeter. Indeed, it was for a while as though the county had her own bishop, since much of Trelawny's time was spent at the ancestral home of Trelawne in the parish of Pelynt.

Of the ordinations by this bishop, 53 out of a total of 78

² See *The Church Quarterly Review*, No. 289, vol. CXLV, p. 80, Oct./Dec. 1947.

³ Even the surplice. Denis Grenville complained of his curate at Kilkhampton officiating without the surplice "to please the dow-baked people of that country". *Remains*, vol. II, p. 158 (1865). There are several examples of Communion rails surviving from the late seventeenth century in Cornwall; Altarnon, 1684; North Petherwin, 1685, etc. Madron has some handsome Queen Anne rails and screen work.

took place in Cornwall, 35 in the private chapel at Trelawne, dedicated by the bishop in 1701, and 18 in the parish church.⁴ This bishop undoubtedly adhered strongly to the idea of the Church's divine commission, expressed and guaranteed by the episcopal succession from the apostles, and asserts the "certainty, nay, perhaps the necessity, of our hierarchy" for true ministry.⁵ Trelawny himself had no difficulty in conforming to the altered state of things when James II abdicated. The High Church tradition was dealt a blow, however, with the secession of the non-jurors, since these men were inclined generally to the Catholic viewpoint. In Cornwall the names of two clerical nonjurors survive—James Beauford, Rector of Lanteglos-by-Camelford, and Thomas Polwhele, Vicar of Newlyn. A Cornishman of well-known family, Denis Grenville, Dean of Durham and great "rubric man", himself for a while Rector of Kilkhampton,⁶ also gave up his preferments to keep his oath's sanctity, dying in exile in France in 1703.⁷

The episcopal appointments made by Anne were usually satisfactory to the High Churchmen, and Offspring Blackall, Bishop of Exeter 1708-1716, carried on the traditions set up by his predecessors. Under the Georges, however, the dreary succession of Whig nominees was only partially enlivened by Lavington's undignified wrangle with Wesley,⁸ by Frederick Keppell's determined efforts to visit the whole of his vast diocese, by the gentle affability of John Ross, and by the unexpectedly strong Churchmanship of Christopher Bethell; he, however, was bishop but for a few months, being succeeded in 1831 by the redoubtable Henry Phillpotts.

Meanwhile the clergy leaned in great measure towards strong and authoritarian ideas of the Church and ministry. From occasional and passing references it may be inferred that high views of their office were held by some among the clergy. For

⁴ Boggis, *History of the Diocese of Exeter*, 1922, 443.

⁵ *Sermon and Charge to Clergy of Winchester*, 1708, 24.

⁶ But apparently non-resident.

⁷ Ornsby *Remains*, p. xlv, vol I.

⁸ Lavington, *Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared*, 1749, 1751.

instance, Jonathan Dagge, Rector of Endellion and Vicar of Fowey, preaching in 1713 before the Visitation gathering at Truro, referred to his brethren as those "who have the honour to wait at the Altar, who are the Ministers of Christ, and Stewards of the Mysteries of God".⁹ Sentiments which occur naturally to the High Church mind are to be found in a sermon before the archdeacon and the assembled clergy at another visitation, that of the Pydar deanery in 1736.¹⁰ William Borlase, the antiquary, could appeal to his sacerdotal authority to excommunicate a certain Mr. Pokenhorne, leader of trouble in his parish of St. Just-in-Penwith;¹¹ this resort to clerical power stands in strong contrast to his brother Walter Borlase's magisterial attempt to detain Wesley. But then, Walter was a zealous Whig.

The connexion of some of the adherents of the High Church school with the Jacobite cause was disastrous. There was considerable support in Cornwall for the Pretender, and many of advanced views were in sympathy. In 1715 industrious propaganda went on among the miners that their Church was in danger from the Whigs;¹² on the death of Anne, James III was, it seems, actually proclaimed King at St. Columb, while as a precaution in view of Cornwall's Jacobitism several whose loyalty was suspect were taken into custody. Among these was Sir Francis Vyvyan, of Trelowarren, who was put under guard as he was about to read daily Evensong to his family in the private chapel.¹³ The Georgian bishops looked with suspicion on the clergy as having aided the friends of the Pretender,¹⁴ and henceforth the men of High views tended to fall back on the defensive, though the Bangorian controversy inspired some to outspoken defence of the Catholic nature of the Church of England.¹⁵

⁹ *Nature and Eternal Duration of Christ's Kingdom*, 1713, 19.

¹⁰ MS. in Truro Cathedral Library; preacher unknown.

¹¹ *Borlase of Borlase*, 1888, 189.

¹² *Journal Royal Inst. Cornwall*, 68 (1921), 554.

¹³ Polwhele, *History of Cornwall*, 1816, iii, 102n.

¹⁴ Reynolds, *Short Hist. Anc. Diocese of Exeter* 1895, 394.

¹⁵ Anon (C. Willis) *Estab. Ch. the True Cath. Ch.* 1718.

From about 1715 onwards to the closing decades of the century a decline may be traced in the vitality of the tradition, though it was slow. The conviction with which its principles were held and their meaning faded. Clergy took up defence of the Hanoverians and Latitudinarian opinions,¹⁶ Communion became fewer and more sparsely attended,¹⁷ and sermons dwelt upon "the propriety of reasonable creatures praising God"¹⁸ rather than the mysteries of faith. But this gradual decline was not unobserved, and efforts were made for instance to increase the frequency of Communion and raise prevailing standards.¹⁹

In other directions, too, some cherished the old traditions. They observed the Church's fasts, as the Vicar of Bodmin did in 1700;²⁰ they presented costly plate for the Altar, like that at Fal-mouth (1719) dedicated to the "Eucharisticall worship" in the parish church of King Charles the Martyr there.²¹ They still kept up daily or frequent recitation of the Prayer-book offices, a few parishes having daily service as late as 1744,²² and many having two or more week-day services until a much later date. In some larger houses daily offices were said with the family, as at Trelowarren in 1715.

The earlier background of the Evangelical leader Samuel Walker of Truro was almost certainly High Church, and after his ministry at St. Mary's had begun he maintained frequent week-day offices, the observance of the calendar and saints' days, carefully explaining the Church's Liturgy to his hearers.²³

Instances can be quoted of the survival of ancient seemly ornament such as the font cloths at St. Ives and Madron-with-Morvah-and-Penzance. The Terrier of 1765 at St. Ives lists an array of plate, linen, altar "carpets", and candlesticks of almost

¹⁶ Sermons at Penzance by Stephen Lobb, 1717.

¹⁷ Exeter Visitation Replies.

¹⁸ Sermon by Wm. Tremenheere at Madron, 1789.

¹⁹ At St. Austell, Penryn and Talland, etc.

²⁰ Maclean, *Trigg Minor*, 1873, i, 337.

²¹ Registers.

²² Exeter Visitation Replies; Ladock, St. Ives, St. Columb, and Launceston.

²³ Edwin Sidney, *Life of Samuel Walker*, 1838.

medieval proportions,²⁴ and other examples might be adduced. But the survival or use of such things is not a reliable guide to the survival of the High Church tradition, since it would not always follow that in such cases the ornaments would be used with any conscious understanding of their meaning. Nevertheless the Communion Table was on the whole the centre of rather more care and richness than is commonly supposed,²⁵ and from this and the frequency of eighteenth-century gifts of Altar plate we may judge that the Eucharist, though regrettably infrequent by modern standards, was in many places none the less valued. And at least the Sunday service was not entirely divorced from eucharistic ideas in that the Ante-communion was part of the morning service, which is not always the case to-day.

Sweeping aside the mass of interested literature produced by those desiring to cast shadows on the middle-eighteenth-century church in Cornwall, the impression is gained of the presence of a sturdy, reserved, Prayer-book Churchmanship of a strong type, smug and respectable perhaps among its family pews, its candelabra, and its gorgeous altar "carpets" and pulpit cloths but still exerting a hold—albeit a loosening one—on a large proportion of the population. The place of the Anglican Church appeared so much the more assured since in Cornwall at least the Dissenting cause was nearly everywhere rapidly on the wane, especially after the outbreak of Arian controversy in the West from 1718 onwards, in which disputes Cornish Dissenters and their congregations took part.²⁶

Two factors caused a notable strengthening of the Cornish High Church tradition in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the opening of the nineteenth — well before the Oxford Movement began its recognized course. The first factor was the interest in Cornish antiquities pioneered by William Borlase, Rector of Ludgvan 1722-1772, and Vicar of St. Just 1732-1772.

²⁴ Doble, *St. Ives*, 1939, 31.

²⁵ *Devon and Cornwall Notes and Queries*, Vol. XXIII, pt. iv. Oct. 1947, p. 112.

²⁶ See *MS. Diary of Samuel Short of Uffculme, Devon (1705-26)*, 179. *Chacewater Baptist Chapel MS. Book*.

This man was the first to call attention on any systematic scale to the remains of the Celtic past with which Cornwall abounds, and opened a vista of ecclesiastical antiquity which could not fail to draw many to a study of the ancient church whose relics lay about them. Borlase was followed by other clerical and lay writers, among them John Whitaker, Rector of Ruanlanihorne from 1777 to 1808, who drew attention in his book on the ancient cathedral of Cornwall to the county's primitive independence of Exeter.²⁷

But the discovery, at the close of the eighteenth century, of the Celtic oratory of St. Piran, long lost in the sands, and its excavation in 1835 stimulated much curiosity and two writers²⁸ set forward with much enthusiasm their views on the primitive British Church. All this had the effect of turning thoughts from the Church of England's struggle in the Reformation period to the Church of the Fathers, and so helped the revival of less local and cramped ideas of the faith. One deeply moved by the later discoveries was the parson-poet Hawker of Morwenstow.

But the greater factor making for revival of High Churchmanship lay in the rise of Methodism, which very quickly shattered the smug complacency into which the Cornish church had fallen in the 1740's. In 1743 was made the first of John Wesley's thirty-one visits to the county, and the tireless work of the Methodist itinerants commenced. Thereafter the strength of Methodism increased phenomenally, especially after about 1780, among the miners and fishermen of the county. Cornwall quickly became the stronghold of Western Methodism, the adherents of the chapel in many places outnumbering those who remained loyal to the church alone.²⁹

The Established clergy were faced with the invasion of their

²⁷ The opinion has been advanced by a Cornish scholar (Ashley Rowe) that the movement to set up Truro diocese found origin in this book.

²⁸ William Haslam, *Perranzabuloe*, 1844. C. T. Collins-Trelawny, *Perranzabuloe, The Lost Church Found*, 1836, and many editions following.

²⁹ See *The Church Quarterly Review*, No. 283, Vol. CXLII, p. 78f. April/June, 1946.

parishes by field preachers, unordained, humbly born and sometimes illiterate men, rousing an enthusiasm which in Revival times worked up into excitement which prolonged meetings all night, and on at least one memorable occasion, for nearly a week!³⁰ This enthusiasm was contrasted with the form and state of the Liturgy, to the detriment of the latter in the eyes of the rank and file.

The position became more complicated after Wesley's death, the Methodist Conferences from 1794 onwards making concessions to the feeling in the societies and allowing the Sacraments to be had at the hands of the preachers. Between 1794 and 1803 many Cornish Methodist societies petitioned for the ordinances in their own chapels.³¹ Though many Methodists remained loyal to the "old plan" of attending church and the Sacraments there well into the nineteenth century the administration of the sacred ordinances in the chapels would bring the question of authority to the attention of the clergy, even if the unauthorized preaching had not done so. It was Baptism rather than the Eucharist which in practice caused difficulties, and the custom arose of interring deceased recipients of Methodist Baptism with the service at the grave instead of in the church.³² In extreme cases the clergy would not take the service at all.³³

When the various offshoots and schisms from the parent Methodism began, the village disunity became scandalous. Represented in Cornwall in the early decades of the nineteenth century, in addition to the many societies of Wesleyan Methodism, were congregations of Bible Christians, Primitive Methodists, Wesleyan Association, Calvinistic Methodists, local offshoots such as those led by Dr. Boase at Redruth and Mr. Boyle at Truro, while in addition there was much activity on the part of the Baptists, Independents and Quakers. Queer sects existed,

³⁰ *Methodist Magazine*, 1814, p. 399. This was at Tuckingmill.

³¹ Minutes of the Methodist Conferences, *in loc.*

³² Anon., *Letters from West Cornwall written in the Year 1826*, p. 21 (1861); *Calstock Par. Registers*, 1821 (note), etc.

³³ *MS. Diary, R. Treffry, Sen.*, p. 81 (1803).

such as the "Trumpeters" at St. Clement³⁴ and the "Heavenly Unionists" at St. Austell.

In reaction from this "seamy side" of Methodism there was on the part of some in the Church of England a new valuation of the old High Church tradition. In the field of doctrine, the Atonement, Justification, Assurance, and the like were all more carefully studied and taught, and distinguished from the distorted views all too current.³⁵ The Liturgy and the rubrics were defended with vigour,³⁶ and though it must be admitted that in some cases the social factor entered in, there was a new valuation of the idea of the priestly mission and authority.

Some, no doubt, fell back upon the fact of legal establishment and challenged the unauthorized preachers on the matter of their licences as did Lindeman of Sithney in 1802.³⁷ But the idea of true ministry being that possessing due authority derived from regular succession from the apostles came very much to the fore.³⁸ Preaching at Penzance before the Bishop of Exeter (Ross) at the Visitation in 1782, Cornelius Cardew, Vicar of Lelant, referred to the clergy as being "commissioned from Heaven, and delegates of the most High God", as regular successors of the Apostles;³⁹ the whole sermon was an exhortation to live a life consistent with the clerical dignity. The point is that Cardew, a notorious and grasping pluralist, would be careful not to give offence to the bishop and clergy by choice of an uncongenial subject. It may therefore be supposed that ideas of ministerial succession and authority were acceptable to those present. In 1819 George Woodley, a Cornish cleric afterwards stationed in the Scilly Isles, published a book *The Divinity of Christ Proved—and the True Church Ascertained* in which the Apostolic Succession is plainly stated. He viewed the Church as

³⁴ The worship of these people was agreeably (?) punctuated by simulation of the Apocalyptic trumpet!

³⁵ See for two examples among many, *Sermons*, by Rev. William Sutton, 1754; *Sermons*, by Rev. Charles Peters, 1776.

³⁶ Eg. Rogers, *Two Dialogues . . . on Common Prayer Book*, 1819.

³⁷ *MS. Diary R. Treffry, Sen.*, 11.

³⁸ Peters, *Sermons*, 1776, 301.

³⁹ Cardew, *Sermon*, 1782, 10, 21.

not heterogeneously assembled, but as chosen by the Head through the apostles and their successors, to whom alone the authority of convening is delegated.⁴⁰ Defence of the visible Church's divine commission is met also in the publications of Richard Lyne, Rector of Little Petherick. Lyne in 1817 unfavourably compares the services and ministry of the Dissenters with "the unintermitted apostolic authority of the church", and maintains the Catholicity of the Church and her ritual worship as acceptable to God ;⁴¹ it is worth noting that Richard Lyne was a kinsman of Father Ignatius of Llanthony.

"The Apostolical Origin of the Three Orders of the Christian Ministry" finds further defence in a sermon⁴² before the bishop's Visitation at Liskeard in 1836, and from this date it is not surprising to find an increasing frequency of appeal to the theory as the influence of the Oxford Fathers spread. It may be observed that in the earlier statements on the succession there appears an inadequate idea of its place in the Church, and indeed the doctrine of the Church itself is never clearly expressed even by the highest Churchmen in our period.

Of the later school of High Churchmen—though perhaps it is better to call it a trend rather than a school—John Whitaker, the Rector of Ruanlanihorne, was the most prominent and deserves rescue from oblivion, since he was in many ways an outstanding man. He had come from Manchester with a name for antiquarian research and had published a *History of Manchester* in 1771. His literary acquaintances included Johnson and Gibbon, on whose *Decline and Fall* he wrote a criticism in 1791.⁴³ Whitaker's Churchmanship was of a very definite order, and from his youth he had with some strictness observed the fasts of the Church, and had absorbed the ideas of Wheatly on the Prayer-book and its ornaments. Whether for his Arminianism, his statements on Baptismal Regeneration, or Ministerial Succession, he may be

⁴⁰ Woodley, *Divinity*, etc., 85, 92.

⁴¹ Lyne, *Sinfulness and Idolatry of Charms*, 1817, 96.

⁴² By Charles A. Ogilvie, Vicar of Duloe, pubd. 1836.

⁴³ On which Macaulay comments, "pointless spite, with here and there a just remark", Trevelyan, *Life and Letters*, 1909, 544.

pronounced a definite High Churchman. On matters of ceremonial his comments in his book, *The Ancient Cathedral of Cornwall* (1804) are of interest, since he laments the disuse of the eucharistic vestments and blames the clergy for allowing these, still ordered by the Book of Common Prayer, as he maintains, to fall into neglect.⁴⁴ He speaks of candles being still used in some of the churches, and felt that the Church of England had fallen far below the heathen in dignity of religious observance by the disuse of incense.⁴⁵

In character Whitaker was zealous and sincere. It is reported that he actually rebuked the Bishop of Derry for talk unbecoming a bishop, and was angered at any levity in sacred things. It must be confessed, however, that Whitaker's theology moved on a somewhat arid plane, and that his relations with his parishioners left much to be desired since for years he was at loggerheads with many of them over questions of tithe. Over some of the local clergy he had considerable influence, especially over his close friend Richard Polwhele of Manaccan (with whom he collaborated in the production of what is called "Flindell's Bible"), correcting his theological misunderstandings over Methodism.⁴⁶ In Polwhele himself can be traced a moderate High Church outlook, somewhat more worldly and unspiritual than in Whitaker, issuing in a violent and outspoken opposition to Methodism, and the publication of works against it.⁴⁷ In his two volumes of sermons published in 1813 Polwhele refers to the Eucharist as a sacrifice and an oblation, and uses the term "Altar", which indeed is not at all unusual throughout our period. In 1825 James Duke Coleridge, Vicar of Kenwyn and Kea defended confession to the parish priest as expedient in many

⁴⁴ He fails clearly to distinguish cope and chasuble, however, meaning the latter often when he uses the term "cope".

⁴⁵ Whitaker, *Ancient Cathedral of Cornwall*, 1804, i, 191.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Polwhele, *Traditions and Recollections*, 1826, 506.

⁴⁷ Of which the chief are, *Anecdotes of Methodism*, 1800, extremely rare, and Lavington's *Enthusiasm of Methodists, &c., Considered*, 1820.

cases of sickness, although he dissented from the Roman view of it.⁴⁸

To sum up, the High Churchmen of Cornwall in this period formed a recognizable nucleus. Many were widely read to a degree surprising for so remote an area as Cornwall then was. They shared fully the faults of their time; they were mixed up in the prevailing abuses of plurality and non-residence, jealous of their position and fearful of popular clamour or demonstration. Their theology was arid and the further reproach is brought that their position had not since 1710 been much more than a clerical sentiment and in no sense a popular movement. But as strengthened by reaction from a popular movement which seemed to them undesirable in many aspects — Methodism ran into many extremes at times in Cornwall—the High Church school fell back upon remote theological realms and (apparently needful) moralizing discourses. As a protest against excitement it knew no better than to shrink back into the coldest and most formal orthodoxy and adherence to the Prayer-book. Had it had the courage to display its truth more popularly, clothed in the dignified ceremonial its adherents believed the rubric to require, the story might have been different. But the hour had not yet struck for that.

However, the result was the cherishing of a sturdy, though restrained, Churchmanship which at least prepared the ground for the later Tractarianism and assured an atmosphere congenial to the ideas of the Oxford Movement, into which many Cornish High Churchmen naturally merged.

⁴⁸ Coleridge, *Observations of a Parish Priest in Scenes of Sickness and Death*, 1825, 10 n.

A RELIGIOUS APPROACH TO NATURE

By W. H. DEW

I. THE NEED FOR A RELIGIOUS APPROACH.

TO-DAY Nature is receiving increased attention from every side of life except religion. A number of reasons can be given for this. The modern religious approach to Nature has often resulted in a religion of Truth and Beauty, inferred from Nature alone, which Christians feel inadequate to meet the deeper needs of mankind; they have therefore been reluctant to meddle with a subject which appears to detract from the fundamental need of salvation through Christ alone. Though Christian writers have given a good deal of thought to the subject of religion and science, the general drift of their conclusions has been that no very intimate connexion exists between the two. This has tended to keep orthodoxy and Nature apart. Moreover, in the conflict with science, the attention of Christians has naturally been concentrated on the points where controversy has been fiercest, such as the relation of Genesis to Evolution, or the contrast between Law and Miracle. As a result, the Christianity of to-day is seldom concerned, except perhaps at harvest festivals, with the Nature which people meet in their everyday lives.

This contrasts strangely with the Bible, in which the ordinary everyday aspects of Nature find frequent mention and serve some serious religious purpose. The feeling for Nature shown in the book of Job is not a mere embellishment of the drama, but something essential to its climax. The prosperity of the ungodly is always a problem for the psalmists, but they take courage when they behold the wonderful works of God; the most glorious of the Nature-Psalms (the 104th) leads to the prayer that sinners may

be consumed out of the earth. The prophetic appeal to Nature is most marked in deuterо-Isaiah, who repeatedly reminds the exiles who doubt his message of release that the Creator of the ends of the earth fainteth not, neither is weary. Jesus, similarly, when his Galilean ministry is beginning to meet with opposition, reminds his disheartened disciples of the unseen power of God in Nature; in spite of all obstacles, the growth of the seed culminates in the harvest.¹ Passages of this kind are too widespread to be accidental, the appeal to Nature is an integral part of Biblical religion.

Nature should therefore play an equally prominent part in the Christianity of to-day, if this looks to the rock whence it is hewn and is true to the Bible. Yet can a modern religious attitude be founded on a book whose ideas about natural occurrences, even of the everyday kind, are so primitive? The difficulty is usually met by saying that the purpose of the Bible is not to teach us science but religion. Yet, if so, the Bible should have something specifically religious to say about Nature, something which is missed by other kinds of knowledge. In what follows, an attempt is made to isolate this element by contrasting the Biblical attitude to Nature with those present-day attitudes which may broadly be called philosophical, scientific and aesthetic. In this way there may be traced, underlying the Bible, a permanent religious attitude to Nature, which in principle is applicable to every age.

Though unbiblical, the word "Nature" has been retained as best suggesting, in its modern usage,² the limited field with which this paper is concerned, viz., God's Creation, excluding Man, and considered as far as possible apart from questions of origin and miracle. Such limitation must not be taken as a denial of the importance of what is excluded, but rather as an attempt to restore the balance and to insist that religious appreciation of the

¹ Job xxxviii; Ps. cxxxix, 16-19; Ps. civ, 35; Isaiah xl, 22-28; xlv, 21, 24; xlv, 5-7, 18; li, 13-15; Mark iv, 1-34; Matt. xiii, 24-30.

² By derivation "natura" means "How things have come to be". But even in the pre-scientific era it never quite lost the emphasis of the Greek "physis" on "how things grow and behave." cp. C. Singer in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, p. 94.

ordinary aspects of Nature is an essential preliminary to those extra-ordinary aspects of the New Creation which are also integral to the Biblical view of Nature.

II. THE BIBLICAL ATTITUDE AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL.

It is a commonplace that the Bible knows no argument for the existence of God, whether from Nature or otherwise. This runs true to experience; only rarely, if ever, is religious conviction reached through Nature alone. Religion must first be met in its personal and corporate aspects and then strengthened by subsequent contemplation of Nature.

And not from Nature to Nature's God
But down from Nature's God look Nature through.

The same order of experience obtains in the history of the Hebrews; they knew Jehovah as a tribal and righteous God before they knew him as the God of the whole earth. For Moses he is the God of Sinai; for Amos he is judge not only of Israel but of Damascus, Ammon, and Moab; for Isaiah his holiness knows no bounds, the whole earth is full of his glory. The doctrine receives its greatest impetus from deutero-Isaiah, who repeatedly allays the fears of the exiles by pointing to the power of God, "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out the heavens with the span and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure and weighed the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance". It is highly probable that development of this kind preceded the fully articulated thought of Genesis i, the idea of God as Creator growing out of the moral and religious experience of the nation, though simple stories of creation, such as Genesis ii, no doubt existed from very early times.³

Important consequences follow from this connexion with everyday personal life. For the Hebrew, God was above all else a God to be obeyed, he was sovereign over all his people. As the idea of his domain grew, his sovereignty was seen to cover Nature

³ Amos i, 3, 13; ii, 1. Isaiah vi, 3; xl, 12, 13; cp. Exodus xx, 11; I Kings viii, 12 (LXX). See also: H. Wheeler Robinson: *Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament*, pp. 22, 23.

as well as Man, and it becomes the leading element in the conception of Creation. The Nature passages in deutero-Isaiah lead up to the affirmation "I am the Lord and there is none else". God's first words to Job are: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" The psalmist proclaims: "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made". The wonder of God's works proclaimed in the Nature psalms is regarded as issuing from his sovereignty recognized in such opening verses as "O Lord our Governor, How excellent is thy name in all the world" and "O Lord my God, thou art very great, thou art clothed in majesty and honour".⁴ Jesus explicitly affirms the sovereignty of God in the saying that the heaven is God's throne and the earth his footstool, though he usually finds it illustrated in simple things, the sparrow that cannot fall to the ground without God, who feeds the birds and cares even for the grass of the field. God cares for all because all belong to him and all depend on him—a quieter note also found in some of the psalms.⁵

The foregoing ideas find striking illustration in the 95th Psalm:

O come, let us sing unto the Lord;

Let us make a joyful noise to the rock of our salvation.

"The Lord" is Jehovah, the great Proper Name of the God of Israel; the rock is a synonym for God, who redeemed his people out of Egypt. The psalm thus begins with the religious experience of the community.

For the Lord is a great God

And a great King above all gods.

i.e. God is all sovereign.

In his hands are the deep places of the earth;

The heights of the mountains are his also;

i.e. the world belongs to him.

We are the people of his pasture and the sheep of his hand;

i.e. we depend on him.

Today, Oh that ye would hear his voice !

⁴ Isaiah xlv, 5; Job xxxviii, 4; Ps. xxxiii, 6; Ps. viii, 1. (P. B. version; A.V. and R.V. have "O Lord, our Lord"); Ps. civ, 1.

⁵ Matt. v, 34, 35, cp. Isaiah lxvi, 1; Matt. vi, 26, x, 29; Ps. civ. 27.

A final reminder of the need for personal obedience.

The religious approach to Nature thus issues from personal obedience and sees God's sovereignty extending to the whole of Creation.

The philosophical approach is very different. Fundamentally it seeks to understand, especially to comprehend things as a whole; beginning with the mind's craving for coherence and rationality, it tries to find unity and order in Nature. In early times it took the form of speculation as to how things have come to be derived from some one principle, or as to how the "elements" of earth, air, fire and water are combined in Nature. In recent centuries it has tried to arrange the results of science in a systematic whole, sometimes in the form of an argument from design. But valuable as such attempts are, especially for strengthening faith, they are not primarily religious. They begin with the unity of Nature, from which God is inferred; whereas the religious approach is the opposite. Thus the Bible is not without a feeling of the unity of Nature; a notable example is Genesis i, where the orderly stages of creation, as day succeeds day, compare favourably with the naïve ideas of Genesis ii. Yet the unity is the result of something more fundamental; each stage is introduced by the words "And God said"; the unity is the result of these commands, i.e., it is a derived unity. More congenial to our minds is the unity implied in the parables of Jesus; the growth of the Word in the human heart can be compared with that of the seed in the field because of a unity underlying them, because, as we should say, both follow similar laws. But no attempt is made to formulate these or to infer a unity behind them. The unity is simply that of God's world; his Word, man's heart, the seed and the field are one because all belong to him, and on him they all depend.

Thus while the religious approach derives the unity of the world from God's sovereignty, the philosophical attitude regards the unity of Nature as primary and infers God from that. The method is not necessarily invalid because it differs from the religious. We should in fact expect God to be known differently by the mind alone than by the obedience of the whole personality;

the result in the one case is bound to be more abstract and remote than the other, though not thereby necessarily unreal. This well-known difference between the God of philosophy and the God of religion is sometimes summed up by saying that the one is "impersonal", the other "personal". But the God of philosophy may be inferred as "personal", and in theistic philosophy is so inferred. The difference may be better expressed as that between "inferred person" and "living person".⁶ The philosophical approach to Nature always finds the inferred God, the religious approach finds the living God, whom Christians still find in the Bible in spite of its crude scientific ideas. This point is missed in Dr. F. Wood Jones's Purser Lecture "Design and Purpose", where he indicates how the argument from design, as developed by Paley and in the Bridgewater Treatises, might be adapted in the light of modern evolutionary ideas. He pays high tribute to Paley and thinks that between his "Person" and the God of Abraham there is in reality little to choose, except in cosmology. In consequence, he not unnaturally blames the Church for retaining the God of Abraham. But the God of Abraham was not known by inference, but by obedience, so much so that Abraham's obedience was held up to succeeding generations as the way to the knowledge of the living God. The Church was therefore right to keep to the God of Abraham, though regrettably slow in abandoning his cosmology.⁷

We may sum up by saying that one of the most dangerous half-truths is to say that the personal God is met with in everyday religion and the impersonal God in Nature. The philosophical attitude always knows God as "inferred Person" whether in personal life or in Nature. The religious attitude likewise always knows God as "living Person", both in personal life and in Nature; the sovereignty of the living God, which obedience recognizes in personal life, faith sees extending to Nature also. This is the attitude of the Bible and the primary characteristic of the religious approach.

⁶ Cp. E. Brunner: *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 30: "A God whom I shall have to know through an interpretation of the world or of myself is less than I am because I give utterance to him who himself is dumb, as it were. He becomes a personality only through me."

⁷ F. Wood Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 76, cp. Heb. xi, 8.

III. THE BIBLICAL ATTITUDE AND THE SCIENTIFIC.

In the Bible natural events are due to the direct action of God: in science they happen of their own accord. The two outlooks seem eternally opposed. Science only developed through emancipation from the idea of divine interference, either in its naïve Biblical form, or indirectly as the influence of "super-natural" forces. Astronomy only became a science as it ceased to be astrology, little progress was made in understanding electrical and magnetic phenomena while they were supposed to be due to certain spirit-like "effluvia", while the idea of controlling "spirits" held up some branches of chemistry as late as the eighteenth century.⁸ All these old ideas have disappeared. A storm is no longer an act of God, but something explicable along the lines of less striking phenomena; even life itself, in its simplest form in the viruses, seems to be little more than a complex molecule of crystalline nucleoprotein. Pattern, order, regular sequence are present everywhere, no other type of explanation is needed.

In the Bible, on the other hand, everything is due to God. The thunder is his voice, the wind his breath; he gives snow like wool and scatters the hoar frost like ashes. He causes grass to grow for the cattle, and green herb for the service of man; the rain is his gift direct from heaven, Palestine being thus greatly superior to Egypt which has to be watered by mechanical means from the Nile. Drought, plague and famine are likewise the visitation of his hand. In the parables of Jesus, it is true, there is a serenity and lack of caprice which places them far ahead of anything in the Old Testament. "So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed upon the earth; and should sleep and rise night and day, he knoweth not how. The earth beareth fruit of herself"—*αὐτομάτι*, automatically. Here is natural sequence, "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear". But there is no thought of this proceeding apart from God. He causes the quiet growth of the seed and also the sudden ripening of the fruit characteristic of a hot climate, "straightway he putteth forth the sickle, because the harvest is come". The sure way in which God achieves his purposes in Nature is a guarantee of an

⁸ Cp. "spirits of salt", the old name for hydrochloric acid.

equal sureness in his workings in the hearts of men. Thus even where the Bible comes nearest to our ideas of natural causation, it throws the chief emphasis on God, all is his doing.⁹ Yet this is the affirmation which science finds so irritating—God is the one hypothesis it never needs.

This central issue between religion and science cannot be discussed in detail here. We may perhaps suggest that the two standpoints may not be so mutually exclusive as is sometimes supposed. The difficulty is similar to that of the body-mind problem. A movement of my arm consists of a sequence of events in nerve and muscle, initiated by my will. I do not doubt the reality of my will because physico-chemical investigation cannot detect it. Moreover, though my will initiates the sequence of events, it is not one element in the pattern, exactly similar to the others, for it can alter the movement at any time. So, far from saying that it interferes at any one point, it is nearer the truth to say that it interferes at every point, for it is in control throughout. The motion of "Will" covers the whole phenomenon just as completely as that of "Natural Causation", though from the opposite angle; while the mystery of their inter-dependence remains unsolved, the two standpoints must be held concurrently. Similarly, pending a clear synthesis, the religious interpretation of Nature in terms of will and personal action must be held concurrently with the scientific interpretation in terms of sequence and pattern; each covers the whole of phenomena, and every event, or sequence of events, is the result of both. God does not cause some events, while others are due to natural causes. So far from interfering at any one point the divine control is extended throughout the whole sequence of natural events, though this may be more obvious to us at some points of the pattern than at others; on the other hand, even the events which most clearly bear the divine imprint are part of natural sequence. Regarded in this way the two outlooks are complementary, though at any one moment we are governed mainly by the one or the other according as our immediate purpose is religious or scientific.

⁹ Ps. xviii, 13; Ezek. xxxvii, 9; Ps. cxlvii, 16; Ps. civ, 14; Deut. xi, 10-12; Deut. xxviii, 22; Exod. xi, 1; Ps. cv, 16; Mark iv, 26-29.

The Bible therefore interprets Nature in terms of personal action, not merely because its science is primitive, but because it is primarily a religious book. This emphasis remains unaltered, as already noticed, even in the parables which show the clearest recognition of natural sequence; the sure growth from seed to harvest, despite the poorness of some of the ground or the hindrance of weeds, is but an illustration of the way in which God achieves his sovereign purposes. Natural processes, insofar as they are recognized, are similarly treated in the Old Testament. The regular succession of the seasons is a result of the solemn promise of God: "While the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease"; the regular succession of day and night is due to God's unbreakable covenant with them.¹⁰ Closely allied to this sense of the sureness of God's ways is that of the wonder of his works. There is more than a note of wonder in the description of "a grain of mustard seed, which, when it is sown upon the earth, though it be less than all the seeds that are upon the earth, yet when it is sown, groweth up, and becometh greater than all the herbs, and putteth out great branches, so that the birds of the heaven can lodge under the shadow thereof". The regularity of day and night, sun and moon are noted with wonder in the psalms, while the courses of the stars and the fixed patterns of their constellations are several times noted in Job. Psalm 139 meditates on the growth of the child in the womb: "I will give thanks unto thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made".¹¹

The religious approach to Nature is thus concerned with the sovereignty of God, especially as expressed in the sureness of his ways and the wonder of his works. The same invariability of natural processes which leads science to the conception of natural law is for religion the wonderful way in which God brings about his ends and fulfils his sovereign purposes. Religion thus keeps alive the sense of wonder without which knowledge soon becomes either presumptuous or burdensome. In this sense, religion is

¹⁰ Mark iv, 1-9; Matt. xiii, 24-30; Gen. viii, 22; Jer. xxxiii, 25.

¹¹ Mark iv, 30-32; Ps. civ, 19-24; Job ix, 9, 10; xxxviii, 31-33; Ps. cxxxix, 13-16.

essential to any satisfying approach to Nature, and is its saving grace. "He that wonders shall reign".¹²

IV. THE BIBLICAL ATTITUDE AND THE AESTHETIC.

The poetry of much of its language often obscures the fact that the Bible has little sense of the beauty of Nature as we appreciate it. The psalmist may proclaim that the heavens declare the glory of God, but he gives little detailed description of the heavenly bodies themselves. References to the hills are usually to their strength, not to their beauty. There is no appreciation of colour, either in landscape or in particular objects and the saying of Jesus about the clothing of the lilies stands almost alone. The Song of Songs comes nearest to our sense of natural beauty, in the descriptions of scenery which form the setting for its love lyrics. The hair of the beloved is like a flock of goats strewn along the face of Mount Gilead, her teeth are like the shorn and newly washed sheep in their freshness, the bride is as a fountain of gardens and as flowing streams from Lebanon.¹³ The book also speaks of the coming of the flowers and the singing of the birds in spring, the dove in the clefts of the rock or by pools of water, the sheaf of yellow wheat in its circle of henna flowers, the red hyacinths against a background of thistles, the young gazelles pasturing among the hyacinths, the waving fronds of the palm-tree, the horizontal foliage of the cedars of Lebanon, the scented apples and the pleasant shade of the apple-tree, the greenness of the nut-garden, the budding of the vines and their full clusters, the glory of the dawn and the beauty of the moon, the sky-line of Carmel, the grace and beauty of the human body in man and woman.¹⁴ This originally secular book shows that the Hebrews

¹² Perhaps a genuine utterance of Christ. Clement of Alexandria, Strom ii, 9, § 45, quotes it from "The Gospel according to the Hebrews." Mr. A. St. G. Walsh has pointed out to me that Clement also gives a longer form of the saying identical with the somewhat later Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 654.

¹³ Pss. xix, 1; xviii, 7; xcv, 4; cxxi, 1; though cp. Isaiah xxxv, 2; Matt. vi, 28-30; Song of Songs iv, 1, 2; 13-16.

¹⁴ The list is taken from H. W. Robinson: *op. cit.* p. 5.

were as capable of appreciating natural beauty as we are; the comparative absence of any such feeling in the rest of the Bible is all the more remarkable.

The explanation appears to be that the other books are religious. They are concerned primarily with the initiative and activity of God, everything comes from him, the whole earth is full of his glory. Nothing must detract from that. In the psalms, God's works, so far from drawing man's praises to themselves, join their praises with his in the worship of their Creator. Beauty needs to be contemplated in itself and for itself, and thus appears to draw attention away from God. The suppression of aesthetic feeling was not conscious, it simply could not develop in a religion with such a strong sense of the transcendence of God, and only appears in circumstances, like those of the Song of Songs, which were felt to have no immediate God-ward reference at all.¹⁵ In the same way, while it appeared quite early outside the Judaeo-Christian tradition (1100 B.C. in Egypt¹⁶), it developed remarkably late within it. For although never entirely absent in Christian history, appreciation of natural beauty was not extensive until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, i.e., when the sense of the reality of God was beginning to weaken and aesthetics was becoming free from the dominance of religion. A parallel exists here with science, which similarly took a long time to establish the autonomy of the sphere of natural causation.

A further parallel with science exists in that both involve a degree of abstraction from reality. Science begins with Nature as it is, but immediately begins to classify and measure, concentrating on these aspects and neglecting others. Aesthetic appre-

¹⁵ It is perhaps significant that one of the clearest appreciations of natural beauty in the Apocrypha occurs in a book whose main interest is moral rather than religious. Ecclesiasticus xliii, 2, 9, 11, 12, 18, speaks of the sun as "a marvellous instrument, the work of the Most High", of the moon as "the beauty of heaven, the glory of the stars", of the rainbow which "compasseth the heaven round about with a circle of glory" and of the snow, "the eye will marvel at the beauty of its whiteness".

¹⁶ H. W. Robinson: *loc. cit.*

ciation similarly singles out beauty as the significant aspect of Nature. But though this is the aspect most easily remembered, especially when living away from her in the town, it is not the only one. When actually in her presence we are quickened by something more than beauty in Nature, by the totality of her aspects, whether we describe this merely as the joy of being out of doors, or as the fascination of being among living things, or as feeling

"The silence that is in the starry sky
The sleep that is among the lonely hills."

The bidding of Jesus to "consider the lilies of the field, how they grow" was primarily to consider them as we actually find them growing in the fields; we miss the freshness of this if considerations of growth or beauty are too much in the forefront of our minds. For this reason the Christian who is a countryman has a surer faith than his fellow in the town; his daily contact and struggle with Nature give him a direct awareness of God's workings which the townsman lacks. Moreover, this is often found in those singularly deficient in a sense of beauty and in any power of expression.

The only satisfying expression of such an attitude is in poetry. Hence it is most evident in the psalms and Job, but it persists as an underlying poetic feeling throughout the Bible, as instanced by its extensive use of Nature-imagery. The vineyard of the Lord of hosts is the house of Israel and the men of Judah his pleasant plant; the man nurtured in the Law is like a tree planted by streams of water, while the ungodly are like chaff driven by the wind. "By their fruits ye shall know them", says Jesus and asks whether men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles. Christ is the true vine; the essence of his life is expressed in a metaphor from Nature: "Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die it abideth by itself alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit".¹⁷ Such texts are so familiar that their significance is easily overlooked. The naturalness of their metaphors implies that the worlds of Man and Nature are one. To him who knows this,

¹⁷ Isaiah v, 7; Ps. i, 3, 4; Matt. vii, 16; John xv, 1; xii, 24.

the imagery of one applies easily to the other; the process is unconscious and unstudied, springing from deep communion with the Creator of both. Where we speak of the imperative necessity of social justice, Amos calls for judgement to roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream; and he does so because he lived nearer to the mountain streams, and also nearer to the Source of all righteousness, than we do. For the same reason, Jesus speaks of the divine sovereignty by saying that not a single sparrow falls to the ground without our Father.¹⁸ The attitude is that of the child who is at home among living things in a way that most adults have lost; he sees the world as it is, fresh from the hand of God. "I preach to you", said Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, "that the base of all Literature, of all Poetry, of all Theology, is one, and stands one rock: *the very highest Universal Truth is something so simple that a child may understand it.* This, surely, was in Jesus' mind when he said 'I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes' ".¹⁹

V. THE RELIGIOUS IN RELATION TO OTHER ATTITUDES.

The religious attitude to Nature, as revealed in the Bible, is thus something *sui generis*. As against the unity which philosophy seeks, it finds a unity derived from the sovereignty of the living God; as against the automatism of science, it sees the wonder of God's acts and the sureness of his ways; and as against the feeling of beauty it finds in Nature a deeper quickening reality. But besides this predominant religious attitude, the Bible also contains a measure of observation and speculation. These needed other influences, notably Greek thought, before giving rise centuries later to modern science and philosophy. Yet the relation of the religious attitude to these humble beginnings is of importance as suggesting what should be its relation to their descendants at the present day.

¹⁸ Amos v, 24; Matt. x, 29.

¹⁹ *The Art of Reading*, p. 61 (1933 edn.). The italics are original.

The Bible as a whole mentions thirty different animals, over thirty birds, and a hundred plants or trees. Naming implies observation in some detail. The migrations of some of the birds were noticed, Jeremiah complains "the stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed time; and the turtle and the swallow and the crane observe the time of their coming, but my people know not the ordinance of the Lord". The later books show signs of questioning, even though the answers are unknown to man. God only understands the formation of the body in the womb or knows the time of gestation in the wild animals. Nature contains much to arouse human curiosity, "the way of an eagle in the air, the way of a serpent upon a rock, the way of a man with a maid".²⁰ It is perhaps significant that the ancient material embodied in the Genesis creation stories has survived in the Bible in a form in which an observational basis can still be discerned. In the earlier narrative of chapter ii this appears to be the simple fact that the first necessity for life is water. No vegetation was yet on the earth, because there had been no rain, therefore "there went up a mist from the earth and watered the whole face of the ground". The word rendered "mist" has something to do with water though its exact meaning is uncertain; it may have meant originally a small overflow of a river like the Euphrates used to irrigate the surrounding land.²¹ Creation of man then follows, his life being maintained by the river which went out of Eden to water the garden. The observation underlying Genesis i is more difficult to detect, though it may be that of the dawn, from the first twilight slowly revealing the outlines of the earth, to the emergence of the sun and the going forth of man to take his place among the other creatures.²² The sense of unity shown in this account has already been noticed and it is also shown by the simple cos-

²⁰ Jer. viii, 7; Ps. cxxxix; Job xxxix, 1; Prov. xxx, 18, 19.

²¹ Gen. ii, 5, 6. Some authorities consider that the rain of ii, 5 has been suggested by a dry country like Palestine and the flood of ii, 6 by the alluvial country of the Euphrates valley, i.e. the narrative as it now stands derives from two sources. See J. Skinner, *Genesis*, *ad. loc.*

²² J. Skinner, *op. cit.* p. 19; Procksh, *Genesis*, p. 455, quoted by H. W. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

mology. The earth was a flat disc, the sky an upturned bowl, and around them were the waters of the Great Deep. From the former came the rain when "the windows of heaven were opened",²³ from the waters under the earth came the sea, lakes and springs, the last always a mystery in a dry land. Though unbelievably crude by our standards, this cosmology represented a first simple effort to picture Nature as a whole. It is significantly absent from Genesis ii, which belongs to an earlier stage, probably when Jehovah's throne was still believed to be on Mount Sinai and not yet above the vault of heaven.

In the greater passages this feeling of the unity of Nature and the perception of some of her observed characteristics and regularities are fused with the fundamental sense of the sovereignty of God over his creation. Thus in Job xxxviii and xxxix the majesty of God is shown from the moment he laid the foundations of the earth, separated the waters above the earth from those underneath, and formed in the heavens the special treasures of snow, hail, ice and frost to await the right moment for their use. The mysterious alternation of light and darkness finds mention—"hast thou commanded the morning since thy days began?"—also the fixity of the constellations and their regular courses—"canst thou guide the Bear with her train?" The remarkable habits and strength of the wild creatures have been given them by God—"doth the hawk soar by thy wisdom . . . or the eagle mount up at thy command?" In the same way Psalm civ begins with the honour and majesty of God, covered with light as with a garment. His sovereignty was declared when he founded the earth and separated the waters. The marvellous inter-related consequences are then recited. From the waters below come springs into the valleys, giving drink to every beast of the field and to the larger birds. The mountains, on the other hand, are watered from the chambers above, causing grass to grow for the cattle, herb for the service of men and trees in which the smaller birds make their nests. The regular sequences of sun and moon are noted, also the mysterious alternation of night and day, one

²³ Gen. vii, 11; viii, 2; II Kings vii, 2, 19.

being the time wherein all the beasts of the forest creep forth, the other being that in which man goes forth to his labour until the evening.

God's sovereignty over his creation is thus displayed in the unity of Nature and in her wonderful workings and regular sequences. The expression of this in the parables of Jesus has already been noticed. The world derives its unity from God, simply because it is his; and the natural sequences it displays are a token of the sureness of his ways. The saying about the lilies is similar.²⁴ Here God's sovereignty takes the form of his tender care and the unity of his creation is seen in the fact that this care extends alike to the grass of the field and to his children who have so little faith. The sureness of his ways is shown by how the lilies grow—automatically, “for they toil not neither do they spin”—and the wonder of his workings by their delicate beauty—“for Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these” The specifically religious attitude thus expresses itself through a sense of the unity of Nature and through a recognition of her observed ways and sequences; while the underlying poetry of the saying reflects the poetry of God's world which inspired it.

VI. THE FUNDAMENTAL REVELATION.

The fundamental revelation in the Bible is that of faith in the sovereignty of God over the world he has created. It is an attitude to Nature, not primarily information about her. The faith is that of a child—implicit trust in the wisdom and ability of the Father to control the things he has made; continual wonder at his workings; and a keen sense of the poetry of his world. Though always remaining child-like, this faith deepens with growing realization of the extent of God's sovereignty. From Moses through Amos, Genesis ii, deuterio-Isaiah, Genesis i, Job and the psalms, to the gospels we can see it being expressed through a widening cosmology and an increasing appreciation of natural sequences. In principle the process should be continued in every age, this fundamental faith always seeking to express itself through the best philosophic, scientific and aesthetic insights of

²⁴ Matt. vi, 28-31.

the day. This ideal state of things has not come about largely because of the confusion of the issues involved. The evolution controversy, for instance, sprang from failure to see where the inspiration of Genesis really lies. Now that the dust of some of these controversies has settled it is easier to see in what the Biblical revelation of Nature consists and how it may be related to modern knowledge. There is the highest authority for becoming as a little child.²⁵ Yet just as in the moral sphere this does not mean becoming childish, but taking on the responsibilities of manhood with simple trust in God; so in regard to Nature it does not mean returning to the cosmology and outlook of the childhood of the race, but accepting the philosophy and science of the day in the sure faith that through them the believer will gain deeper insight into the wisdom of the Creator and the continual wonder of his ways.

The difficulties of working this out in practice to-day are formidable. No generally accepted philosophic view of Nature exists (though no-one really doubts that she is a unity), the tension between the religious and scientific methods of describing a natural sequence is still acute, and other aesthetic insights have developed besides the primary poetic outlook of the Bible. In the long run the surest ground for hope is the increased certainty of modern knowledge of Nature. Though never final, it has a verifiability and degree of objectivity far in excess of that possessed by earlier ideas. Just for this reason, because it is truer than the old, it is so much better fitted to bring out the deeper truths of specifically religious revelation. We do not cease to wonder at the stars now that we no longer regard them as animated beings in the sky or as lamps hung from the lower surface of the firmament. To a believer with some idea of the immensities of inter-stellar space and of the scale of cosmic evolution, God's question to Job, "Canst thou bind the cluster of the Pleiades or loose the bands of Orion?" has tremendous poignancy.²⁶ It is true that science alone is as likely to develop pride

²⁵ Mark x, 15; Matt. xviii, 3.

²⁶ Job xxxviii, 31, cp. J. H. Jeans: *The Universe Around Us*, 4th edn., p. 38. An apt slogan for our present thesis would be "No Job without Jeans—and no Jeans without Job".

as humility, true also that it has made initial religious faith much harder to come by. But a child-like faith once obtained, so far from depending on primitive cosmology, gains immensely by release from it. Fact turns out to be more wonderful than fancy. In the same way, appreciation of the wonderful ordering of the world (the deep religious theme of Psalm civ) is deepened far more by our present knowledge, however imperfect, of climate and weather, the balance of Nature and the adaptation of organisms to their environment, than by the quaint arrangements for watering the earth imagined by the psalmist. Mention of plant physiology in connexion with the Nature-parables of Jesus seems at first sight either irreverent or absurd; but to see growth in terms of physics and chemistry is to link it with other sequences and uniformities which extend, except perhaps at the atomic level, throughout the whole of Nature. The words "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" will stand for all time, in their profound simplicity, as the unique description of God's silent work in causing the earth to yield her increase. Even so, appreciation of this is deepened when growth is seen not as an isolated phenomenon but as a culminating instance of a sureness and regularity extending throughout the whole of the natural world. In such ways the child-like faith of the Bible is greatly enhanced by well-grounded modern knowledge. Each, in its own way, is of the Truth, and therefore bound eventually to reinforce the other. At present we can only get glimpses of this in a few instances, but we need have no doubt about the final result.

A Christianity grounded in the Bible should therefore develop a specifically religious attitude to Nature, distinct from that of philosophy, science or aesthetics, yet using all these to mediate and express its fundamental faith in the sovereignty of the Creator over the world he has made. Without this child-like faith there can be for the Christian no specifically religious approach, "except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God".²⁷ This applies to every sphere. All Christians hold that such an attitude is the gift of grace and many of them believe it can only be sustained by a life lived within the fellowship of

²⁷ John iii, 3.

the historic Christian Church whose roots go back to the ancient People of God who gave us the Bible. Yet few follow its lead and attempt to extend the faith of everyday personal life to the wider sphere of Nature. So the task of relating the Christian vision to modern knowledge languishes. Not until it is undertaken in earnest will mankind begin to hear again God's works praising him.

DO WE INFER GOD'S EXISTENCE?

By DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN

IN his review of Mr. Mascall's *Existence and Analogy*¹ Dr. Hawkins observes that the author "follows a contemporary fashion in hesitating to describe our apprehension of God as an inference", and he goes on to suggest that Dr. Farrer, Dom Mark Pontifex, Mr. Casserley and myself "have put forward theories which are really inferential, but have been deterred from calling them so by an unduly restricted conception of what inference means". I am grateful for the opportunity to comment on this.

First, a few words seem in place about the "contemporary fashion". Dr. Hawkins is presumably referring to writers who are allied at least to some extent with one of the traditional schools, since there have been innumerable theistic writers before now who have rejected "reason" altogether and appealed to "experience". (I shall have something to say at the end about that dichotomy. For the moment I would remark that nothing is further from my mind than to align myself or any of the other writers mentioned with the anti-intellectualism which the appeal to "experience" usually involves.) The "fashion", then, has set in, I take Dr. Hawkins to mean, in unexpected quarters, and he suggests that it was started in 1943 by Dr. Farrer's *Finite and Infinite*. In using the word "fashion" he was not, I am sure, intending to suggest that the writers to whom he refers were taking their philosophy, as it were, on faith. But to avoid any misconception, it may be as well for me to point out that articles have been appearing at intervals in *The Downside Review* since 1941 by a considerable number of writers who have been working (in some cases at least) on demonstrably independent lines and with substantially the same results on the issue in question—to

¹ In *The Church Quarterly Review*, January-March, 1950, pp. 224-7.

say nothing of books which have appeared in France such as Père de Lubac's *De la Connaissance de Dieu*.

Dr. Hawkins and I have been engaged in a friendly contest on this matter since 1946. In the April issue of *The Downside Review* for that year I had published an article in which I concluded that "syllogistic inference has a very limited rôle in the mind's activity. Our most important metaphysical conclusions are reached in experience by a process which may be called 'immediate inference'". (It now seems to me undesirable, for reasons which will appear, to speak of "inference" at all in this connexion.) Dr. Hawkins in a reply published in the same periodical the following October, while not undertaking to defend the use of the categorical syllogism in demonstrating God's existence, insisted that the hypothetical one must be employed on pain of falling into ontologism, the doctrine, that is, that God is the first object of the human mind; to which I replied (in the same place) that, although "our knowledge of God is *based* on our knowledge of creatures . . . it is impossible to find a logical bridge leading from the creature to God", and repeated my original contention that a hypothetical syllogism beginning "if there is contingent being, there is necessary being" does not represent a way in which anyone could discover God's existence. For there could not be any reason for adding a second premiss, the required conclusion being already contained in the first (nobody could agree that "if there is contingent being, there is necessary being" unless he had *already apprehended* necessary being through contingent being, which is what the hypothetical syllogism is supposed to be enabling him to do).

Here I must pause to drive home, if I can, that conclusion. It seems to me quite obvious, but Dr. Hawkins does not seem to see it, and I must give the reader every chance of determining for himself which of us is right. The question is whether our discovery of God's existence is appropriately described by a hypothetical syllogism. And by a hypothetical syllogism Dr. Hawkins means a scheme which, although it contains only two terms, contains three propositions. As he puts it in his review of Mr. Mascall's book: "the general process of thought may be repre-

sented in abbreviated fashion thus: if finite being exists, infinite being exists; but finite being exists, therefore infinite being exists". And he goes on: "Neither the obviousness of the existence of finite being, nor the truth that the recognition of the entailment depends not upon logical acumen but upon an understanding of what finite and infinite being mean, seems to make this process any less inferential. Nor does the fact that there can be only one instance of God make the entailment any less an entailment". In the second and third sentences of this passage Dr. Hawkins is referring to objections which I have raised from time to time against this syllogism. I cannot see that he has answered them. The "entailment" in which the whole movement of thought consists is found in the first proposition. Dr. Hawkins seeks to break it up into two further propositions so as to achieve syllogistic form. But for anyone to entertain the first proposition and at the same time to require the information which the second and third are supposed to supply is, to my mind, a meaningless state of affairs. It is not merely that it is in practice unnecessary to enunciate in explicit fashion the second and third propositions, but that the existence of finite being and the existence of infinite being could not be presented to our minds as pieces of information even implicitly distinct from the meaning of the first proposition. The "entailment" cannot be apprehended unless we are already apprehending the realities between which it holds. Dr. Hawkins seems to recognize (or have I misunderstood him?) that in this syllogism he is *not* appealing to a rule and then finding God as an instance of it, and observes that this does not "make the entailment any less an entailment". But what he has to show is how in that case the entailment is one which can be properly used in a meaningful syllogism. It seems to me that he has entirely failed to do so.²

² The *form* of the syllogism to which Dr. Hawkins appeals is not of course impugned: "if A, B; but A; therefore B." My contention is that the *matter* of it does not represent a possible way of discovering God's existence. The whole point of syllogistic reasoning, I take it, is to show that two premisses, when once their truth has been grasped,

Dr. Hawkins has pointed out a few lines earlier that his opponents speak of the existence of God as "entailed" by the existence of creatures, adding that "the simple-minded may be excused for retorting that this is precisely what we mean when we say that we know something inferentially". I am therefore obliged to point out once more that the difference of opinion concerns the use of an entailment *in a syllogism*. Dr. Hawkins's opponents do not mean what he means. Whether they ought to, the reader must eventually decide. The further stages of the debate will provide him with the necessary materials.

In *Certainty*,³ then, published at the end of 1948, I repeated the substance of my reply to Dr. Hawkins's article of 1946. In his review of the book in *The Month* for May 1948 he wrote:

"We can only repeat that, if the existence of God were part of the datum when we apprehend the existence of creatures, the knowledge of God would not be inferential at all; if it is inferential, it can be appropriately expressed in syllogistic form. Fr. Trethowan says that this movement of thought is unique, but even a unique process of thought must be either an analysis of the given or an inference from the given; it cannot be both."

I can only repeat that a *syllogistic* inference has not been made out, and that an apprehension of God gained non-syllogistically in and through our knowledge of creatures has nothing contradictory about it and is what in fact occurs. (I do not hold, as Dr. Hawkins might seem to suggest, that the total datum is the existence of creatures, which includes that of God! The suggestion,

(Continued from preceding page.)

produce the required conclusion when held together by the mind. If a man accepts your two statements that a whale is a mammal and that all mammals breathe through their lungs, he will see (if he holds on to these two results) that the whale breathes through its lungs. But nobody can accept Dr. Hawkins's first premiss unless he becomes *ipso facto* a theist, or is one already. If you have never encountered finite being, if you still require to have its existence pointed out to you, you will certainly not be prepared to say anything about the relations in which it might be found to stand to an alleged infinite being. What we do say to ourselves is "*since* finite being exists, infinite being exists". The one leads us to the other—but non-syllogistically.

³ Dacre Press, pp. 42-3.

to which I shall recur, is that "existence" means "creatures-as-related-to-God".) Dr. Hawkins went on to say:

"We might hazard the suggestion that Fr. Trethowan's aversion from introducing reason into the knowledge of God may be due to his associating with all reasoning the characteristics of merely probable reasoning. In probable inference we have reasons for yielding a greater or less degree of assent to a proposition; we do not know the truth of that proposition on its own account. Everything looks as if Fr. Trethowan supposed that, by making the demonstration of God a matter of syllogistic inference, he would reduce us to having compelling reasons for believing that God exists rather than knowing God. But, in demonstrative inference, we do really know the conclusion, although in virtue of the premisses. In this respect demonstrative inference is like intuition, although in respect that the conclusion is logically dependent upon the premisses it resembles probable inference. Perhaps, if Fr. Trethowan took a more adequate view of the privileges of demonstrative inference, he would not be so averse from introducing a syllogistic process into our knowledge of God. This, however, is merely an hypothesis about his state of mind, which he is at full liberty to deny."

I took the opportunity of denying it in a review of Mr. Casserley's book, *The Christian in Philosophy*, last October. Dr. Hawkins's claims for the validity of syllogistic inference in general need not cause any of us a moment's hesitation, and I am at a loss to account for his supposition that I disallowed them. The point is that they are irrelevant to the question of proving God's existence. What, after all this, are we to make of Dr. Hawkins's suggestion, quoted at the beginning of this article, that the writers whom he criticizes have "an unduly restricted conception of what inference means"? Is he repeating the suggestion made in *The Month*, or the point made in his article of 1946 that inference is often not explicit but only implicit? Certainly we often syllogize without realizing it, but it has yet to be shown how this is relevant to the present issue.

At this point the reader might be inclined to say with some impatience that so long as Dr. Hawkins and his opponents offer the same general considerations to their agnostic friends, their technical descriptions of the processes of thought involved may differ without arousing any widespread interest. And this might

seem to be borne out by the concluding sentence of Dr. Hawkins's discussion of the question in his review of Mr. Mascall's book: "It is evidently true, however, and perhaps this is the point which has caused the difficulty, that our quarrel with atheists and agnostics is not about the formal validity of a logical process; it is about the material truth of the entailment of infinite by finite being". How Dr. Hawkins reconciles this last statement with his insistence a few lines above on a syllogistic formula I cannot say. But presumably we must understand him as continuing to insist on the formula. And that, in my judgement, will gravely prejudice the practical value of his demonstration. The great issue of our time is manifestly that between theism and anti-theism, and it is in the highest degree important to free the presentation of theism from encumbrances. That is why I have abandoned the language of inference altogether. Although there is a good deal to be said for the formula "immediate inference" from the etymological point of view, the logic books mean by it nothing more than the obverting or converting of a single proposition, which is not to the purpose, and the general reader takes "inference" to be a purely deductive process.

Before making a final attempt to overcome this *impasse*, I must comment on the following passage in Dr. Hawkins's discussion: "It is not clear what sort of argument Dr. Farrer had in mind when he made the accusation of *quaternio terminorum*. It must have been a categorical syllogism in which the middle term was used ambiguously because analogically, but an alleged demonstration of the existence of God in this form would not be easy to find". Dr. Farrer makes his meaning so plain to me that I can only quote his own words:

"If, as is most naturally done, we treat the analogies as general principles from which the theological truth follows as an instance falling under the rule, we make a formal false syllogism or paralogism, as was shown at length in our first part—if, for example, we treat divine causality as an instance of a universal "causality" and as logically required by the application of the universal causal rule to the case of the world as such. This is formal paralogism, for all analogical syllogisms have *quaternio terminorum* and are invalid. But we avoid the charge of para-

logizing, if we abandon the pretension of syllogizing at all and allow that the "syllogism" is not the simple application of a rule to an instance, but a challenge to us to recognize a genuine analogy and in doing so to arrive at the cosmological idea."⁴

(The passage also conveniently shows how the traditional arguments in syllogistic form are *useful* provided that we do not suppose that the required conclusion is obtained *vi syllogismi*.) In the first paragraph of his article of 1946 Dr. Hawkins admitted that "in their passion for syllogistic form" writers of scholastic text books "often present what is really a piece of conceptual analysis as if it were an inference, and their special *penchant* for the categorical syllogism makes them cramp their thought to its framework . . ." Is it not still often supposed that we may argue to the existence of God as follows: every effect has a cause; the world is an effect; therefore the world has a cause (where the word cause, if it is to refer to God in the conclusion, must have been illicitly introduced with this meaning into the first premiss)?

It is now my turn to put forward a hypothesis about Dr. Hawkins's state of mind. I suggest that he is deterred from recognizing the true state of affairs because he has assumed that the only alternative to syllogistic inference is an immediate vision of God. This assumption seems to be the reason why he cannot seriously envisage the process, indicated by so many recent writers besides myself, whereby we find God *in* his activity upon creatures and not by an inference which acts as a sort of no-man's-land or buffer-state between them. In his article of 1946 Dr. Hawkins pointed out that what are normally called perceptual judgements often turn out to be inferences, and to dwell on this may be illuminating in the present connexion. When we enter a room, we may become certain that there is a bookcase against the opposite wall without going across and touching it, because the phenomena which we experience are identical with those which we experienced on previous occasions when we did satisfy ourselves that it *was* a bookcase and not a representation of one. Or perhaps it may be through the statement of a wholly reliable

⁴ *Finite and Infinite*, pp. 262-3.

friend that we become certain of the bookcase. Anyhow we have become certain, let us say, *that* there is wood over there and not canvas. But we do not on this occasion *encounter* the wood as we did before. Without taking the analysis into wearisome detail, we may surely claim that there is a difference here between a "direct" and an "indirect" knowledge. Everything looks as if Dr. Hawkins supposed that our knowledge of God must be of this second kind. But it does not appear that such knowledge can arise except on a basis of previous experience, and this is clearly inapplicable to our knowledge of God. We cannot know *that* he is without knowing *him*, although we can know that there is a wooden bookcase over there without being directly affected by the properties of wood. Or, to return to a previous example of syllogizing, we can discover *the fact that* whales breathe through their lungs without examining a breathing whale, because we know what a whale is (up to a point) and what breathing through the lungs is, and we are assured that we may infallibly combine these two pieces of previous information because we are assured that the whale is of a class which does so breathe, that of the mammals. But this is not the way in which we find something hitherto unknown which is not a member of any class. If we are to say that God exists, we must claim a real acquaintance with him. Nevertheless our knowledge of him is not direct in the sense in which our knowledge of hard surfaces is direct, for it is only in his actions on things, and on our own souls in particular, that we know him. We find things as related to him and only so find him in them.

Thus the dichotomy between reason and experience to which I referred at the beginning is liable to mislead. If we purge "experience" from adventitious connotations of a merely emotional or subjective kind and use it to refer to intellectual operations (it is unfortunate that it should be used only of *sensible* experience), then we may say that we have an experience of God, though not a vision of God. And our claim is a rational one in the sense that we can point to evidence of its truth accessible to any human mind. A true intellectualism is the cure for mere syllogizing on the one hand and mere feeling on the other.

Finally, how are we to lead people to appreciate the evidence? In the earlier part of his review of Mr. Mascall's book, before the hypothetical syllogism comes upon the scene, Dr. Hawkins says exactly what I should wish to say about it: "Materialists, atheists and agnostics must be convicted of a crass failure to realize what an extraordinary and exciting thing it is that we and other finite things exist". That is just what the theistic existentialists (at whom Dr. Hawkins points the finger of scorn a few lines below) are trying to bring about. There are many ways of presenting our evidence, of showing that man's thought cannot, except by violence, avoid the Infinite, but the word "existence" is, I suppose, the most useful to scrutinize if we would try to reveal the fundamental character of man's intellect from the evidence of linguistic conventions. We use the word about everything. And unless we are content to explain this by saying that it refers to the possibility attaching to all things of being known by our mind (in other words, that "existence" or "being" refers in no way to any activity independent of our minds), then we must admit that there is in all things, as Dr. Hawkins put it in the paragraph last quoted, a "fundamental activity". But I am not satisfied with the way in which he develops this all-important point: "when we ask why things exist, we are really asking why existence takes this form or that, and we apprehend God when we see that the source of the being of the things of experience must be a being about which no such question can arise, because it is existence itself and, since it is existence itself, must be a fullness or infinity of being". Even if Dr. Hawkins did not insist on reading syllogistic processes into this, to ask "why existence takes this form or that" seems to involve treating existence as a sort of common stuff. Here is another long-standing source of debate between him and myself on which I can only briefly touch, although it brings us to the most vital point of all.

It has seemed to me for some time (the doctrine is adumbrated in Dom Mark Pontifex's *The Existence of God*⁵) that so long as

⁵ and developed by him subsequently in articles. I venture to think that his view has not received the attention which it deserved, and that Dr. Hawkins has not yet seriously envisaged it.

those philosophers who attach any objective meaning to "being" at all regard it as referring to beings of various *kinds*, and not in any way—until a syllogistic process has been performed—to pure Being, God, they cut themselves off from a valid indication of him. That indication begins by pointing out that "existence" cannot mean a common *stuff*. If the things to which we refer as beings have a common stuff, they must also have differentiating characteristics. And if we say that the common stuff is "existence" or "being" we cannot also apply those terms to the differences. But we must apply the terms to *everything*. Therefore we must not say that it refers only to a *common* stuff. If it refers to everything, both the common stuff and the differences, it must refer to something which is common both to any features which beings possess in common and to their differences. We must therefore make a distinction between what beings possess in common when compared with one another and something else which is common to all that they possess. And to find this something else we must look outside the beings themselves. In other words, the use of the word "being" proves on analysis to indicate a source of being. By "being", that is, we refer implicitly not only to things of a particular kind but to the relation in which they stand to God; we refer to God as well as to those things. The notion of "being" or "existence" is a *double* notion, one which contains a reference to two orders. That the implication is not to be drawn out syllogistically I have argued already—I fear, at tedious length. How then is it to be done? I shall answer in the words of a recent article which relates St. Anselm's ontological argument with Marcel's distinction between a "problem" and a "mystery": "The method [of St. Anselm] does appear at first sight to be like the inductive method of the natural sciences, yet that is because it is neither inductive nor deductive, but reflexive, and therefore anyone accustomed to dividing his mental processes into 'inductive' and 'deductive' automatically tries to apply this customary division to this reflexive method. But there is one great difference between this Anselmian 'experiment' and the natural scientists' experiments: from the latter one only reaches a law, but in the

former case one awareness passes smoothly into another awareness—or, rather, one awareness is discovered *in* another awareness. This involvement cannot be treated either inductively or deductively, because that would be turning a mystery into a problem.”⁶

⁶ Mr. Donald Nicholl in *The Downside Review*, April 1950, “An Anselmian Soliloquy,” p. 176.

ON TOTAL DEPRAVITY

By G. C. STEAD

I.

THE IXth Article of the Church of England states that "man is very far gone from his original righteousness and of his own nature inclined to evil". It has long been customary for Anglicans to defend this formula as a middle way between sentimental optimism and undue severity. But the emphasis has necessarily varied. Quite recently it would have been natural to apologize for its apparent harshness; but with the spread of Barthian influence there are many who would now dismiss it as too mild a censure. They stand by Total Depravity; all human wisdom or merit must be utterly excluded, if God is to be all in all. It is time to consider whether the traditional arguments against Total Depravity are equal to their task.

For the Barthian movement has undoubtedly had a liberating and revitalizing effect on German theology. Its earnestness is impressive, its consistency marked. It shows in practice how the Bible may be honoured as the Word of God. Yet its persuasive force springs partly from a contrast; a long overdue reaction from the study of religion as a purely human phenomenon, which perhaps infected German theology more deeply than our own. And its distrust of speculation has been enhanced by the disappointment of human efforts in other fields, by the collapse of liberalism, the decay of social and international morality and the threat of destructive warfare. So our first concern is to try to disentangle these two factors: the genuine theology of transcendence on the one hand, the purely secular pessimism on the other.

Three fairly obvious lines of influence may be detected.

1. Barth stands, of course, in the tradition of the great Christian converts, notably Paul and Augustine; men of sensitive temperament, to whom the sudden blinding light of a new conviction made their own past life, and so also the lives of all the

unregenerate around them, appear by contrast as unrelieved futility and darkness.¹ In using such antitheses as "grace and the law", "grace and nature", etc., they were in part expressing their own condemnation of their unconverted state; but they also included unconverted human nature in general, or sensuality in particular, or mere moral idealism, under the same condemnation. Thus their judgements, even if they originated in the vivid sense of God's transcendent holiness and grace, were soon reinforced by external and empirical considerations; the actual faults of pagan culture or philosophy were seized upon and used to justify the sharp distinction between "the world" and "grace".

Now the members of a sick society may well be drawn to precisely these aspects of Pauline and Augustinian teaching. Even if the first-hand experience of sudden conversion is lacking, the contrast between a disordered world and the healing revelation will encourage the same sharp distinction of darkness and light, the same anthropology, the same soteriology, the same concept of revelation. They will develop their experience at second hand on Pauline and Augustinian lines.

2. The Christian doctrine of Man has been largely developed in the context of an argument about Adam and his condition before the Fall. The account given in Genesis may be taken as history or as myth; but in either case a dualist theology will naturally favour the doctrine of Adam's original righteousness; since "the more glorious man's original state and endowments are, the deeper by contrast becomes the criminality and guilt of the Fall"²—and so, consequently, of fallen Man. Conversely, a doctrine of "non-moral innocence" would allow that Man has in certain respects progressed since the Fall and in spite of it, and so invite an optimistic and evolutionist interpretation. Now on the whole modern anthropology has made historic perfectionism much more difficult to hold; so the Barthians have had recourse to the semi-mythical category of an *Urgeschichte*, which frees them from

¹ Cf. Prof. John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God*, pp. 81-2; N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall*, etc., pp. 155, 169-70, 237, 331, 426 ff., but he, perhaps, over-stresses the subjective and temperamental factors.

² N. P. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 360; cf. pp. 300-1.

historic control and allows them to make Adam's original state as perfect as they like.

3. The crucial point is the transcendence and sovereignty of God himself. Yet even here the theologian's own temperament and circumstances inevitably colour his presentation. In a disordered world, men tend to emphasize God's transcendence, as if to excuse him from responsibility; the mystic always inclines to the *via negationis*, the convert favours an invasive conception of grace. All these influences have been at work either in the Barthians themselves or in their great theological forerunners. And the opposite conditions, a stable temperament, a Christian upbringing, an optimistic view of society outside the Church, a philosophy of progress and sympathy with scientific evolutionism, all tell in favour of God's immanence and providence.

The Barthians would certainly reject this whole method of criticism; they claim to be merely the passive recipients of the Word. But one cannot, in fact, expel the subjective element of human interpretation; and it is only common sense to recognize and allow for the influences which have helped to mould one's theology. At the same time, such criticism does not take one very far. A position is not shaken merely by showing how it has been reached; it can only be attacked by pointing to some false step or inward inconsistency, or else by proving that it leads logically to consequences from which both parties recoil.

There are, of course, some familiar practical objections to Barthianism. A total condemnation of all human actions outside the sphere of grace may easily lead to antinomianism in politics and elsewhere. If all are corrupt, what does it matter which we choose? To avoid this conclusion, we must seek to justify a verdict of relative approval and disapproval about men, practices and institutions outside the Christian Church, even though from another point of view we condemn them all. So Paul has to borrow his Stoic maxims and Calvin to formulate his *justitia civilis*.

Again, such a condemnation may prejudice individual penitence, since our own sins are comfortably swallowed up in a *massa*

perditionis for which we are not personally responsible.³ Here, again, Calvin is well aware of the difficulty: "We must deale wisely heere: for if we say that man is deprived of all righteousness, he will foorthwith thereby take occasion to become sluggish: if we ascribe to him even but a very little, he will streightway be overthrown with rash confidence".⁴

But I need not enlarge these practical objections, which have been ably exposed by Professor H. D. Lewis.⁵ Clearly we should not rely on merely practical objections, still less on instinctive dislikes; so I pass to consider what can be said against the doctrine of Total Depravity on the plane of explicit theological argument.

II.

The first two chapters of Romans are notoriously productive of conflicting interpretations. On the face of it, they might give rise to the following argument. Unless man has some knowledge of God, he is not responsible for his idolatry; but if he has some knowledge of God, he is not totally corrupt. St. Paul's main object is to accuse both Gentiles and Jews of disobedience; and the basis of this charge is that man possesses some kind of natural knowledge of God which they have perverted. God's "invisible things" are "clearly seen"; and men are condemned because "though they knew God, they did not glorify him as God". It is the perversion that is stressed, not the natural knowledge; but the former presupposes the latter.⁶

One can, of course, reply that the condition of responsibility is satisfied if one says that each man has had some knowledge of God, but has forfeited it. This is true to the general tenor of St. Paul's thought, but does not quite correspond to his explicit statement in Romans i, 19-20. Similarly Calvin argued that all men still possess some sort of knowledge of God, but are guilty of wilfully suppressing it, so that it cannot help them; and a

³ I owe this point to Principal J. O. Cobham.

⁴ Fetherstone's abridgement of Inst. II, 2.

⁵ In *Morals and the New Theology*.

⁶ Cf. C. H. Dodd, *Natural Law in the Bible*.

similar position has been attractively presented by Dr. John Baillie. Dr. Baillie, however, rejects the doctrine of total corruption; and as his discussion of this problem is one of the ablest and most important in recent years, I shall try to evaluate his arguments.

Three main arguments are developed. The first attacks Barth's position by maintaining that the work of revelation is not a sheer miracle of revelation *ad nihilum*, that man's already existing reason and conscience and religion condition his acceptance of the gospel. If this be allowed, then we must hold, in theological terms, that the *imago dei* in man is not wholly obliterated and Barth only maintains the contrary by flying in the face of all those ordinary empirical facts about human moral progress and conversion which we normally take for granted.⁷

I myself should accept this argument; yet I doubt whether Barth himself would be seriously discomposed by the admission that his theology contradicts all accepted empirical observation. This is an important point, to which I must return; what, in fact, is the Christian thinker's right to paradox? Meanwhile I think it important to emphasize that a man's state before his conversion is neither a mere irrelevance nor just a correctly-laid substructure which only needs to be completed by the work of grace. One might perhaps say that revelation is God's gracious answer to men's specific needs: the individual's need of grace, his perversions no less than his positive abilities, provide the setting for God's act of revelation and redemption. There is thus a "point of connection"⁸ in man's failings as well as in his positive capacities: God's self-revelation is always relevant. On the other hand, there is also an element of sheer discontinuity in the process. There may be nothing in a man's sinful state which can suggest how it is to be healed. God's answer cannot be anticipated. It has, in an infinitely higher degree, the unpredictability of genius.⁹

⁷ J. Baillie, *op. cit.* § 2, especially p. 22.

⁸ I am, of course, suggesting a modified sense for Brunner's *Anknüpfungspunkt*. For a different solution, cf. G. Aulén in *Theology*, March, 1949, p. 85.

⁹ Cf. C. S. Lewis, *Miracles*, pp. 116-117.

Dr. Baillie's second argument develops from a criticism of Brunner, who attempts the difficult task of upholding human responsibility while at the same time asserting the total depravity of human nature. Brunner therefore has to reconcile the two following propositions:

(i) That the original image of God in men has been destroyed, that the *justitia originalis* has been lost and with it the possibility of doing or even of willing to do that which is good in the sight of God, and that therefore the free will has been lost.

(ii) That man, though a sinner, is responsible for his sinful state, and that he retains his intellectual superiority to animals, his *Wortmächtigkeit*, which is the condition of responsibility.

Brunner's solution is to "distinguish categorically": "Formally the *imago* is not in the least touched—whether sinful or not, man is a subject and is responsible. Materially the *imago* is completely lost, man is a sinner through and through, and there is nothing in him which is not defiled by sin".¹⁰

Now Dr. Baillie has no difficulty in disposing of this artificial distinction: "You cannot have form without matter: still less can you . . . have the complete form without any matter". However, the principal difficulty in criticizing Brunner seems to lie in his lack of precision. What is it, exactly, that he supposes intact? At one point he seems to identify it with man's "function and calling", which seems roughly equivalent to "God's purpose for mankind". But this is not enough to safeguard human responsibility: for this we need empirical statements about the actual condition of the human race. Men cannot be responsible unless their actual reasoning capacity is still in some measure reliable.

Dr. Baillie, indeed, simply identifies Brunner's "untouched form" with "rationality"; and he very naturally objects to any actual element in human nature being pronounced incorrupt. "What we are asked to believe is that the form of rationality is still fully possessed by all men, while all have completely lost the power to do or to desire anything good. Yet it appears certain that the ravages which sin has wrought upon the content of God's

¹⁰ *Natur und Gnade*, § 3; E. T., *Natural Theology*, pp. 22-24.

image in man has in no small manner extended also to the form of it; and that our reasons have been corrupted no less than our wills".¹¹

I should agree in the main; yet even so I think we shall have to admit that not all the functions of our reason have been equally corrupted. Its cruder functions, like reasoning or calculating, may be remarkably developed even in notoriously wicked men, and would only be disturbed by the cruder vices, such as gross intemperance. In its higher functions, where nice judgment and exact balancing of arguments is demanded, moral factors are much more likely to count.

So we may perhaps sum up as follows. Man is gravely corrupt, and no part of his nature remains intact. Yet the corruption is unequal; and it has not taken such a form as to extinguish man's responsibility.

But Dr. Baillie also brings a third argument against total depravity, which I wish to reject. "Perfect goodness and perfect reasonableness are one and the same thing. And again utter wickedness and utter unreasonableness are one and the same thing . . . But if, on the one hand, utter wickedness is the same thing as utter unreasonableness, it is equally true, on the other, that all wickedness involves some degree of reasonableness—a completely unreasonable being would be as incapable of wickedness as of goodness, for he would be simply non-moral. This means that total wickedness is a self-destroying conception".¹²

It is this last phase that I find misleading. It might easily suggest that there is an upper limit to the gravity of evil that can exist. (I used it once myself to prove that there could not be a personal devil; but now I am not so sure.) Dr. Baillie holds that "evil is essentially parasitic in nature . . . evil feeds on the good which it seeks to destroy, and in destroying it completely would therefore destroy itself".¹³ And this may be a fair description of

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 33: "Hence total corruption is not anything that can exist but . . . a limiting conception that can be approached only asymptotically." For a similar argument, cf. E. J. Bicknell, *Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 231: "If man were totally corrupt he could not be aware of his corruption," etc.

some types of evil. The fact is, however, that such evil in its destructive course is far more formidable—far more evil—than the corruption and degeneration which it may finally produce. If the parasite is to flourish, there must be a good healthy host for it to feed on. And, indeed, one of the most fearful things we have learnt from our actual experience of wicked men and corrupt societies is their power to preserve themselves by harnessing good motives and unselfish activities to wicked ends. This process can continue indefinitely without reaching its logical conclusion. Anything that preserves men's natural capacities may also increase their power for evil. And in these days, when we are told so much more about the devil's strategy, one might even venture the opinion that he is careful not to tempt everybody! No doubt he leaves the redeemed alone, as innocent tools providing the material for fouler and more formidable wickedness.

Alternatively one might compare certain sorts of evil not to a parasite, but to a caricature. It is essential to a caricature that the original should be recognizable in it; but it would be quite misleading to talk about the "remnant" of a true portrait, as some sort of mitigation. The likeness is actually essential to the malicious power of the caricature.

This discussion seems to suggest the following conclusions:

(1) We can give a qualified support to the doctrine of total corruption if it only means a corruption extending to every part of man's nature. This milder form of the doctrine is to be found in Calvin, and it would seem consonant with the general unity of the human personality: cf. I Cor. xii, 26.

(2) We must reject it if it means simply a theoretical extreme of degeneration. But this is presumably not what is meant by those who uphold it; hence by denying this we are not denying anything really important.

(3) We have provisionally accepted the argument about responsibility. Man cannot be really wicked unless to some extent he retains his rationality; nor can he be responsible for his wickedness on any other terms. Indeed, he cannot be bad in any way without retaining some elements of goodness; but the exist-

ence of this "remnant" does not necessarily do anything to mitigate the evil—it may even contribute to it.

(4) From a philosophic point of view, it is worth observing that many of our difficulties result from trying to reduce our verdict on the human race to a simple linear scale. To produce any judgement valid for all men would seem hard enough; but we go further: we ask whether the *imago dei* is completely lost or only partially; we compare the state of mankind to the gradation between light and darkness, or introduce the quantitative notion of a remnant. In all such cases we are over-simplifying so drastically that no precision of statement is possible; different judges are bound to project the situation in different ways according to the viewpoint with which they start, each seizing a particular perspective and drawing flat diagrammatic schemes between which no accommodation is possible.

Brunner at least does introduce two variables into his diagram; but as he insists on making $x = \text{unity}$ and $y = 0$, the advantages of this concession are largely lost. A position such as Paul's or Calvin's is far more realistic.

(5) But if it is misleading to assert total corruption, it is equally misleading to deny it. Our proper course is to find some less misleading form of expression; and I pass to consider some arguments about human sinfulness which are stated in other terms.

III.

One such argument finds expression in statements such as the following: "Man is a sinner, who can do no good work without grace". The obvious objection is that this contradicts what we ordinarily believe about pagan virtues. But it is clear that we can take both "good works" and "grace" in a narrower or a broader sense. So there are three courses open: (i) to restrict the sense of "good works";¹⁴ (ii) to enlarge the sense of "grace"; (iii) to uphold the contradiction itself, either tacitly, or explicitly, through a theology of paradox; both the absolute condemnation and the relative approval have their legitimate function and use.

¹⁴ "Nothing absolutely good in the sight of God (but perhaps some relatively good works)."

In practice, both Lutherans and Calvinists are apt to combine (i) and (iii).¹⁵ Calvin himself clearly wishes to exclude any sort of good works without grace in the narrowest sense: "Free-will does not enable any man to perform good works, unless he is assisted by grace; indeed the special grace which the elect alone receive through regeneration". (Inst. II, 2, 6, etc.) But he is driven to admit, inconsistently, that there is a certain sort of good conduct which men can achieve without grace in this sense (*Ibid* II, 2, 12-16), simply in virtue of God's general liberality or assistance; and a certain sort of knowledge of God also, though not saving knowledge.

But there is much to be said for taking the second course, and interpreting "grace" in the broader sense, as "*favor Dei erga nos*". Incidentally, this gets rid of the scandal of a Pelagian Adam: "The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works . . . without the grace of God by Christ preventing us . . . and working with us . . ."

What, then, was the condition of Adam before the fall? The reformers assumed that it was one of exalted wisdom and holiness. Well and good; let Adam be an historical man, and let his spiritual endowments be as exalted as you please. Are we now to say that this excellence of wisdom and knowledge did not pro-

¹⁵ For a good Lutheran statement, see G. Aulén in *Theology*, March, 1949. For (i), p. 84; for (iii), pp. 83, 85; e.g., "When Lutheranism speaks of man's 'total depravity' and moral 'impotence' . . . what is meant is that in the sight of God man is disclosed as a sinner." Cf. N. H. G. Robinson, *ibid.* December, 1948: "The doctrine of the universality of sin is not the result of a detached examination of virtues and vices; it is rather an insight of faith . . . It grasps an essential moment in the relation between man and God." This is essentially Reinhold Niebuhr's position, without his curious formulation, "The Equality of Sin and the Inequality of Guilt." Niebuhr is, of course, right in saying that "the sense of guilt rises with moral sensitivity"; but he uses the dangerous metaphor of "the vertical dimension" of the soul's relation to God; this too easily suggests that there is no analogy between divine goodness and human goodness: God is unknowable.

ceed from the grace of God? That Adam had no need of God's grace? Or that God withheld it? This is surely nonsense. God was gracious to Adam, supremely so; no question of need arose in all that blessed converse. What is true is, that Adam did not need the sort of assistance that God by his grace now affords to sinful man.

There is, therefore, a serious ambiguity in the statement, "Man is absolutely dependent on God's grace". We have to distinguish several different kinds of dependence; including,

(a) Man's ultimate dependence as a created being, perpetually kept in being by God's creative will.

(b) His absolute spiritual dependence. If God is the source of all good, then Man, in his best actions, is drawing most deeply on God's grace. Righteousness for man is, to use the manifold grace of God. There can be no good work which is not done by grace. And there can be no knowledge of God which God himself does not impart.

(c) His dependence on an *assistentia generalis*, by which God's providence overrules the worst consequences of human folly and safeguards the conditions which make amendment possible.

(d) His dependence on the various sorts and means of grace.

Of these, (a) and (b) certainly express a dependence which is absolute; but, equally, one which would hold for mankind in any imaginable state of innocence. Hence no argument for human sinfulness can be based on them. Again, man, as sinner, is dependent on God's healing grace and forgiveness (d); and absolutely dependent, in that none but God can supply such assistance. But this does not prove him absolutely sinful.

The argument might, however, be restated in more personal terms: "If a man is to rely wholly on God's grace, then he must wholly distrust his own capacities and merits". And this is true to one aspect of Pauline thought. But here one must reckon with the well-known exhortation: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do".

There is no need to press the sense of the expression, "your own salvation". No doubt it does little more than reproduce the sense of "In my (Paul's) absence", not "without God's grace". It is the single word "for" which is all-important, since it shows that an appeal for human effort can be actually reinforced by the recognition of God's grace. If it were possible that human effort could in any way replace or substitute itself for the grace of God, then this "for" would be meaningless. The point is, however, that their effort (in this sanctified response) is at once the outcome of divine grace and the means of laying hold on it. This does not mean that the effort itself is in any way superseded or obviated by grace. Rather, God's grace inspires their effort; in their response itself his grace will be at work.¹⁶

Let us put the matter in another way. We are apt to think of God's grace and our wills as in some sense co-ordinate—as it might be, partners in a common task. If this picture were accepted, then St. Paul's "for" would become meaningless: the more we did by our human efforts, the less there would be for God to do; our efforts would encroach on his. Or else, the more truly God was at work in us, the less we should need to exert our wills.

Strictly speaking, of course, this argument only applies if the task is a limited one. In other cases (e.g. that of prospectors in virgin country) the work of one partner might easily increase the work and responsibilities of the other. And the winning of salvation is not a limited task; it is much more like prospecting than piece-work. But the real solution is that this whole conception of a partnership is false. We are not partners, we are creatures through and through; yet it is God's will that we should act and exercise the freedom which he has entrusted to us. The task of grace is to elicit a response from the human will. Hence anything that we do in obedience to grace is also, and more truly, something that God does in and through us. We can never contribute anything from our own independent resources

¹⁶ "God so works upon the moral nature that it . . . appropriates God's will as its own." M. R. Vincent on Phil. ii, 13, in I.C.C.

(I Cor. iv, 7); nevertheless there is a measure of co-operation which we can give or withhold.¹⁷

We might then seek to abandon the whole notion of co-operation, of a joint enterprise, embodied in the theory of Synergism; and then we need no longer insist that the human partner contributes nothing, or decry the importance of human effort and human merit, in order that God may be all in all. But here we must notice a further difficulty. For although so long as we keep strictly to first-order realities, it is impossible that our efforts should encroach on the sphere of grace, or *vice versa*, the case is not so simple when we take account of human interests and motives and allegiances. For trust in God's will is still trust—a human motive, which can come into conflict with other motives, e.g., the normal self-reliance of responsible man. Again, if we consider grace as mediated through outward institutions or sacramental means, these have to compete for our time and interest with other claims and occupations. And this competition is, I think, not entirely a result of man's sinful state, but of his natural needs. If he is to live at all, his conscious attention must be to some extent preoccupied with the things of this world.

It is, I think, this fact that God works in and through the limited human consciousness that brings grace and effort into apparent competition. And if this competition be recognized, we may often find in "*Sola gratia*" a salutary corrective, and we cannot blame the Barthians for insisting upon it, even at the cost of a certain element of paradox. It does not mean, "Exert no effort, achieve no merit"; it means, "Rely not on effort or merit, but on God's grace". And yet I should suppose that self-distrust is of the same nature as asceticism; it is only justified if it does in fact increase our trust in God. Mere diffidence is no more good to us than mere masochism; and there is no virtue in a doctrine of human wickedness, or in any other pessimism, except in so far as

¹⁷ It seems allowable to say, "Grace co-operates with our wills", if one abstracts the grace from the Giver. It would seem absurd to say, "God co-operates with our wills." Indeed, we could not even say that a teacher co-operates with his pupils. Yet he needs their co-operation.

they help to cleanse our hearts and turn our loyalties to their true holding-point.

And do the Barthians in fact achieve this? My own suspicion is that their self-distrust and self-condemnation may be useful as a protest, but they are negative attitudes which cannot be long sustained. The original dynamic of faith in God is easily lost, and is replaced by faith in a Church, or a system of doctrine, or pride in one's own form of self-abasement. On the whole the history of Protestantism bears this out.

In conclusion, we might point out that the Barthians often follow Calvin's predominantly homiletic treatment of man's free-will, which blurs the important distinction between *liberum arbitrium* and *libertas*.¹⁸ No doubt man's *libertas*, his moral spontaneity and freedom from temptation, is gravely compromised. And no doubt all responsibility lies ultimately in the hands of God, and all good motives and desires come from his inspiration. But none of these facts must be allowed to belittle man's delegated but very real responsibility. This might appear to commend God's majesty, but it ends by making him responsible for human sin, and then no shifts about divine justice or "preterition" will remove the scandal. We must say instead that God, though ultimately the sole cause, is yet self-limited in allowing some mediate causality to man. He chooses to teach rather than compel. He would rather have rebellious children than responsive machines.

Doubtless this will not satisfy the neo-Calvinist. He will feel that if one admits any human responsibility or merit, men in their self-love will be led to rely on it and despise God's grace. We have already recognized a certain justice in this contention; nevertheless, we say, the risk must be taken. To deny human rationality leads to sheer confusion; one must affirm it, though

¹⁸ See especially Institutes II, 2, 7. Luther adopts the same tone in "On the Bondage of the Will." I have not the space to deal fully with Niebuhr's deeply suggestive notion of "Responsibility despite inevitability", and his "ultimate paradox" that "Man is most free in the discovery that he is not free." The essential point is, surely, the realization of God's love and forgiveness: "I know that I shall often sin again, yet my sin shall not hinder His goodness working."

with earnest warnings against presumption, if there is to be any Christian theology at all. For what, after all, is the Christian thinker's right to paradox? No doubt it is often right to talk about the virtuous as though they were guilty: it is right because it expresses an essential element in the relationship between God and man. We see how man must appear in comparison with God's transcendent goodness, and exclaim with Isaiah, "Woe is me, for I am undone". From this point of view indeed our sins are as scarlet, our righteousness as filthy rags. And yet an exclusive emphasis on this point must ultimately devalue our language and blur the distinction between right and wrong, without which the paradox itself will lose its force. We may, indeed we must, allow an element of "foolishness" and "scandal" to poets and prophets in their attempt to grasp at realities which exceed our power of consistent statement. But the last word must lie with wisdom and right reason.

REVIEWS

FAITH AND HISTORY: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. (Nisbet). 16s.

SOME twenty-five years ago the work of Reinhold Niebuhr originated in a radical social criticism of a capitalist culture on the verge of decay. It was born of his own experience in the pastoral ministry in Detroit under the shadow of the Ford plant. It was carried out primarily on the ethical level, and it was informed to some extent by Marxian insights. This preliminary phase of his work comes to maturity in two books, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1933) and *Reflections on the End of an Era* (1934), which in turn reflect these two points of departure; while in the following year the publication of *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* indicates the movement of his thought into a new phase characterized by theological orthodoxy. From this date we can detect the tentative explorations of two themes which come to occupy a dominant and central position in his later work: the problems of man's nature and destiny, the first centering in a reaffirmation and a fresh interpretation of the doctrine of original sin, and the second in an extended investigation of the Christian understanding of historical existence. This phase of his work achieved massive and coherent expression in the Gifford Lectures on *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (1941, 1943), and *Faith and History*, the latest volume from his vigorous pen, must be regarded as a companion-piece to them in certain respects.

In these two major works Niebuhr has constructed a frame of reference by comparing the distinctive views of human nature and history represented by Classical thought, Biblical Christianity and Modern Culture (cf. *Human Nature*, ch. 1, *Faith and History*, ch. 2); and it is his purpose to show how the latter is partially the product of perversions and combinations of the two former, while at the same time it achieves specific features from its own internal logic. The inquiry into the problems of human nature, within this frame of reference, is important because it seeks to establish a view of human nature as a structure of finite freedom which is involved in, and yet transcends, the contingencies of the natural world and history; and which also locates the origin of evil within the human personality, as the source of the discrepancy between man's ideals and achievements which becomes increasingly manifest as the harmony of creation is disturbed through human sinfulness. The assessment of human nature which is given by the

insight of the Christian faith carries with it an assessment of the human situation in existence; and it is necessary to grasp this clearly because the most significant error of the modern view of history, and the source of its most profound illusions, has been the assumption that the march of historical development will bring about a radical alteration of the human situation.

The relation of man to the horizontal dimension of existence, represented by the flux of time, as well as to the vertical dimension represented by the scale of nature, is always ambiguous, and precludes premature solutions to the problems to which it gives rise. Man transcends the natural order by his freedom and rationality, just as he transcends the flux of time by his memory and his imagination; and in virtue of this transcendence he is able to envisage structures of meaning and coherence which have a longer span of life than that of natural organisms, and which may therefore be falsely endowed with an absolute immortality which they cannot possess as finite creations. This pretension has to be corrected at every point by the correlative truth that human existence is rooted in nature and spanned by time, and from these limitations man is unable to extricate himself completely. Niebuhr demands a continual recognition of this ambiguity of the human situation; and he employs this insight as a razor with which to prune the pretensions of human nature as it moves unwarrantably in the direction of transcendence or in the direction of identification with nature.

It becomes all the more necessary to keep it in view when we are concerned to elucidate the problems of historical existence because the realm of history may not be simply identified with nature or with the dimension in which man's transcendence expresses itself: it is in a sense rooted in both of them, and is woven out of transitions between them. Thus, Niebuhr observes that "the three views of history which have matured in western culture are all answers to problems and perplexities which are consequent upon the radical nature of human freedom. Man's freedom is unique because it enables him, though in the temporal process, also to transcend it by conceptual knowledge, memory and a self-determining will. Thus he creates a new level of coherence and meaning, which conforms neither to the world of natural change nor yet to the realm of pure Being in which Greek idealism sought refuge from the world of change. This is the realm of history." (*Faith and History*, p. 16).

Already, in *Human Destiny*, Niebuhr has defined the fundamental distinction between historical and non-historical interpretations of historical existence. It can be expressed most succinctly as "the difference between those which expect and those which do

not expect a Christ. A Christ is expected wherever history is regarded as potentially meaningful but as still awaiting the full disclosure and fulfilment of its meaning. A Christ is not expected wherever the meaning of life is explained from the standpoint of either nature or supernature in such a way that a transcendent revelation of history's meaning is not regarded as either possible or necessary" (p. 5). The pages of *Faith and History* are devoted to a detailed elaboration of this distinction, illustrated by a considerable range of learning and a power to grasp and express in a few words the essential character of many different viewpoints.

The interpretation of history in classical thought represents in various ways the attempt to consume history in eternity by severing the timeless and divine element in human nature from its involvement in the world of change, particularly by means of the unique powers attributed to the human reason; or it seeks to reduce history to the level of nature, and so gives birth to the doctrine of cyclic recurrence, bringing with it a deep-rooted pessimism which precludes men from dealing creatively with the concrete novelties of history. Both of these types fail to appreciate the ambiguity of the human situation, and in particular the mysterious character of human freedom. They "emphasize that aspect of man's freedom which is expressed in his ability to rise above the flux of temporal events. But they do not see that other aspects of the same freedom enable him to create a new order of reality, which, though grounded in a temporal flux, is not completely governed by natural necessity, since human agents have the power to change the natural course" (p. 19).

The Biblical view of history breaks through the idea of cyclic recurrence, and creates the attitude of future expectation towards the fulfilment of historical destiny which in turn is subjected to various perversions in modern culture. Moreover, "Christianity embodies the whole of history in its universe of meaning because it is a religion of revelation which knows by faith of some events in history, in which the transcendent source and end of the whole panorama of history is disclosed" (p. 24). It thus creates a conception of universal history, not by the empirical correlation of the individual histories of semi-discrete cultures, but in terms of the divine sovereignty over the historical destinies of all peoples (ch. 7, and p. 120). The prophetic interpretation of the divine sovereignty moves, as it were, between the covenant of God with Israel and the ultimate disclosure of the divine love and mercy. Both the remembered event and the expected event acquire the character of centres of meaning, so that from the one prophetic interpretation is driven back to the creation and forward to the messianic reign, while the other acquires the character of both an end and a new

beginning (p. 27 and p. 157). The other profound contribution to the understanding of historical existence made by the Biblical view is its handling of provisional elements of moral meaning and moral obscurity in history, and its refusal to bring either of them to premature solutions (ch. 8).

The modern view of history is a compound of classical and biblical elements. From the one it inherits the desire to make historical existence rationally intelligible and self-explanatory, and attempts to do so at the price of a bifurcation of human nature. From the other it inherits the view that history moves towards a climax, but interprets this in a too simple and utopian manner by the expectation of a universal reign of peace, justice, rationality and freedom within history itself. According to Niebuhr's analysis the modern view of history is undermined by its extravagant estimate of human freedom, and by its identification of freedom and virtue (chs. 5 and 6). As a whole, it is characterized by the view that history itself is a redemptive process, rooted in the facile assumption that man's increasing technical power manifested in the control of nature would operate with equal validity and precision in the more complex and ambiguous realms of society and history. This view of history has embodied its own refutation in the fateful logic of events in the modern period, and it is in this refutation that Niebuhr discerns the spiritual crisis of our age.

Faith and History is an exciting book to read, and the reader continually catches his breath at some flash of the author's brilliance. It has also a strangely elusive quality which is perhaps due to the fact that its argument tends to move on three levels at the same time. It is not only a comparison of the three distinctive views of historical existence, such as we have indicated in the preceding paragraphs. It also makes a considerable contribution towards a formal Christian interpretation of history, although one feels that there are a number of factors which still require to be taken into account. And it is, thirdly, a contribution to an elucidation of the nature and task of a Christian apologetic in the contemporary situation, in both its positive and negative forms, and in its distinction between the form and the content of the New Testament data (particularly in chapters 9, 10 and 11). The exposition moves from one level to another with bewildering rapidity and dexterity, and while this is a tax upon the reader's attention, it adds considerably to the stimulus which the book provides.

There can be no doubt that it will add appreciably to Niebuhr's already considerable reputation, although in two respects it is a disappointment. After the reading of *Human Destiny* many of us wanted to know what Niebuhr made of the *metaphysical* problem of

man's destiny, how the structure of human nature is related to its consummation by participation in the Communion of Saints and the Beatific Vision, and we felt that he had evaded this largely in his concentration upon the working out of that destiny in the metaphysics of historical existence. Related to this is the problem of the rôle of the Church which has received only cursory attention in Niebuhr's writings generally. In chapters 12 and 13 he sharpens his razor to distinguish the false absolutes which enter into the Christian interpretation of history, and the fulfilments *in* history from the fulfilment *of* history, but in neither does he come to grips with the first problem; while in the last chapter he defines the Church as the "community of hopeful believers, who are not afraid of death or life, of present or future history, being persuaded that the whole of life and all historical vicissitudes stand under the sovereignty of a holy, yet merciful, God whose will was supremely revealed in Christ" (p. 270). Thus we are, in effect, told much that is salutary about the apprehension of the ultimate meaning of historical existence by faith, but we are told virtually nothing about the household of faith. The little that is said drives us to the conclusion that, in Niebuhr's view, the household of faith has no metaphysical structure, no essential nature, however much it may be wounded and whatever pretensions it may make under the conditions of existence. If we are correct in this conclusion we are left with the uncomfortable feeling that Niebuhr is not really in a position to harmonize the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of human existence between which the Christian universe of meaning must ultimately be woven.

R. H. DAUBNEY.

A REBIRTH OF IMAGES: THE MAKING OF ST. JOHN'S APOCALYPSE.
By AUSTIN FARRER. (Dacre Press.) Pp. 348. 25s.

In a most disarming preface Dr. Farrer, modestly protesting that this book is no more than an interim report on seven or more years' study of the Apocalypse of St. John, expects and even seems to hope that it will be thoroughly pulled to pieces, which, says he, will be all to the advantage of the truth. The charming and intimate way in which the author discloses the mental pilgrimage which brought him to the conclusions, not only about the Apocalypse but about the other Johannine writings, which he here sets forth, impels me to abandon the austere impersonality of a reviewer, and express the intense delight which the reading of this brilliant piece of biblical study has given me. No doubt it will have to undergo the neces-

sary testing, but I am sure that whatever changes or corrections in detail may result, it will be found that, as the author hopes, the principal pegs of his structure are well and truly driven.

In the first place it was a peculiar pleasure to discover that, *si maximis licet parva conferre*, I had been moving towards the same conclusions as Dr. Farrer on several issues. Having been, in my youth, thoroughly indoctrinated with what he calls the "critical dogma of plural authorship", I had, after carefully working over the Fourth Gospel for a number of years, been brought, almost reluctantly, to recognize the presence of the fundamental patterns of the Apocalypse in the Gospel. In this connexion I cannot refrain from quoting a characteristic and delightful passage from Dr. Farrer's discussion of the question of unity of authorship: "The identity is so subtle and at so profound a level, the pattern is so naturally adapted and developed in the Gospel, as to make the hypothesis of imitation by another hand fantastic. Why, then, is the dogma of separate authorship so prevalent? Not, of course, through the inability of intelligent men to give the correct answers to their own questions, but by the right questions not being asked. If, for example, we ask: 'Is the style of the Apocalypse that of the Gospel?' the answer is, plainly, 'No'. If we ask: 'Is the attitude to the Advent Hope the same in the two works?' the answer is, again, 'No'. But since the style of the Apocalypse is completely artificial and antiquarian, to refuse to allow St. John ever to write in more ordinary speech is like refusing to recognize the authenticity of my everyday writings, because I once composed a collect in what I supposed to be the style of Archbishop Cranmer. And as for the attitude to the Advent Hope in Apocalypse and Gospel, let us get on to the time-machine, fly back to Patmos, and put our question to St. John himself, at work on his Revelation: 'Are you not developing a somewhat onesided eschatological emphasis?' 'Let me be', the saint replies. 'I am making my meditation on the Last Things. I shall meditate on the Incarnation to-morrow.'"

This is very delightful, but a dogmatist might possibly reply to the first part of the argument that anyone who did not know Dr. Farrer or his writings, on being confronted by the collect *à la* Cranmer and, let us say, *The Glass of Vision*, might have justifiable doubts whether both writings were by the same author and of the same period of English literature. But the argument relating to the Advent Hope is both subtle and convincing and is still more convincingly developed further on: "By the time that St. John had seen the Vision of the Bride, and bowed before the Throne of God and of the Lamb planted in the heart of the redeemed creature, he was ready to begin writing the Gospel, whether weeks,

months or years in fact elapsed between the composition of the two works." This is acutely observed, and it is most refreshing to find Dr. Farrer resolutely breaking away from the atomistic methods of literary criticism, already recognized to be inadequate in the field of Old Testament studies, and boldly developing a new approach to the Apocalypse in which it is treated as a living unity, the product of poetic imagination in its profoundest form. From the nature of the case, dogmatists are hard to convince, but the most confirmed believer in the dogma of plural authorship cannot but recognize that the arguments advanced by Dr. Farrer for the essential unity of the Apocalypse must be given the most serious consideration.

The second important feature of the book which I found equally satisfying, and for a similar reason, was the insistence on the process of transformation of images which we see going on in such a thrilling way in the Apocalypse, and especially the insistence on the fact, often insufficiently recognized, that it was Christ who, in the experience of his earthly life, had made the decisive transformation of the images. Fifteen years ago, in the volume entitled *The Labyrinth*, I published an essay which attempted in a humble way to describe the persistence of the ancient images, and their transformation in Christian apocalyptic. Hence it is a peculiar pleasure to find Dr. Farrer developing the subject with so much insight and such a wealth of learning.

In connexion with the author's defence of the essential unity of the Apocalypse reference may be made to R. P. Boismard's article in the *Revue Biblique*, Oct., 1949, entitled "*L'Apocalypse*", ou "*Les Apocalypses*" de Saint Jean. It provides an interesting contrast to Dr. Farrer's method of approach. Fr. Boismard's thesis is that the Apocalypse can be analysed into two independent Apocalypses, both by the same author, one written during the Neronian persecution, and the other under Domitian; the two being combined later by another hand into a single work. The theory is an attempt to explain the presence of so much apparent repetition in the book, a feature which has troubled many commentators.

Dr. Farrer, dealing with the Apocalypse on the assumption that it is, in his own words, "the one great poem which the first Christian age produced", demonstrates convincingly that what appear to be repetitions and intrusions are part of the logical structure of the book. He shows that the pattern of the book is a mounting spiral of six great sevenfold visions, culminating in the final vision of the eternal sabbath of God and the New Creation. There is no otiose repetition whatever in the poem, and what appears to be such is but the rhythmic pattern of the book's architectonic structure.

Dr. Farrer believes that St. John of Ephesus was a Jew who

had served a long apprenticeship in the synagogue, and was thoroughly familiar with its lectionary and the pattern of its worship. His mind was stored with the apocalyptic images of Ezekiel, Daniel and Zechariah. But his apprehension of the dying and glorified Son of Man, the Lamb slain, was the creative experience in which, as in the flame of a crucible, all this wealth of imagery was transformed into the great gem-like Christian Revelation with its many facets, each reflecting the glory of God-in-Christ.

Dante's *Divina Commedia* is not easy to read, neither is its early Christian and greater counterpart. The reader of Dr. Farrer's exposition will without doubt be bewildered at the outset by the intricacy of the pattern, like Ezekiel's "fire infolding itself". The Jewish synagogue lectionary, its religious year revolving on its cycle of feasts, the days of creation, the stones in the high-priest's breast-plate, the signs of the zodiac, the names of the twelve tribes of Israel, all make up a mosaic of images which will leave the reader dazed and amazed. But patient study, with the Old Testament and the Septuagint ever at hand, will in the end yield so rich a harvest that the diligent student will thankfully acknowledge with the present writer that no more fruitful piece of biblical exegesis has appeared within living memory. Of this book it can truthfully be said that it is indeed *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*.

S. H. HOOKE.

STUDIES IN OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY: Presented to Professor Theodore H. Robinson, Litt.D., D.D., D.Th., by The Society for Old Testament Study, on his 65th birthday. Edited by PROFESSOR H. H. ROWLEY. (T. and T. Clark.) 16s.

IN England professors, along with mothers-in-law and curates, have generally been regarded as legitimate butts of the comic spirit. But on the Continent it has long been far otherwise, and the pleasant custom of the Festschrift has spread in recent years to this somewhat irreverent country. Few members of this industrious and often ridiculed class can be more worthy of this token of affectionate esteem and honour than Professor T. H. Robinson, to whom this book is dedicated by his former students and colleagues together with a number of distinguished foreign scholars. Wherever the Old Testament is studied Professor Robinson's name has long been a household word, and much of his most valuable work has been done in the field of Old Testament prophecy. Hence it is most meet and right that the volume which celebrates his attainment of 65 years of devotion to biblical studies should be wholly occupied with the subject which is most dear to his heart.

There are collected here thirteen essays dealing with a wide range of aspects of the prophetic literature of the Old Testament. The volume opens with an essay by the Achilles of American Old Testament scholars, Professor W. F. Albright, on The Psalm of Habakkuk, in which he makes skilful use of the new light thrown by the Ras Shamra material on early Hebrew poetry. The essay is completed by a reconstruction of the Hebrew text of the Psalm, a translation and notes. It is a brilliant piece of original work.

While all the essays are worthy of inclusion and of honourable mention, space will not allow of more than a brief notice of a selection from them. Special interest attaches to the publication here by the late regretted French Old Testament scholar, Professor A. Lods, of a hitherto unedited tablet from Mari. The text and translation, with a short commentary, are by Professor Dossin, who is engaged in editing all the recently discovered texts from Mari. Professor Lods discusses the bearing of the new tablet on the technique of the prophetic oracle, with special regard to the much debated question of "cultic" prophecy in the Old Testament. It appears from this tablet that as early as the time of Zimrilim of Mari, who was a contemporary of Hammurabi of Babylon, there existed a class of official persons called "answerers", both male and female, whose function it was to give replies in the name of the god of the temple to which they were attached. In this particular case the oracles thus delivered were from Hadad of Kallassu and Hadad of Aleppo.

The existence of a similar class of persons in Israel has been the subject of much debate in recent years, and is touched on in several of the essays in the volume under review. Professor Pedersen has some illuminating remarks on the subject in his essay entitled "The Rôle Played by Inspired Persons among the Israelites and Arabs", while Professor Norman Porteous discusses it with wisdom and insight in his essay on "The Basis of the Ethical Teaching of the Prophets."

Professor North follows up his authoritative study on *The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah*, recently reviewed in this journal, by a most interesting discussion of the meaning of the "former things" and the "new things" in Deutero-Isaiah; in his view, supported by a learned and acute analysis of the relevant passages, "the former things" refer to the early victories of Cyrus, while the "new" alludes to the expected new Exodus from Babylon.

Professor Henton-Davies presents a valuable discussion of the Yahwistic tradition in the eighth-century prophets, and makes us hope for more from his pen in the near future.

Space will not allow of reference to other valuable essays by scholars whose names are well known and whose contributions to

Old Testament studies are everywhere recognized as of first-rate importance in their chosen fields. The general impression left on the mind by the reading of this most interesting and stimulating collection of essays is that the state of Old Testament studies in this country is wholly encouraging. While the well-recognized British tendency to prefer the *via media* is worthily represented, it is also clear that the younger scholars are not afraid of adventuring along new paths and breaking new ground. In short, it may be said that both the "former things" and the "new things" are to be found here in due proportion, a happy mingling of brilliance and caution. Professor T. H. Robinson has good reason to contemplate with thankfulness and satisfaction the sheaves of his harvest.

S. H. HOOKE.

DEN THOMANDER-WIESELGRENSKA PSALMBOKEN. AV ALLAN ARVASTSON. Pp. xxxii + 320. (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrrelses Bokförlag.) Kr. 12:50.

THIS attractive and admirably printed volume is the twenty-first of a series of "*Samlingar och Studier till Svenska Kyrkans Historia*", edited by Hilding Pleijel of Lund. It tells in considerable detail the remarkable and, it must be admitted, highly complicated story of the successive stages of the efforts towards hymn-book revision which have occupied attention in the Church of Sweden since the publication of the Wallin revision in 1819 and in the Swedish Lutheran churches in the United States especially since the foundation of the Augustana Synod in 1860. It is probably for the latter reason that the book contains a summary of nineteen pages giving in English an outline of the main lines of a controversy which the 32 pages of a comprehensive bibliography show to have awakened widespread interest, even though it be unfortunately true that on the other side of the Atlantic "it is only a question of time before hymn-singing in the Swedish language will definitely belong to the past."

For English students the book has interest in more than one direction. It illustrates in more senses than one the range and effectiveness of royal control in Swedish ecclesiastical matters—a control which, in view of the tension excited by the proposal to replace the old Hymn-book of 1695 in 1819 by something more modern, seems to have been exercised with wise discretion. It exhibits also the difficulties which beset the fate of reformers from their own point of view as well as that of those disposed by tradition and temperament to hold that the old is better. Readers will probably agree that some of the grounds of opposition were well taken

and the revisions of revision associated with the names of Wieselgren and Thomander lend at any rate some support to the critics, even if the comparisons for which Mr. Arvastson's Swedish text affords opportunity do not always carry conviction. It is easy to understand that efforts at translation or adaptation of a hymn of Prudentius like that *In exequiis defunctorum* may awaken the same kind of qualms as some English editors have felt, quite unnecessarily as others would hold, about versions of the *Imitatio* of Thomas à Kempis. But it is not less easy to see how perturbing to devout and uninstructed minds suggestions might prove that the Church of Sweden was being committed by what was proposed as its new official hymn-book to semi-Pelagianism; or at best was showing a serious declension from the norm of Lutheran interpretations of Scripture. And it must be admitted that those who are fortunately not committed to an official hymn-book may find themselves marvelling at the boldness with which at one stage the reforming party in Sweden seem to have endeavoured to secure prohibition of the use of any book but their own.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST AND THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS

By GREVILLE NORBURN

"The noblest of all studies is the study of what man is
and of what he should pursue".

—Plato's *Gorgias*.

I. FROM MORALS TO METAPHYSICS.

THE cynic in his disillusionment sometimes characterizes life as being like a game—to him so much seems to depend upon mere luck. The comparison, however, need not be cynical at all.¹ For just as the playing of a game demands that it shall be played only in a particular way, so in the game of life—if it is to be lived well—it is required that the particular things that are done shall be done *in a certain manner*. For example, in cricket, no matter how much I want my side to win, there are some things which simply are "not done". I must not let my eagerness interfere with standards of fair play or of good sportsmanship. I must play the game according to the rules and in the proper spirit, or not at all. So in the good life. Whatever my "passions" (as Hume labelled them) happen to be, whether my needs and desires at any particular moment are centred upon food, security, money, office, knowledge or pleasure, there are some things which in the pursuit of them I may not do. There are manners which I must maintain, codes I must exemplify, standards below which I must not fall. Suppose my object is to make money. As an end this has a legitimate place among my desires; only I must pursue it in a certain way. The means I employ must be lawful, the motives honest. I must not make it like a cheat or a churl. Lying and swindling are "not cricket".

In the light of this comparison, we can see immediately what is the purpose of these rules of the good life or "manners"—to

¹ I owe this thought to the late Professor Stocks. (*Limits of Purpose*, p. 74 f.).

use an old-fashioned word. They are designed to impose moderation, limitation, or even prohibition upon the ways and means we adopt in order to pursue any particular "passion" or purpose we happen to have a mind to; and to impose it in the interests of the better ordering of society. They are artificial only in this sense that, like the rules of cricket, they are unmistakably works of art and the products of men's will. They come down to us from past generations, modified no doubt in the process according to circumstances, but exemplifying one constant aim; which is to create and maintain a public order and tradition of such a kind as to harmonize all the wills of the individuals who make up a particular group or society, and to prescribe *how* private desires may be rightfully satisfied, in what order and degree, when, where and under what circumstances.

This being the case, it follows that they are not things that may be arbitrarily taken up or set aside at a man's private pleasure. They are part of the social framework into which each of us was born, and, as such, are objective and authoritative. No man can afford to have an open mind about them any more than he can afford to have an open mind about the "No ball" rule in cricket. For whoever is committed to life is committed to living as well as he can.

Yet although their imperative authority is thus objectively real, they need nevertheless to be subjectively conditioned if they are to acquire their specifically *moral* character. Here lies the essential difference, rooted in our very language, between an obligation and a command, between a "Thou shalt" and "You ought". Our obedience to moral rules and manners must always be uncoerced, spontaneous and self-authenticating to the judgement, if it is to be the act of a free man and not a slave. Bowing to their authority, a man must yet be conscious that he is also legislating for himself. Morality is an affair of rational assent, of *conscience* in fact, so that the sense of "ought" removes it entirely from the realm of force or compulsion.

But now our analogy begins to break down, as all analogies do sooner or later. Cricket is a voluntary game. I need not play it, if I do not care to. *When* I play it, I am of course expected to play it in the proper manner and according to the

rules—on pain of disqualification. But if I play it, I have only one end in view—to win.

In the moral life, playing is compulsory. I cannot contract out of it—unless perhaps I become a Robinson Crusoe, and even then it is doubtful. Like cricket, I must play it according to the rules and in the proper “manner”—on pain of blame. But (and this is the important difference I have in mind) *there are more ends than one*. In the practical life, every claim seems to be met by a counter-claim. So the demands of a man’s family upon his time may conflict with those of his town. An employer’s concern for an employee is sometimes at war with his responsibility to the group of which that employee is a member. It is the duty of a general, aware that in his brain alone lies the plan of an imminent battle upon which his country’s future may depend, to keep alive in the meantime. But suppose a situation arises in which, at the cost of risking his life, he might save that of his humble orderly, what then does honour bid him do? Or what is the fireman’s duty on rushing from the flames with a “priceless” work of art which has given enjoyment to millions, and hearing a baby cry—is it to drop the picture and rescue the child or leave the child and save the picture?

It is because of these clashes of loyalty in the matter of ends, some trivial, some tragic, some difficult, few simple, that it becomes imperative for thought to formulate some order of priority and scale of importance, so that it can distinguish between claims which are urgent, and those which are less so. This means that, if life is to be taken seriously and intelligently, a comprehensive and systematic *policy* is required to set in order those general moral ends or “values” which underlie the particular casuistical decisions which men find themselves called to make almost every moment of their lives. A rational policy of this sort is necessary, not merely to enable us to choose the right means to those ends we all naturally desire (self-preservation, sex, etc.), but also to impose an order of preference in respect of those ends themselves. For morality is—or should be—not only a matter of fitting the right means to any end whatever, that is to say, simply a matter of good manners; it is a matter also of adjudicating between ends themselves and fitting the proper manners to the

right ends. And, as it demands selection between alternative means, so it may equally demand the absolute prohibition of some ends altogether. Perhaps we should not expect *absolute* and *complete* consistency in this necessary effort to systematize our scale of importance. It may well be that there will always be room for difference of opinion as to the *comparative* worth of things which stand at the very "axiological summit". Yet I believe it to be an essential part of the strictly philosophical quest to go as far as may be in this effort; for without a policy as comprehensive and consistent as possible we are like a ship without a rudder.

Now let us take the argument a stage further. We have said that a rational policy is a *conditio sine qua non* of the moral life. To this we must now add a caution—it must be the *right* policy. This pushes thought to the very brink of metaphysics. For it is common knowledge that men's choice of means, no less than their judgement of ends, has always been affected by the way they have conceived their destiny. This is not surprising, and confirms what I think is a truth; namely, that that special branch of philosophy which tries to think in an orderly fashion about our duties and responsibilities is largely a derivative and secondary kind of philosophy dependent at every turn upon metaphysic. For how can we pretend to know what is good without our knowing what is true? It would appear that in order to get our moral values properly graded and systematized, it is necessary to judge our various responsibilities, not only in the light of (say) "my station and its duties" but ultimately in the light of what I think are the purposes of human life as a whole. I must formulate some synoptic conception, however firm or however tentative, of the nature of man as such and of his place in the universe in which he finds himself. A developed and articulated morality demands no less than the attempt to think together *all* the pervasive aspects of human experience and the achievement (in ideal at least) of a total outlook upon reality.

It is precisely here, needless to say, that much controversy arises; for there are many candidates, all claiming that they alone speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

The situation, however, is not so bad as to allow us to dismiss

the matter, with the cynical observation "*tot homines quot sententiae*". Indeed a fundamental division can be made between all possible "world views". For throughout the long tradition of European thought, two rival opinions can be observed in competition. On the one hand it has been maintained, by those who have earned the right to be heard, that nature, though it is a thing which really exists, is yet not a thing which exists in its own right, as it were. It is a thing which depends for its existence all the time upon something else. On the other hand, it has been maintained by those who have earned no less a right to be heard, that nature is not so dependent, that it exists on its own, and is, so to speak, a thoroughly self-going concern. Of the naturalistic and exclusively one-worldly view, I take Spinoza, the greatest of the stoics, to be the ideal type. Of the other view, which recognizes in addition the existence of some non-naturalistic and other-worldly object, I take Socrates—the wisest of pilgrims—to be the best-known representative.

Here is a major difference compared with which all others are minor, and a choice between them is forced upon us, as a matter which (as Pascal put it) "concerns ourselves and our all". It is not possible to sit on the fence and suspend judgement in the hope that more evidence will be forthcoming. Life itself commits us imperiously to action, and, even if we refuse to decide "with the top of our minds", an honest introspection into the springs of action will often reveal what decision has been made secretly at the bottom of our hearts. "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also". Nobody really keeps an open mind in this matter. Each man's scale of importance will show to which point of view he inclines.

The way our minds are made up on this crucial issue goes far to determine the answer we give to the question of where the *chief* end of man is rightly to be looked for. The naturalist is bound to seek it, in general, within the limits of space-time existence. The *particular* form it takes varies of course with different writers. Ecclesiastes, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Marx and Nietzsche all conceive blessedness (if that is the right word!) in very different ways; yet all place it *within* history. The non-naturalist, on the other hand, shows a marked tendency (though

there are, of course, exceptions) to entertain a hope of personal immortality, at least as a not irrational possibility. Hence the Socratic "tendance of the soul". "If death ends all", says A. E. Taylor, "it may not matter so much what sort of soul a man has, since in a few years his wickedness will end his life. But if the soul lives for ever, it takes with it into the unseen world nothing but its own intrinsic character for good or evil, and its unending future depends upon that. On the character we bring with us into the unseen world our company will then depend, and our happiness and misery will depend on our company". (Plato, p. 207.) Pascal reminds us that this also is a matter "of so great consequence that all our actions and thoughts *must take different courses* according as there are or are not eternal joys to hope for".

INTERIM CONCLUSION.

In view of what has been said so far, we may then come to the tentative conclusion that the philosophical quest, starting as Socrates himself did from the moral exigencies and intellectual "*aporiae*" of the practical life, must rise by inexorable stages to the traditional problems of metaphysics. Is the existence of a God upon whom the world of nature and man depends a credible assumption or not? Is the world the product of unconscious power or of a loving Creator, ruled by fate or Father? Is man a tiny lump of carbon and water, impotently crawling upon a small and unimportant planet, or is he the embodied soul he seemed to Socrates? Is man free enough to take responsibility for action, or is he quite determined by causes beyond his control? What hopes are there of immortality, or is the rational soul quite incapable of surviving the shock of death? These perennial questions of God, freedom and immortality, are, as Kant pointed out, the centres around which the thoughts of men continually revolve—and they make a great deal of difference. They are not *all* the metaphysical questions a man must settle with himself; but these three at least will not allow themselves to be passed over, even if (as is the case) they are incapable of being answered with apodeictic certainty.

But now having arrived at this tentative conclusion, a doubt begins to assert itself. Is the human mind capable of dealing with these speculative questions at all? Or are they such things

as ought never indeed to be asked? Kant, as usual, raised this question when, at the very beginning of his first Critique, he said, "our reason has this peculiar fate with reference to one class of its knowledge, it is always troubled with questions which cannot be ignored, because they spring from the very nature of reason; and which cannot be answered because they transcend the powers of human reason". Kant himself solved the difficulty by admitting that there were other sorts of knowledge besides the strictly scientific sort whose function it is to deal with empirical matters of fact. Indeed, he laboured in his first Critique to "remove" such "knowledge", so that in the second and third "he might make room for faith". Nowadays, however, certain modern "illuminists" or sceptical persons—to wit, the Logical Positivists—have come along to assert that there is no such knowledge beyond, or in addition to, the strictly scientific sort, and that traditional metaphysical questions of this sort are strictly "non-sense" questions, which all men of good taste should now eschew as completely obsolete. Let us then examine their case to see if it can be substantiated.

II. THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS.

These "minute philosophers" of our day—to use a phrase of Berkeley's—assert that the only true and legitimate function of reason is analysis and criticism. They deny to philosophy the right to formulate any synoptic view of human experience and aver that, as reason is limited simply to re-arranging the data delivered by sense-experience and to putting the scientists right on what they really mean, it follows that it has of itself no material contribution to make to the sum-total of human knowledge. There is only one kind of genuine knowledge; that is to say, knowledge which refers to the interconnection of things in the space-time world of commonsense experience and which alone can be verified by methods of observation or experiment.

In support of these naturalistic claims, the Logical Positivists tabulate all sentences which, on the surface, seem to be true and significant into three groups:

- (a) "tautologies" or *a priori* propositions,
- (b) empirical propositions, and
- (c) literally "non-sense" propositions.

As to the first, we get an example in mathematics or logic.

In the jargon of the school they are labelled "tautologies", because they merely serve to make explicit what is already implicit in any given set of assumptions. Thus, if we start with Euclid's assumptions, we can, for example, draw out of a given isosceles triangle the consequence that it has two equal angles at its base. Such statements are thus purely analytical and do not assert any fresh fact or give any new information about the actual relation of things in space and time.

In contrast, empirical propositions or sentences do claim to give information of this sort—or at least intend to do so. They are statements about fact; and as such can be proved either true or false. Their verification, actual or possible, is always an affair of sense-observation or experiment. Thus, for example, the proposition that the boiling point of benzene is 80.4 deg. C. is an empirical proposition. Its truth can be verified experimentally by anybody who can obtain the necessary apparatus and has the skill to use it properly.²

These two groups of sentences, referring respectively to matters of definition and observation, exhaust the whole field of *cognitive* significant discourse. They alone are meaningful statements. But not so the third class of sentence. These comprise those propositions which on the surface claim to be true and significant, but which in the nature of the case cannot be objects of sense-experience, nor be shown to be logically constructed out of elements of sense-experience. The proposition that "God exists" is just such a one. The claim of such propositions to truth is spurious. Indeed they are neither

² As a matter of fact (though this is to anticipate) the verification of so simple and obvious a generalization as this is an affair of great complexity, as Professor Ritchie shows in some detail (see *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 74 ff). Verification of any sort is an activity which assumes a high degree of inter-subjective intercourse; that is to say, the co-operation of minds other than my own to check my private observations by public confirmation. In the last resort, the truth or falsity of any assertion is a judgement which can only be affirmed or at least confirmed by social testimony. But can human testimony be translated without remainder into sense-data? To raise the question is to answer it. Consequently, it is true to say "that the plausibility of the positivist case rests upon his apparently appealing to actual sense-data; the possibility of its being valid rests upon a concealed appeal to what are not actual sense-data." (*op. cit.* p. 78).

true nor false. They are literally and technically nonsense, and as such meaningless. They are the products of *emotive*, not *cognitive*, discourse. They serve merely to convey or arouse personal emotion, and assert nothing at all about the actual state of affairs in the outside world. They are interesting merely from a psychological point of view.

It naturally follows from all this that, if the Logical Positivists are right, not only metaphysics, but also ethics, aesthetics and religion in their traditional forms are all examples of the emotive and psychological use of language. All speculative attempts to reach a synoptic view of experience as a whole are simply matters of feeling and entirely without significance, except as indicating the private histories and predilections of those who make them.

In short, we can sum up for our purposes the main gist of these positivist polemics by quoting the famous words of Hume at the end of his *Enquiry*: "If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics for instance; let us ask: Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it contains nothing but sophistry and illusion".

It is, of course, quite obvious that, after their master David Hume, the Logical Positivists have been influenced by the popular impression of the teaching of Kant, according to which it was his essential contribution to learning to establish the truth that genuine knowledge must be confined to that area of fact which alone can be verified by sense-experience. This, of course, is but a caricature of Kant. It is to consider only the Kant of the *Dialectic* and forget the Kant, for example, of the *Critique of Judgement*. It is to fail to discern the essentially religious Kant under the mask of Kant the iconoclast.

But this is hardly the place to show how Kant—even the Kant of the *Analytic*—could be made to refute those who swallow his positivism and dismiss his metaphysics as but the unfortunate effect of his pietistic upbringing. I will simply indicate some of the blunders which the Logical Positivists seem to me to commit.

In the first place, it would appear to be the acme of illogicality to assert that all statements (apart from definitions or

tautologies) are strictly nonsense which cannot be shown to be verifiable by observation or experiment. For the statement cannot itself pass the very test which is supposed to distinguish sense from nonsense. It is not put forth as a definition: it is put forth as a significant proposition. But there is no possible way of verifying it empirically—the only way the Logical Positivist will admit. It would appear, then, that the Logical Positivists are in the extremely awkward position of being hoist by their own petard—i.e. of asserting a principle which, by their own canons, condemns itself as nonsense. But it is never, of course, sufficient to refute an opponent on the ground of mere inconsistency. So let us pass to a second criticism.

It would appear that, in attacking metaphysics, the Logical Positivists are in effect attacking the very foundations of science whose apostles they profess to be. For science lives upon the assumption that the order of nature which it examines and seeks to understand is one system and one order. It assumes that things will continue to behave in the future exactly as things have behaved in the past. It assumes that the book of nature really is a book and not a scrap-book, and in particular that its language is intelligible when deciphered by the key of applied mathematics.

But such an assumption—the very life-blood of the natural sciences—could never in this world be proved by observation. Nor could it be confirmed by experience or verified by experiment. The assumption has no doubt been found to work pragmatically, but this is not what the scientist means. When he says that the book of nature is a whole and that it is written in the language of mathematics, he does not mean only that those few pages of the book which he has managed to read up to date have been found to be intelligible, and that they probably will continue to be so for the next few pages ahead. He means that the book of nature is quite certainly a unity written in this language *from end to end*.

But at this point the Logical Positivist who is really in earnest with his principles should leap to his feet in denial. "You are affirming a proposition", he should say, "which applies to an indefinite number of instances, said to be observable, which in fact have never been all observed, nor can be. Tell me that

mathematics has been applied by this or that person to this or that thing, and I know what you mean. I may believe you. But tell me that mathematics is applicable to everything in nature, and I cannot either agree or disagree. You are affirming a proposition which can never be verified experimentally and therefore I maintain that it is meaningless and you are talking nonsense" (Quoted from Collingwood's *Metaphysics*, p. 256 ff.)

Consistency would therefore seem to require of the Logical Positivists that they should deny the possibility, not only of metaphysics, but of science also. The fact that they have not done so would appear to be due to a certain understandable reluctance to impugn a principle upon which actual science ever since Galileo has depended. So, as Collingwood dryly points out, they let it pass, "and to ease their consciences drop heavily upon the proposition 'God exists', because they think that nobody believes in God except poor miserable parsons, whose luggage enjoys no such diplomatic immunity". (*Op. cit.* p. 257.)

It would be profitable, by way of a third criticism, to ponder Leibniz' reply to the positivism of *his* day, when in response to Locke's contention that *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*, he made the somewhat devastating reply: *excipe, nisi ipse intellectus*,³ an echo of which is to be found in Kant's dictum: "the senses do not err, not because they always judge rightly, but because they do not judge at all". (Kr. I, p. 356. 2nd Ed.)

But this would take us too far afield. Sufficient it is to say here that the new form in which the Logical Positivists have dressed up the old saying that "seeing is believing" would dissolve quite away that "transcendental unity of apperception" without which the capacity to *count*,⁴ let alone to think or to converse, would be quite impossible.

Our final criticism must be this. The Logical Positivists would seem not only to deny the foundations of the natural sciences whose praises they so loudly proclaim, not only to dis-

³ There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses; *provided we make the reservation*, except the intellect itself.

⁴ If there were no such thing as memory (unverifiable by sense-data) we could not even add up the number of fingers on our hand.

solve away the *proposer* of any proposition whatever; they liquidate also those ordinary judgements which we make every day in our normal relations with our fellow men. Professor Stocks, in his book *Reason and Intuition*, pointed out that there were two kinds of significant assertion. "I ask you", he said, "to let me make a general distinction between Partial and Total assertion—an absolute dichotomy, providing two very capacious boxes into which any assertion that has ever been made must necessarily fall. An assertion is to be called Total, which has reference to the whole of the being indicated in its subject; an assertion is Partial which has reference only to a part of it. . . . Take the example of a person, an individual human being. To say that he is six feet high, the father of two children and works at the docks is clearly to make a Partial assertion about him. To ascribe any virtue to him, and more generally to call him a good man, is to make a Total assertion". (p. 39 *op. cit.*)

There can be little doubt, I think, that Professor Stocks has indicated a useful and valid distinction. The Logical Positivists, however, whilst admitting the significance of the former kind of assertion (that is scientific!), are compelled by their own principles to dismiss the latter as of merely emotive significance.

Yet this is simply not the case. We may easily verify the assertion that some particular neighbour of ours has red hair. We have only to go and look. But we cannot, by the same method of observation, verify the judgement that he is an honest and good man. We may perhaps take his outward and visible actions as indices of his inward and spiritual character, but the judgement itself goes far beyond what can be verified simply by sense. It is a matter as much of insight as of sight, of sympathy as much as of observation, of evaluation as of evidence.

Yet we are constantly making these judgements upon the characters of those with whom we come into daily contact. We think So-and-so is to be trusted; So-and-so is not. And, in spite of the possibility of mistake, it is simply not true to say that these judgements are simply the reflection of my private likes and dislikes, opinions and prejudices. I do not say that So-and-so is honest because his manners please me. On the contrary, I assert his honesty to be something which really belongs to him object-

ively and quite apart from my feelings about him. In the light of further knowledge, I may perhaps change my opinion. But this makes no difference to the fact that it is *to him* that I attach merit (or demerit). If ethical judgements were simply matters of taste, then they could be safely dismissed on the ground that *de gustibus non disputandum*. The fact that we *quarrel* about them indicates clearly enough that there is something objective and impartial about them. (See Kant Kr. III, p. 230 ff. Bernard's translation.)

Ethical judgements, in short, being of a Total kind, are things which, though excluded from science and incapable of proof by empirical means, are yet rightly regarded as proper objects of knowledge in the strictest and most definitive sense of the word. The constant "dropping of the object" (to use a phrase of Joad's) in these matters on the part of the Logical Positivists, and their inveterate habit of decrying, not only ethical judgements, but judgements of beauty as well as of greatness as nothing but sentiment, would seem to indicate minds which are morally timid, possibly resentful, and certainly conceited.

Incidentally, religion itself springs from a judgement as to the *character* of that in which we live and move and have our being, and as such derives from something which is of the nature of a *total* assertion. "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" is a typical expression. It is this fact which makes religion incapable of proof or verification in the same sense or by the same methods as would be applicable to verify a *partial* assertion. It is as certain as anything can be that, as the Logical Positivists are wrong in describing ethical judgements as of merely emotive significance, so they are wrong in characterizing religion as nonsense, simply because its claims cannot be verified by the empirical method of simple observation and experiment.

In the light of these criticisms, we may conclude that the Logical Positivists have not made good their case against the possibility of metaphysics; that is, of a reasoned, though speculative, interpretation of human experience as a whole. We have found them to be guilty of inconsistency, both with their own principles and with common sense. For not only do they assert as true a principle which, by its own canon, condemns itself as

nonsense; they assert a principle which would liquidate the very subject which maintains it. Nay more, they assert a principle which would abolish the enduring material world in which common sense cannot but believe. Finally, they assert a principle which would make nonsense of those objective ethical judgments without which we simply could not find our way about in the practical affairs of life. Were he to be consistent, the Logical Positivist would not take one step outside his study without falling into some action or statement which, on his own principles, he should condemn as absurd or nonsensical.

And yet, when all is said and done, he is a most useful person to have around, if only as a check to over-enthusiastic speculation. Even if (as is the case) "clarity is not enough", even if (as is the case) analysis is not the be-all and the end-all of the philosophical quest; yet the Logical Positivist, by his Socratic insistence upon these virtues, forces the metaphysician to keep his feet on the ground. He forces him to consider whether, in fact, his notions are indeed significant of anything real; he forces him to consider what empirical controls there are for his rational speculations. In so far as he does this, his influence can be nothing but salutary and wholesome. Logical Positivism, we may say then, is good as a propaedeutic to the philosophical quest. Socrates himself might have been the first to agree to that. But Socrates did not stay at clarity and analysis. He died a martyr to "God, freedom and immortality". With such an example in view, philosophy need not be ashamed of, or call off its quest for truth. The perennial philosophy is (so far) still a reasonable possibility.

(To be continued)

ECCLESIASTICAL USAGES IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY SCOTLAND

By GEDDES MacGREGOR

I. BACKGROUND

PAPAL jurisdiction over Scotland was repudiated, with singularly unanimous popular assent, by Acts passed in the Scottish Parliament of 1560. One of the first steps taken to implement that revolutionary measure was the appointment of a commission to produce a revised doctrinal statement. This promptly took the shape of the *Scots Confession* of 1560, which was no less promptly adopted as "hailsome and sound doctrine groundit vpoune the infallibill trewth of Godis word". Knox claimed, indeed, that the Confession was completed within four days of the order to prepare it; that after it had been read, first to the executive of Parliament and then to the entire House (including representatives of the old ecclesiastical *régime*), not one objection was raised; and that some days later, when it was again read that the vote might be taken, the extent of disapproval was limited to a comparatively mild protest by three nobles who proposed to adhere to the faith of their fathers, and a perhaps somewhat ominous episcopal silence. While Knox's account does not quite square with those of contemporaries, it is plain that the Confession enjoyed a generally cordial reception, with negligible opposition.¹

¹ In spite of its ferocious denunciations of the corruption of the "Papistical Kirk", it was a much broader and less violent statement than the *Westminster Confession* that followed nearly a hundred years later. In the nineteenth century, before the Act of Assembly of 1921 much modified the old rigorous subscription to the latter document, its authority was often invoked by Scottish divines in the Established Church who, having rebelled against the narrowness of the Westminster Standard, were charged with heterodoxy in the ecclesiastical courts; and its prestige is now officially recognized under the Act that united disrupted Presbyterianism in 1929.

In sharp contrast with this early doctrinal settlement is the comparatively indeterminate state of church government and organization during the early years of the age of reform. Knox's First Book of Discipline does not set forth any complete scheme of government. There are, of course, certain features evidently intended to be permanent; but many seem to have been intended as provisional; and it is not easy, if it is even possible, to distinguish precisely between the two. It is not clear, for instance, whether the office of the superintendent, who was a kind of bishop, was meant to be integral to the new system.² Much, at any rate, was left in a fluid state, with a minimum working arrangement. It was not until five years after Knox's death in 1572 that the government of the Reformed Kirk hardened into a form that would be clearly recognized to-day as Presbyterian: the Presbytery of Edinburgh dates only from 1580. It is the adoption of the Second Book of Discipline by the assembly of 1577, under the leadership of Andrew Melville, that marks the beginning of the century of bitter struggle between bishop and presbyter and people and Crown. Melville, fresh from Geneva, had his ecclesiastical polity much more cut and dry than ever Knox had had, and also more unimaginatively imposed it. Much of Scotland, especially the remote north and west, was still untouched by the Reformation. James VI, characteristically, vacillated in his attitude to the rigours of Melville's new system, trying at first to combat it and restore episcopacy and then, faced with a rising in favour of the old Roman allegiance, quickly arrayed himself on the side of Melville's powerful machine. When the arrangements of the Second Book of Discipline were confirmed and fully established in 1592, the spiritual and temporal prestige of the Kirk throughout the country was very great. Now fully established and at the summit of her power, she worked out the rigid system of Melville in detail. But within twenty years it gave way to episcopacy, which became legally established in 1612, nine years after James VI had ascended the throne of England at the Union of the Crowns. The vanity and

² The first parliament of the Regent Moray reintroduced lay patronage in 1567, and charged the superintendent with the induction of the nominee.

uncouthness of this monarch made him unpopular in his southern kingdom; but his time-serving policy made him despised in both. He married his daughter Elizabeth to the elector palatine, a German champion of the Protestant cause, did his best to marry his son to a Spanish infanta, and ended by being dragged, by his son Charles, into an unnecessary war with Spain after he had, by his indiscretions, laid the seeds of endless ecclesiastical strife in his own native northern kingdom. For from his accession to the throne of England in 1603 he strove to assimilate to English episcopacy the rigid presbyterianism he had himself so fully encouraged but eleven years previously, in confirmation of the covenant to uphold presbyterianism that he had signed in 1580.

For over thirty years after James's accession to the English throne, the increasing pressure by the Crown to undermine the Scottish system and align it to that of England culminated in tumult in St. Giles's with widespread rebellion that expressed itself in the National Covenant of 1638. This act of revolt against the imposition of the episcopal system was signed by nobles, clergy and commons; the Crown was quite helpless to impede the rising or to compromise with it; and in 1643 we find presbytery again fully established. By this time the unfortunate policy of Charles had thrown England into similar trouble; but here the parliamentary opposition was of a different character. Presbyterianism had never meant much to England, which conceived its opposition to the Crown on its own lines. In the Westminster Assembly the Scottish divines were quite outnumbered by representatives of the more radical English opposition, which, to say the least, deeply tinged the Scots with ideas quite alien to those of the Scottish reform not only of Knox but even of the more drastic Melville. The *Westminster Confession* which superseded the *Scots Confession* of Knox and his contemporaries profoundly altered the complexion of the Kirk. And in place of Knox's *Book of Common Order*, which had served as the Kirk's sole liturgical guide apart from the liturgy imposed by the Crown, there appeared the *Westminster Directory*, which outlined a kind of service of unexcelled puritanical gloom. Knox's *Liturgy*, although tedious enough to modern ears, is much less arid; nor does it, like the *Directory*, wholly repudiate set forms of prayer,

although, in accordance with the general policy of the early reformers it did not commit itself precipitously to fixed forms unhallowed by time. After the next episcopal period, between the Rescissory Act of 1661 and the Settlement of 1690, when the Kirk was finally established on a presbyterian basis, asserting its spiritual independence and yet allying itself to Crown and State, the *Westminster Confession* and the *Westminster Directory* were the books officially adopted; and the Kirk settled down to a worship the baldness of which was unrelieved throughout the eighteenth century, and has left a permanent mark on the character of Scottish worship.

The early seventeenth century is peculiarly interesting and informative as a period in which to look at the Kirk's usages and feel her ethos; for, on the one hand, her political suspicions had made her, in comparison with the Kirk of Knox, a hard and rigid machine, doggedly resisting the growing threat to her independence; and, on the other hand, she was more Knox's daughter than ever she was after her contacts with English puritanism. Menaced but still powerful, in the doldrums and yet more confident than ever of her national character and mission, she steered amid great difficulties a course that might have led to her development on much broader lines than fell to her after English puritan influence had indelibly altered her aim and outlook and bitten hard into her heart.

II. CHURCHES AND THEIR FURNISHINGS.

The Scottish Reformers destroyed few churches. They pulled down many images, it is true; but, apart from an occasional mob outburst against provocative adherents to the old ways, the damage inflicted on fabric was not great. The great abbeys of Jedburgh, Melrose and Dryburgh had been destroyed before the Reformation: their destruction was not connected with it. It is recorded, indeed, that Knox went out in person to save the monastery of Scone; and the same historian remarks that he has heard of but three or four churches cast down at the Reformation.³ And in spite of the Reformers' dislike of images, it is plain that as late as 1640 crucifixes, images of our Lord, of Mary, and

³ Baillie, *Historical Vindication of the Church of Scotland*, p. 40.

of the saints were still not wholly unknown; for we read of severe measures being then taken to suppress them, sometimes because of offence they were said to have given to the soldiery. In all pre-Reformation churches the chancels were retained; and for some time after the Reformation they were used for the celebration of Holy Communion.⁴ If rich vestments had been abandoned, sackcloth was retained for public use; and every church had its pillar and stool of repentance.

In the middle of the sixteenth century, while fixed pews were common in England, and even shut up pews or "closets" were found in some churches,⁵ they were rare in Scotland until the middle of the seventeenth century. For a considerable time their erection was a matter of arrangement between the persons desiring it and the kirk-session. They were often sold or leased; and they seem to have been at first the prerogative of local officialdom: a burgh Act passed in Paisley on October 16, 1617, forbids councillors to enter the "town dassie" (*i.e.*, desk, pew) "without hattes" (hats were much worn in church: in some cases the clergy preached covered, and the people generally put on their hats to hear the sermon); and it also prohibits the use of the "dasse" by any but present or past members of the council.⁶ The people generally had portable stools or chairs which they left in church or removed as they pleased. It was one of these that the herb-woman, Janot Gaddis, is said to have thrown at the heads of the clergy in St. Giles's Cathedral on July 23, 1637, when they were reading the liturgy newly imposed by Charles I.⁷ In some towns men and women were separated: in 1604 the Glasgow Session ordered all women to sit apart. The Kirk was not, however, insensible to the unsatisfactory conditions of church interiors.

⁴ On the other hand, organs were much disliked, and even when retained were not played during service. By the seventeenth century there must have been few, if any, left. Charles introduced them into cathedrals: but after 1638 they went completely out of use.

⁵ Mickelthwaite, *The Ornaments of the Rubric* (Alcuin Club), p. 44 f.

⁶ Cf. Regality Club papers, series 4, part 2 (1902): "The Faculty Of Procurators in Glasgow and their Pews in the High Church."

⁷ She did not, of course, instigate the tumult, but only brought to a point one that was already seething.

The clergy constantly complained of them as unfit for human habitation, not to mention the worship of God. One writer likens them to cattle folds, attributing their disgraceful state to the "insatiable sacrilegious avarice of earls, lords, and gentlemen".⁸ For the aristocracy, on whom, naturally, had fallen the chief responsibility for the upkeep and decoration of the sanctuary under the old system, had found the popular cry for bleak austerity exceedingly profitable.

By an Act of 1617 every parish church in Scotland was required to be provided before February of the following year with cups, tables and cloths for the celebration of Holy Communion as well as basins and lavoirs for Holy Baptism. For such provisions the heritors⁹ were responsible; but the minister of the parish became answerable for the loss or profanation of these furnishings,¹⁰ the control of which the Act of 1617 put into his hands. The arrangement of church furnishings about this time seems to have been left to convenience and the discretion of the minister. In the draft liturgy sent to London in 1629 (or earlier) and rejected by Charles I, it is stipulated that the table be covered with a "white linnen cloath"; but it is to stand "in that part of the church which the minister findeth most convenient".¹¹

III. POSTURE AT PRAYER.

The slovenly practice of sitting at prayer, now so common in Scotland, in spite of many attempts to reform it, had no sanction in the early Reformation period. It is true that there was much irregularity and uncouth behaviour; but the ecclesiastical authorities took a serious view of it. The Presbytery of Glasgow ordered, in 1595, that all worshippers "humble themselves on their knees in the kirk in time of prayer".¹² Such injunctions are common about this time, showing that laxity had become prevalent, but also that the Kirk did not doubt that one ought

⁸ James Melville, *Autobiography*, p. 188.

⁹ Heritors were, broadly speaking, landowners.

¹⁰ See *Hamilton v. Minister of Cambuslang*, 1752.

¹¹ MS. in British Museum. Edited for the first time by Dr. Sprott in 1871: *Scottish Liturgies of the Reign of James VI.*

¹² Maitland Club, *Miscellany*, 1, 72.

always to kneel at prayer. In the years immediately following the Reformation the practice is rarely mentioned, being then evidently more generally followed. Calvin not only prescribed it, but declared it to be no mere wholesome tradition of men, but divinely appointed. "It is", he says, "of God".¹³ The Kirk was in this respect probably as reverent in the early seventeenth century as ever she had been before the Reformation.

IV. ORDINATION AND INSTITUTION.

The Form of Ordination set forth in 1560 was used till at least 1620. But at first, it appears, imposition of hands was omitted as unessential. Calvin had held that, while it was an ancient and salutary custom, it had become, through superstition, temporarily conducive to scandal. It was therefore desirable, he thought, that "*on sen abstient pour l'infirmité du temps*". What was essential, however, was the *oratio super hominem*. It may be that Calvin had in mind the words of St. Augustine (whose authority in such a matter he would have much respected): "*Quid aliud est manuum impositio quam oratio super hominem?*"¹⁴ William Whittingham became Dean of Durham without reordination after having been ordained at Geneva in this manner.¹⁵ But in the Second Book of Discipline the imposition of hands was expressly enjoined in Scotland, and became, from about 1580, well established, being in use to this day.¹⁶ Fasting before ordination was rigorously imposed. Ordination was, of course, by presbyters, co-operatively.¹⁷

About 1620, however, new forms were introduced, by which presbyters were ordained by a form consisting of a mixture of the

¹³ Calvin, *Institutes*, 4, 10, 30.

¹⁴ *De Bap.*, 3, 16; cited by Duchesne (*Christian Worship*, p. 377). Bishop Wordsworth (*The Ministry of Grace*, p. 129) interprets *χρῆσις* in the Greek liturgies as often meaning simply benediction.

¹⁵ Whittingham was, with Knox, a member of the committee appointed in 1555 by the Marian exiles in Frankfort and Geneva to compile a service book that would meet the differences that had arisen between Anglicans and Calvinists.

¹⁶ Most of the early clergy had been ordained before the Reformation.

¹⁷ Only presbyters ordained to the ministry took part in the act.

English form and the one hitherto in use. When a man was instituted to a benefice he was solemnly given a Bible by the presiding minister as a token of his institution. We read, too, that later on the custom of giving the keys of the church was not uncommon, and in some cases even bell-strings were given. It was customary for theological students to be allowed to take part in the service, but it was not regarded with favour that they should be allowed to preach. Nevertheless, many evidently did, and as the practice spread, Assembly prohibited it in 1610.

V. PUBLIC FASTING.

The Book of Common Order has a long treatise on fasting, which was taken very seriously indeed in the early days of the Reformed Church, and was observed in many places until comparatively recent times. It is not always easy to ascertain precisely what measure of physical abstinence it involved; but at least only a very moderate diet was allowed. The food saved was customarily given to the poor in many cases. Sunday was appointed as a fast day "not of superstition, neither yet to bring in any schism within the Church, but because that upon the Sunday the people (especially that dwell in country towns) may best attend upon prayer, and the rest of the exercises that ought to be joined with public fasting". Abstinence was in this case from Saturday night at eight till Sunday afternoon at five o'clock. "And then only bread and drink to be used, and that with great sobriety". During the long fasts all games and the wearing of "gorgeous apparel" were forbidden. In the early seventeenth century it was a well established practice to begin the Assembly with solemn fasting. Lengthy devotional exercises were an integral part of the fast, with prolonged periods of solemn silence. The General Fast began with a prescribed prayer of confession, followed by the reading of the 27th and 28th chapters of Deuteronomy; and then for a quarter of an hour at least minister and people prostrated themselves in private meditation, after which the minister again prayed in a form prescribed in the Order, ending with the Lord's Prayer. After sermon and further prayers, the *Miserere* was sung "whole"; and the congregation dispersed only to gather again in the afternoon for further exercises. The

General Fast was intended for three causes expressly mentioned, *sc.*, (1) to call to God for mercy "for our unthankfulness" and "in that we see sin so to abound in all estates"; (2) for the "great hunger, famine, and oppression of the poor, although the rich and wealthy, that keep their corn while the wild beasts eat it, feel not the famine"; and (3) "chiefly" to call upon God for the comfort and deliverance of "our afflicted brethren in France, Flanders, and other parts; for although the plague and cruel decree of Trent is begun at Shushan, or rather in filthy Sodom in Paris, that butcher-house of Satan, by those mansworn and cruel murderers, yet their mind is no less cruelly bent towards us. For if they had not pity to drink their own blood . . . much less . . . when they shall only hear cruelty used against strangers".¹⁸

VI. PUBLIC DISCIPLINE AND EXCOMMUNICATION.

In the heyday of the Kirk's social and political influence it undoubtedly exacted discipline with inexorable severity towards all persons who offended against its laws. The Scottish Reformers had very clear notions about their disciplinary mission; but one cannot attribute the severity of ecclesiastical discipline in Scotland exclusively to its Presbyterian framework, for there is no doubt that it was just as rigorous in episcopal as in other times, and when, as in the period with which we are concerned, presbyter and bishop were in the throes of their first great struggle for ascendancy in Scotland, discipline was executed with unmitigated severity. The purpose of discipline, public or private, was declared to be the execution of an order "left by God unto his Church, whereby men learn to frame their wills and doings according to the law of God, by instructing and admonishing one another, yea, and by correcting and punishing all obstinate rebels and contemners of the same". It was "the Father's rod", which, nevertheless, was to be wielded, according to the theory, "to chastise gently the faults committed, and to cause (the offenders) afterward to live in more godly fear and reverence". The degree of publicity was in proportion to the publicity of the offence: discipline might be private, that is, executed either in the presence of the offender alone, or, if his fault

¹⁸ *The Order of the General Fast* in the *Book of Common Order*.

had been known within a certain circle of the faithful, in the presence of representatives of that circle. Many offences, however, were held to concern the entire Church; and it was then that public discipline was administered.

Offenders were publicly excommunicated according to a prescribed form, beginning with an intimation by the minister in the presence of all the people: "It is clearly known unto us that *N.*, sometime baptised in the name of the Father . . . hath fearfully fallen from the society of Christ's body, by committing of cruel and wilful murder (or by committing filthy adultery, etc.) which crime by the law of God deserveth death. And because the civil sword is in the hands of God's Magistrate, who, notwithstanding, oft winks at such crimes, We, having place in the Ministry, with grief and dolour of our hearts, are compelled to draw the sword granted by God to his Church; that is, to excommunicate from the society of Christ Jesus, from his body the Church, from participation of sacraments and prayers with the same, the said *N.* AND THEREFORE IN THE NAME AND AUTHORITY . . ."

Once the sentence had been passed it was not permitted to the Church to receive back any such person at his first request. At the least, forty days from the time of his first request were required as probation of the sincerity of his penitence. During that time he might be admitted to sermon, occupying the place of public shame, but in no case might he be admitted to prayers. Then he had to stand for at least three Sundays at the church door, barefooted and bareheaded, clothed in the sackcloth that was generally one of the appurtenances brought from pre-Reformation days, as we have already seen, and bearing some token of his offence, such as the weapon he had used. After the quality of his penitence seemed satisfactory, he was taken into church during service, and solemnly and lengthily addressed by the minister, who was required to inform him not only of the gravity of his offence but also of the boundless mercy of God. The minister was also required then to consult the people whether any had objection to offer against the re-admission of the offender; and if no-one desired further satisfaction the minister pronounced the sin remitted and exhorted the people to receive the offender once again as a brother. Gross offenders were

generally required, however, to suffer a much greater measure of humiliation. In some cases they had to stand in sackcloth in the "jogges", which was an iron ring for the neck, usually hanging by a chain from a pillar or wall at the entrance of the church, and still to be seen at the entrances of some old parish churches in Scotland.¹⁹ Their hair was clipped short and they were required to stand barefoot irrespective of the weather, for sometimes more than half the Sundays of a year, openly confessing (in their own words) the wrong they had done and the sorrow they now felt, begging the prayers of each of the faithful as they filed into the church, so that they might not die cut off from the society of God and the Kirk.

Excommunication was, of course, familiar to Scotland before the Reformation. In the Rathen Manual, a manuscript of probably the end of the fifteenth century, and containing offices in Latin according to the Sarum use generally followed in pre-Reformation Scotland, there is a form of excommunication in the Scots vernacular. The emphasis laid upon public repentance in the early Reformation period was much due, however, apart from the general asperities of the northern temperament and harshness of the age, to the remarkable popular unanimity supporting the Kirk's great power throughout the land. The right and duty of the Church to impose such public humiliation was probably quite unquestioned, and accepted, indeed, as a sign of the great purity and vigour of the new system. During the period of our study the records of the Kirk Session, in which was vested disciplinary jurisdiction over the people, are full of references to the rigorous exercise of public discipline.

VII. BAPTISM.

The continental Reformers seem to have allowed private baptism in some special cases of sickness; but Knox was vehemently opposed to it, and during the early years of the

¹⁹ *E.g.*, Duddingston, Edinburgh. The use of sackcloth continued until about the middle of the eighteenth century; and very old people still living in remote parts of Scotland affirm that they remember having been warned as small children that if they misbehaved the minister would "put them in the jogges": the threat was, of course, only the echo of a practice long disused.

Reformation it was strictly disallowed. Dr. Sprott says that the Minister of Tranent was suspended and required to make public repentance for having baptized children in private houses.²⁰ Apparently there was some relaxation during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century; but on the whole private baptism was regarded with the strongest disapproval. Baptism was required to be administered in the church, during service, for the edification of the people as well as for its own sake.

There was remarkable opposition in some quarters influenced by the Brownists in the late sixteenth century, against the presence of "gossips" (sponsors) at baptism; but the Kirk was in this matter generally tolerant. Calvin writes as if it had been his custom to have them; and the custom was not only accepted in Scotland but evidently became so fashionable in some places that as many as sixteen "gossips" sometimes accompanied the child and its parents, so that we read of "gossips" having to be restricted by local enactment to four or six.

It seems clear that the Apostles' Creed was always rehearsed by parent or godparent during the baptismal service²¹ until after Charles's unfortunate attempt to impose his liturgy. The omission of it by some after that date was presumably a demonstration of hostility towards the hated efforts of Charles and Laud; but even so such omission was widely deprecated in the Kirk. At the Westminster Assembly the Scottish Commissioners pleaded earnestly, though in vain, for a place for it in the baptismal service of the Directory. Baptism in the Kirk has always been, of course, in the Triune Name, although sometimes, in the seventeenth century "into" the Name (following the Greek, εἰς τὸ ὄνομα).

VIII. HOLY COMMUNION.

A weekly eucharistic celebration had been one of Calvin's most cherished desires. Indeed, his attempted insistence on it had been a source of the quarrel between him and the magistrates

²⁰ Sprott, *Worship and Offices*, p. 57.

²¹ The *Book of Common Order* requires not merely that it be rehearsed, but that the minister, after a satisfactory rehearsal, proceed to consider, one by one, and in an exposition of over 2,000 words, each of its twelve articles.

at Geneva which led to his banishment from the city. After he had gone to Strasburg in 1538 the magistrates there specially compromised with him to the extent of permitting a monthly celebration. With this he evidently decided reluctantly to content himself as the best that could be done in adverse circumstances. Monthly celebrations became, however, an ideal not generally realized. When Calvin returned to Geneva he tried to have this at least, but the magistrates opposed it, allowing "for the present" a celebration only four times a year, at Easter, Christmas, Pentecost and the first Sunday in September. Such a quarterly celebration became the customary usage in Scotland in the towns; but in the country twice a year was common. The *Book of Common Order* has a rubric referring to celebrations "once a month, or so oft as . . . expedient"; but the first phrase generally gave place to the second, in practice. In the early seventeenth century a celebration but once a year became unfortunately common, so that we read that in 1638 Assembly had to consider means of restoring greater frequency. On the other hand, about this period the practice of surrounding the celebration with elaborate preparatory and post-communion thanksgiving devotions on Saturday and Sunday afternoon respectively was developed.²²

The Scottish Reformers had been peculiarly apprehensive of any custom that in the least suggested the abhorred doctrine of transubstantiation, and particularly anything tending towards adoration of the elements. Although kneeling at prayer, as we have seen, was general in the Kirk (despite certain laxities) before the influence of English puritanism, kneeling at the eucharistic celebration was avoided. The ideal was evidently to reproduce as far as possible the conception of the table with the disciples seated around it. Plainly it was impossible for all the people to sit down together at one table. The practice was, therefore, to have the people in relays; and while they were changing over a psalm might be sung, or the reader might read the story of the Passion of our Lord. According to Calderwood, who

²² The celebrations at that time were sometimes very early in the morning, e.g., four or five, and there is clear evidence that celebrations at eight or nine were common.

writes in 1623,²³ this was then the accepted practice. The minister, having broken the bread, passed it to those seated next to him, who broke likewise and passed on the remainder. Servers were at hand with the paten, which they offered as soon as the fragment had been entirely consumed. So also with the chalice. Calderwood affirms that such practices had been in use at that time for sixty years. The Perth Articles of 1618 prescribed kneeling at the reception of communion; and no innovation was more fiercely opposed. It caused endless disorder; for some knelt, some sat, and others even stood; and we read also of wine being spilt in the confusion.

The antipathy of the Reformers to the Mass had resulted in a very arid eucharistic form. Until comparatively recent times no attempt to recapture even some of the delicacy of the devotional spirit of the Mass was ever dared. The mind of Scotland in the early seventeenth century was undoubtedly opposed to any semblance of the Mass, and the attempts of liturgists to trace its influence on the Communion service of the early Reformed Kirk can hardly be fruitful; for any such similarity that remained was due to the natural limitation of the Reformers' ingenuity. It would be difficult to imagine a more drastic alteration of any form without taking away its essence and every single idea underlying it. The change in the tempo, movement and character is as complete as it could have been without making it absurd for us even to think of a comparison at all. Practically speaking, the Mass was obliterated, and nineteenth and twentieth century efforts to revive its parts in the celebrations of the Kirk, however admirable, can claim no sanction from the early Reformed practice. But the Eucharist is a special case: in other matters the Reformers were not so drastic as they are widely believed to have been.

IX. OTHER RITES.

The marriage ceremony was plainly set forth and allowed little scope for individual aberrations. Sunday marriages were common in the seventeenth century: as we saw to be the case with Baptism, the Reformers believed it to be salutary to exhibit the marriage ceremony to the people convened for regular Sunday

²³ *Altare Damascenum*, p. 777 f.

worship.²⁴ It was apparently the custom for couples to intimate a promise of marriage to the minister, who received caution money "for abstinence till the marriage be solemnized", and in the event of forfeiture such money was given to the poor. Both parties were required to show that they knew the Lord's Prayer, Creed and Ten Commandments; and we read of a Glasgow marriage being stopped in 1642 pending the bridegroom's adequate instruction. The giving of a ring was permitted; but it was forbidden to recognize it as part of the service. It was regarded as conducive to superstition, and had to be treated much as one treats confetti to-day.²⁵ It was particularly repugnant to the seventeenth-century Kirk to place the ring on the officiating clergyman's book.

Dr. Sprott affirms that pictures and images were commonly carried at burials before being forbidden by Assembly in 1598. But there seems to have been no objection to trumpets and torches at the funerals of distinguished people, although the First Book of Discipline had condemned singing, preaching and even prayer at funerals, on account of the danger of superstitions connected with such customs. This ban, however, was envisaged, no doubt, as but a temporary expedient, to be forsaken as soon as memories of requiem masses had been obliterated. It seems that no last offices for the dead were encouraged, and that in the seventeenth century there was often practically no devotional observance at all.

In Holland, in the early seventeenth century, it became customary for ministers to adhere less to the set forms of prayer. Scotland, being much in contact with Holland at the time, was naturally influenced. But a much greater influence in this growing distaste for read prayer was the persistent effort of the Crown's party to impose the reading of prayers other than those to which the people had become accustomed. The strongest influence of all was probably that of the Brownists who, having sojourned in England and Ireland, where they had abstained from

²⁴ Dr. Sprott, writing in the middle of last century, refers to one such marriage within living memory.

²⁵ Calderwood says of the use of the ring: *Hunc ritum non damnaremus, si foedera ciuili modo celebrarentur.* (*Altare Damas-cenum*, p. 870).

public worship rather than conform to English usage, had developed, consequently, eccentricities of their own which they sought to introduce to Scotland on their return. They opposed, for example, the custom of the minister kneeling for private devotion before service, the use of even the Lord's Prayer, the Gloria and the Creed, and certainly all forms of liturgical (*i.e.*, not "extempore") prayer. This attitude was quite foreign to the ethos of the Scotch Kirk of the early seventeenth century. Such notions crept into it, but very slowly; for the Kirk vigorously resisted their influence, and by repeated Acts her assemblies clearly repudiated all such innovations. After 1645, of course, there was a general landslide in the Kirk's old practices, many of which were completely laid aside in an orgy of libertinism.

X. CONCLUSION.

Scotland, until the beginning of the seventeenth century, had been a country wholly independent and separate from England, poor, isolated, in many respects very barbarous, and, under constant suspicion of her richer southern neighbour, bitterly tenacious of her borders. One might have expected the Union of the Crowns in 1603 to open up a new era of gradual improvement in her relations with England and in her affairs at home. Instead of that, we find between the Union of the Crowns in 1603 and the Union of Parliaments in 1707 a century of incessant ecclesiastical strife. It cannot be doubted that this was due largely to political blunders of an extremely unfortunate character. The benefits of union were clearly enough perceived, but while under reasonably prudent statesmanship Scotland would have gradually assimilated English culture and institutions to her own character and would soon have been on terms of genuine friendship with England, the weakness of James and the imprudence of Charles settled her in a determination to enjoy the benefits of union while resisting with all her might every influence, even the slightest, associated with the English political power. Far from breaking down after the Union of the Crowns, the attitude of defensiveness that had become traditional throughout the preceding centuries was, through force of circumstance, revived and made more bitter than ever. From being an honourable enemy of England

she became a cynical, disillusioned partner. Now that her very soul seemed to be in danger, her chief psychological need was to express her national individuality; and her most obvious and efficient weapon was her Kirk. This, at least, she felt she must maintain at all costs, and, now united with her stronger neighbour, she felt better able than ever to meet the challenge to her spiritual independence. It must be remembered that her traditional antagonism, distrust, and suspicion of England was comparable to the English suspicion of the continent of Europe. As England, especially southern England, has always felt herself keeping Europe at bay, eyeing France coldly from her own white cliffs and standing there on her guard and aloof from the spiritual current of Europe, so Scotland had eyed the Borders with dread and distrust in her heart. This state of affairs was bad enough when England was to her what Europe in the last century or two has been to England—a menacing powerful neighbour with whom she was periodically at war. But when, being united to her, she was unfortunate enough to find immediately that her worst traditional fears seemed about to be realized, the psychological effect was disastrous. In our study we have found the Kirk just entering on this mood, but enjoying, as she has never since done, usages which she had inherited from Knox and Melville but which she was slowly developing on promising lines.

The spirit of the Kirk of this time was so different from that of the eighteenth century that only an intimate acquaintance with the historical background makes it possible for a modern spectator to fit the one into historic continuity with the other. Although she manifested many of the characteristics one would expect of a remote and impoverished land in a rough and intolerant age, she had a marked sense of restraint and churchly piety and an aspiration after sound liturgical principles foreign to English Puritanism. The early seventeenth century Kirk was, indeed, not in the least puritan in this sense. Far from being opposed to the idea of episcopacy, she had known and readily accepted Superintendents who (although the precise nature of their office is in some doubt) were bishops of a kind; nor were even the bishops she encountered in the first episcopal *régime* in the least alien to her ethos except to the extent that they represented the distrusted

political power of England, and in particular the Crown which had been so recently united to that of Scotland.

While it is indisputable that the Reformation was in many respects peculiarly drastic in Scotland, it could hardly have been otherwise, on account of the fact that the Papacy in Scotland had exhibited itself in a particularly unfortunate light. Scottish hostility to England had also bound her in close ties with the continent, where the Reformation was also on more stringent lines than were known in England, and which, at the time of the Scottish Reformation, had been the chief source of Scotland's cultural nourishment. She had to steer her own course; but it was not a course that would have led whither it did had the wider influence of England been permitted to mellow her as she steered.

ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS

By GEOFFREY C. BOSANQUET

To the modern reader the Epistle to the Romans presents peculiar difficulties. Not only are there particular passages which are hard of interpretation; but still more is there difficulty in following the sequence of the argument as a whole. It is probable that, apart from certain special passages which are a delight to all readers, the epistle is to many a somewhat forbidding work propounding what seems to be a strangely formal legalistic view of the Christian doctrine of atonement. That its subject has for generations been termed "justification by faith" is in itself sufficient to associate it with bygone controversies and outmoded forms of thought. It is, indeed, expressed in terms of law; but, so far from propounding any merely formal theory, the writer's whole purpose is to show that, whereas under the old revelation man sought to attain the good life, life in communion with God, by attempting to comply with the obligations of law, an attempt which proved ever unavailing, now he is freed from all that. The end is the same, but a new way of attaining it has been revealed. The driving force is to be no longer the compulsion of law but the power of the divine Spirit. We are no longer ruled by the restraint of an external command but, partaking of the spirit of God, are by that spirit, imparted to us, impelled toward that way of life which is in accordance with the character of God and so to the enjoyment of that life in communion with God, which is itself the good life. If this be so, then surely the writer is dealing in this epistle with the practical problem of life which besets everyman in all ages everywhere. How is he to realize the full capacity of his individual personality, how is he to make the best of his life, of himself? Here is something not arbitrary or formal, but essentially real and vital.

Now in coming to analyse the epistle, which, differing con-

siderably from most of St. Paul's letters, is rather a theological treatise, it is readily seen that it consists of three distinct parts or sections. There is clearly a break and change of subject at the end of the eighth chapter. The following three chapters are concerned with the position and prospects of the Jewish people, who by rejecting the teaching and the person of Christ had cut themselves off from the destiny to which they should have attained, for whose restoration the writer as a member of the race so passionately yearns. The third section from Chapter XII to the end is largely concerned with the practical application in actual life of the principles and teaching contained in the earlier part of the book. But the first part of the epistle, from the beginning to the end of the eighth chapter, is one continuous whole, and it is solely with this first portion that the present essay is concerned. After the preliminary introduction we have a definite thesis stated in Chapter I verses 16 and 17, and from that point onward to the end of chapter eight the work consists of one continuous argument directed from beginning to end to establishing, and defending against objections, the thesis so originally stated. But it is one thing to see that this is so; to follow the working of the mind of the writer; to keep steadily hold of the thread of the argument, is quite another thing. Anyone who has tried to do this for himself is likely to have found that the task is far from easy. This is partly a matter of difference of date. St. Paul necessarily expresses himself in the language and uses the modes of thought of his own time. We are not bound to accept St. Paul's arguments as logically valid; but we do want to try to follow the argument as the writer presents it. Only by so doing shall we appreciate what the conclusions at which he arrived meant to him and so come to have a fuller understanding of the "gospel according to St. Paul", the spiritual truth which had revolutionized his own life and which he believed to be of such vital concern to mankind.

Even with the assistance of the able commentaries which we have in English, such scholarly works as Sanday and Headlam's volume in the International Commentary series, it is no easy matter to follow the thread and appreciate the relevance of each paragraph or portion in relation to the argument as a whole. Such commentaries give us so much else besides an analysis of

the epistle as a whole, that we may easily lose the thread amid the abundance of interesting detail relating to particular passages.

The object of the present essay is strictly limited. Its aim is to present a layman's attempt to follow the thread of the argument as it develops from stage to stage so that the first portion of the epistle to the end of the eighth chapter may be seen and appreciated as a continuous whole beginning with the statement of a thesis and then building up the argument until, after meeting various objections which St. Paul realizes will inevitably arise in the mind of his readers, it reaches its conclusion and ends with an outburst of rejoicing which forms a sort of epilogue to this first portion of the work. To present this portion as an intelligible whole is the primary aim of this essay.

Now in reading these eight chapters as a piece of continuous argument it is clear that some passages are of cardinal importance in the development of the writer's thesis, whilst others are rather contributory and of secondary importance. There may be some differences of opinion as to whether particular passages are in this sense primary or secondary. But I believe that there are at any rate four passages which are without any doubt primary and cardinal as setting forth the substance of the gospel which St. Paul felt that he was called upon to deliver. These passages are (1) the enunciation of his thesis which is given in Ch. I. verses 16 and 17; (2) the first statement of the answer to the problem with which he is dealing, which we have in Ch. III, verses 21 to 26; (3) the further statement developing this in Ch. V. verses 1 to 11; and (4) the final conclusion of the argument contained in Chapter VIII. I believe that we shall best get a synoptic view of the whole as a piece of continuous argument if we consider each of these four passages in particular and only summarize the intermediate portions so far as seems necessary or helpful to the understanding of these.

We start then with the thesis which St. Paul is setting out to establish. He writes (Ch. I, 16 and 17): "For I am not ashamed of the Gospel; for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth, to the Jew first and also to the Greek. For in it the, or a, righteousness of God is revealed starting from faith and leading to faith; as it is written 'The just shall live by faith'".

Here we notice at once several of the cardinal words which play so large a part in St. Paul's gospel, words which meant so much to him, which from mere familiarity are apt to mean so little to us. The word salvation (*σωτηρια*) inevitably suggests to us a theological term with a whole body of dogmatic teaching attaching to it. To St. Paul it is something very different. He is bitterly conscious of a sense of frustration. With an intense yearning after what he feels to be the good life, the life of communion with God, he yet finds that somehow, try as he may, there is always something in himself which as it were binds him in chains and prevents his ever reaching that which he so desires. To St. Paul experiencing this frustration of life, a frustration which we all feel to some extent but which to him was so much more intense as the longing for the good life was so much more insistent, to him salvation meant the deliverance from all that hindered him from realizing that good life, freedom to live in communion with God.

And faith—what this meant to St. Paul we can only come to know by studying his use of the word. It clearly is not primarily belief in a fact or a dogma. Trust in a person is more in the direction of his thought, but how much it meant we can only hope to learn if and so far as we come to share his experience. To this we shall return later.

St. Paul's thesis is, then, that a righteousness of God has been revealed and that therein is found for everyone who has this faith the power of God bringing deliverance from that brooding sense of failure and frustration which to St. Paul, trained in the law and accustomed to think in terms of law, presents itself as a continual sense of condemnation. From this sense of failure, whether we think of it as condemnation or as frustration, St. Paul tells his readers that a new way of release has now been offered to all. But it looks as if the deliverance were not so much a single act or event, but rather a process. For the revelation of God's righteousness is said to be from faith and to faith. Whatever this faith may prove to be, it must be there from the beginning; it will not be fully realized until the end.

St. Paul then proceeds by reviewing the state of mankind both Jew and Greek, that is non-Jewish, as he sees it all around

him. He draws a dark picture of the prevalent degradation of the pagan world and then goes on to declare that the Jew, although he considers himself as a privileged and superior person and as such criticizes others, is yet himself self-condemned. In that he judges and condemns others he acknowledges that there is a standard and an obligation to live up to that standard and yet he does not himself do so. And with God there is no partiality. He will render to everyman according to his work. Not the hearers of the law but the doers are accounted righteous before God. Where non-Jews, without having had the specific revelation of the law which the Jews had been privileged to have, live the kind of life which the law ordained, walking according to the light that is in them, they show the work of the law written in their hearts. The privilege of the Jew is a privilege of opportunity, not a privilege of exemption. He is indeed privileged in that his nation has been entrusted with a special revelation of God and of the character of God. But no privilege or symbolic ritual could avail him if he did not live that life of righteousness which the law demanded. And in fact neither the Jew nor the non-Jew succeeded in doing this. The whole economy of the law had failed to produce that real goodness which was its aim and requirement. So far from doing this it had but resulted in man being acutely conscious of his failure. Through the law, says St. Paul, is knowledge of sin (ch. III, 20).

The law had made men conscious of sin; it had not and could not set them free from its bondage. "But now"—and here in Ch. III, vv. 21 to 26 we have the first statement of the solution to the problem—"apart from law a righteousness of God hath been manifested, witnessed by the law and the prophets, a righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ unto all them that believe; for there is no distinction; for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God". There has come a new revelation; a divine righteousness has been manifested. The character of God himself, God's righteousness is in some way imparted to us and this through faith in Jesus Christ. Now what this faith is we can only come to know by studying St. Paul's usage; but it is clearly something in the nature of a personal relationship, the trusting and putting one's confidence in a person. Suppose that

we deliver into the keeping of another the most treasured possession that we have, there we have an instance of the trust and faith in a friend. It is more than this to give our life into the hands of another, to trust absolutely to his not betraying us. But there is a stage yet further than this. The man may not regard the loss of life as the final end of his being. But to surrender his very selfhood as a separate self so that it can never in any conceivable state of existence be again that separate self which it was before the surrender was made; to make such a surrender as that, is perhaps something of what St. Paul means by faith. It is nothing less than this which is needed, that the separate self having broken down all its exclusive isolation may find itself taken possession of, as it were flooded, by the very life of God himself. So is the character, the righteousness, of God imparted to all that make, and in proportion as they do make, this surrender of faith. It is the only possible way for all. It is needed by all. For all have sinned and do come short, or fail, of the glory of God. What here is meant by the glory of God? Clearly not the magnificence of God as existing by himself, not some royal splendour which man might possibly look forward to in the future; rather something which he should attain to, but fails to attain to, here and now. It would seem as if what St. Paul means by the glory of God is that perfection of character which each would have if his personality were fully developed as an expression in its measure of the life of God. The word glory seems to be used by St. Paul almost in the sense of perfection. Man is intended to be partaker of the divine perfection, of the character of God himself. It is of this high destiny that man so miserably fails. St. Paul knows that only by being like in character to God can man have communion with God. The old revelation had failed to effect this. Now a new remedy has been revealed (Ch. III, 23-26). Man can, and is, justified or righteous (whether in the sense of accounted righteous or in that of made righteous) as a free gift by the grace of God through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. And then St. Paul goes on to speak of Christ Jesus as having been set forth by God as a propitiation or mercy seat through faith in his blood (that is, perhaps, as a place or point of meeting between God and man) to the end that there

should be a showing forth of God's righteousness, in his character as perfect goodness. Before, under the old dispensation, there had been a passing over of sins; but now he is shown to be at once righteous and accounting, or making, man like in character to himself. And the relation of the new revelation to the old is not one of revocation but of fulfilment. The new righteousness has been witnessed to by the law and the prophets. The ideal which the law and the prophets had set forth is not abrogated but confirmed. The old revelation had shown what life should be, it did not enable man to realize it. Now that one thing, the lack of which had rendered the old method ineffectual, is in the new method supplied. Now is given the enabling power to live the good life, not merely to know it and vainly reach after it. It is thus that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth. And this new way of incorporation into, and being possessed by, the life of God through the absolute surrender of the separate self, so far from destroying the old revelation and all that was for St. Paul covered by the term "the law", actually establishes it, giving it a fresh validity.

In this passage (Ch. III, 21-26) St. Paul has given the first statement of his solution of the problem, of how it is that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth. He next deals with the objection which he sees will at once be taken against him, that by his interpretation he is doing away with all the privileges which were promised to Abraham and through him to the Jewish race as his descendants. To this he replies that in fact the benefits of the revelation to Abraham were from the first intended not only for his descendants according to the flesh but for all those who following in his steps trust God as he did. With the details or the validity of St. Paul's arguments we are not here concerned. This is not part of the substantive statement of his thesis; but, having thus met the objection raised, he returns to the development of that thesis and proceeds to show the results which in the present and in the future follow, or would follow, if the absolute surrender of self were actually made.

"Being then justified from faith", he writes (Ch. V, 1-11), "let us have peace (or we have peace), toward God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have had our introduction into this grace wherein we stand and let us exult (or we exult),

in hope of the glory of God . . .” We have been admitted through Christ into a new relationship to God. The grace of God is as it were a place of refuge wherein we stand. We have been accepted by God as being, that which in fact we are only becoming, like in character to God through the absolute surrender of the isolated exclusive self and the becoming thereby partakers of the life of God. Then the first consequence is that all that sense of hopeless alienation and antagonism is at once swept away. There need be no more of that troubled striving to satisfy the requirements of an inexorable law. Instead of this there should be the restful assurance of acceptance by God, that admission to communion with God which is peace. This at once; but beyond this is the promise of the future. We are to rejoice in the hope of the glory of God. And it has already been suggested that by this phrase “the glory of God” St. Paul means the perfection of the character of the individual as a realization in its measure of the life of God. That which we are to look forward to in the future is the completion and fulfilment of that which already is. Already we are made partakers of and sharers in the divine life. The realizing of this is a process of development till in the end we shall be so permeated with the spirit of God that our whole life shall find its perfect realization in realizing and expressing the life of God. And we are to rejoice in our very troubles and hardships because these things, the stages of training, result in a hope which does not make us ashamed in that it does not fail us. For “the love of God hath been poured forth in our hearts through a holy spirit which has been given to us”. (Ch. V.) Already that love of God, which is the character of God, the righteousness of God which has now been manifested, is imparted to us through the giving to us of a holy spirit; and, from the nature of spirit, that which it is can be communicated only to other spirit and, so communicated, imparts its own character to that other spirit. The spirit that is given to us being holy is necessarily holying or making holy. The spirit of God is already imparted to our spirit and is from the first, in however slight a degree, making us like in character to God. The full realization of the process may be very far in the future; but already we are partakers of the spirit of God, which is the life of God himself, and this is the assurance to us that in the end the meaning of our life as an

expression in its measure of the life of God shall be fully realized. While we were yet alienated from God, Christ died for us and brought us into communion with God. Much more surely shall we, so reconciled, find our salvation in his life.

We see clearly from this passage that there are in St. Paul's interpretation of the gospel what we may call two distinct moments in the achievement of our redemption. By the death of Christ the bondage of the inheritance of sin has been broken, the state of alienation from God at once put an end to. We are by his death reconciled to God. The way to attainment of our true life has been opened. As the *Te Deum* expresses it: "When thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death thou didst open the kingdom of Heaven to all believers". But more than that is needed; the gate has been thrown open by a single act; but the enabling us to walk in the way that leadeth to eternal life can only be secured by a continuous process. If we are to realize our true life, it will be by a continual partaking of the life of the risen Christ. Nothing less than this is offered to us. "Reconciled to God by his death, much more shall we be saved in his life". Thus, that which we had all along been seeking, freedom to realize ourselves and deliverance from all that hindered this, will be realized by our continuously partaking of the life of the risen, ever-living Christ.

In this passage (Ch. V, 1-11) St. Paul has further worked out his conception of the new way of attaining that freedom which the method of the Law had failed to give. It is seen as a process begun in the present but stretching out into the distant future. Having through the death of Christ been brought into communion with God, we are here and now to claim and enjoy peace. Already the spirit of God is given to us and is working in us so that, to the extent that we let it be so, our activity is the activity of God in us. And for the future, we have the hope of that perfection which is at once the fulfilment of our own personality and a complete functioning of our life as an expression of the life of God. That which is, is the assurance of that which is to be, because it is the beginning of that very thing which, to the extent to which it is realized, is our salvation and which in the end shall be so completely. Already from the beginning we are partakers of the life of God. In the end we shall be wholly so,

when in every activity we shall in realizing ourselves be at the same time realizing and expressing the life of God.

At this point (Ch. V, 12) St. Paul introduces a comparison between Christ and Adam, or rather between the effect of Adam's sin on his successors and the effect of the act of Christ, the one bringing into the world sin and death and the other the opposite of these, grace and life. The passage is difficult to follow in detail as St. Paul works out the parallel contrasting the one with the other. But as developing his main thesis, that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth, the comparison seems intended to bring out two points. First and foremost there is the idea of heredity. Adam sinned and his descendants inherited a sinful nature which resulted in their sinning in their turn. We have no doubt learned much about heredity since St. Paul's time; but still the influence of heredity seems curiously apposite to his view of the relation of the believer to Christ and the work of Christ. Probably many people as they grow older have at intervals a curious feeling that in doing a particular act they are not merely doing as their parent did before them but that the spirit of that parent is, so to speak, still acting in them and yet none-the-less it is they that are acting. The hereditary influence is not something which affects them by acting *upon* the self but rather within the self; it is something that is inwoven in the very texture of the personality. St. Paul was acutely aware of the sinful nature working within his own self and in the selves of others and thinks of it as an hereditary taint resulting from the original act of sin on the part of Adam. But there is a Christ heredity as well as an Adam heredity. The man who has by faith surrendered his own exclusive self absolutely and let in the larger life, the life of God, to take possession of him, for that man the spirit of Christ is in a measure become his spirit, and in his living and acting Christ, that is God himself, is living and acting in him. It is in this way that we are even from the beginning made partakers of the righteousness of God which has been manifested by the new revelation in Jesus Christ.

But there is a second point which St. Paul seems to have in mind in his use of the Adam story as illustrating the work of Christ. It will be noticed that in verses 13 and 14 he makes

special reference to the generations between Adam and Moses and says: "Death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them who had not sinned after the likeness of the transgression of Adam". There seem to be three stages; first, the act of disobedience on the part of Adam; then the stage between Adam and Moses, that is, until the giving of the law, and it is suggested that throughout that stage the descendants of Adam had not sinned in the full sense in which Adam had sinned and yet they shared in the penalty of his sin, in the death which was its consequence. They had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression in that they had not disobeyed an express command as he had. They had partaken of his sinful nature but were not at that stage themselves fully sinners. It was not until the third stage, when having the law they disobeyed that law, that men became full partakers in the sinfulness of Adam. The apodosis of the comparison is, after the manner of St. Paul, not worked out but simply indicated by the phrase "who is a type of him that was to come"; but the similarity inferred by the comparison suggests that in our relation to Christ there are also three stages; first there is the righteous act, the life and death of Christ; then there is the stage in which we in some degree partake of the spirit of Christ and during that stage we are already accounted as sharers in his righteousness although we are not in this stage ourselves actually righteous. And there is a looking forward to the final stage in which, however far in the future, we shall have become so fully sharers in the spirit of God that our whole being shall function as in its measure an expression of the life of God.

But the story of Adam is used not only by way of illustration as pointing a likeness but is itself relevant to the context. The work of Christ was the reversal of the work of Adam; the one brought sin and death, the other, triumphing over sin and death, brought grace and life. But, says St. Paul (Ch. V, 20): "Where sin abounded grace did much more abound", that, as sin reigned in death, so grace should reign through "righteousness unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord". This leads St. Paul to state and define in Chapter VI two objections which he anticipates may be taken against his thesis as so far set forth. First, it will be said: If, where sin abounds, grace doth much more abound, if grace is always more than sufficient to counteract the

evil of sin, can we not then contentedly remain in a sinful state knowing that in the end grace will triumph and the sin be annulled? Secondly (what looks at first almost like a repetition of the first objection but is really directed to a different point): Are we to sin because we are not subject to law, but are under grace?

In answering the first of these questions, "Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?" St. Paul treats of the symbolism of baptism and what it implied; but, for the general understanding of the drift of the whole argument, there are two points which are brought out in this passage; first St. Paul's conception of our incorporation into and union with Christ, whereby we so partake of his spirit that we are made sharers in his death and in his risen life; and, secondly, that we must ourselves each undergo an experience which is nothing less than the dying to one life and the entering into another. For him the faith that justifies involves the absolute surrender of the private individual self. The exclusive self must be surrendered but only that we may find our true selves in the all-comprehending, the infinite, life of God. And so he bids us present our limbs, our bodily members, through which we act and function, as instruments of righteousness to God; bids us so surrender our exclusive individual selves to the inflooding tide of the spirit of God that in every action expressive of the self in the physical world it shall be the spirit of God expressing itself through our spirit and shall yet be not less, but much more, truly the activity of ourselves. Thus shall we come, ideally at once, in practice how slowly!, to fulfil our true function, realizing the good life not by subjection to compulsive law but by the free activity of a self irradiated by, and so radiating forth, that grace of God which is the very spirit of God working within our spirit. "For", says St. Paul (Ch. VI, 14) "ye are not under law but under grace".

This leads on to the second objection mentioned above. "Are we then to sin because we are not under law but under grace?" that is, not under the compulsion of an external force but under the influence of an indwelling spirit. St. Paul meets this suggestion by likening the position to that of a slave freed from one master and made the slave of another. He recognizes the apparent contradiction which we meet with whenever the problem of freewill is raised. Man is free; he has to make choices

and is conscious that he is responsible for making such choices. Man is not free: what he does is determined by what he is as the result of what he has done in the past. Free he is not, if free be taken to mean unbiased, able equally unhampered to move in any direction; but if free means to act in such a way that the activity is the true expression of the personality of the doer, then he is, or may be, free. "Know ye not", says St. Paul, "that to whom ye yield yourselves"—there is the freedom of choice—"his slaves ye are to whom ye obey"—there is the bond of necessity. We are slaves not to our circumstances but to our habits, to our past choices. But it is possible for us to make the effort of breaking with our old master and surrendering to another. So shall we be free of that servitude to sin which leads on to its certain end, death. Instead of that we shall be bound to a fresh self-chosen obligation, to righteousness, to the living of the good life, being made ever more and more like in character to God, till at the end we attain that perfect likeness to, and knowledge of, God which is itself eternal life.

Then St. Paul gives a second analogy dealing with the same point. The first illustration was of the change of allegiance of a slave from the service of one master to the service of another. Now the same change of obligation is illustrated by the law of marriage. So long as the husband lives the wife is bound to that husband; but if the husband has died she is free to marry again and to bind herself to another husband. The point is the change of obligation, obligation now to this control, then to that; it cannot be to both at once. And the further point of this second illustration is that the change is brought about by a death. The change from the self-centred life to the God-centred life is no easy thing but involves a giving up of the self which is so real a break and so separating an experience as to be itself a death or dying, being the absolute surrender of the will of the individual to the will of God. Furthermore, the illustration of marriage adds to the illustration from the relation of slave to master in that it brings out the closeness of our continuing relation to Christ. When the surrender of the independent self has been made we are made one with Christ as the woman is joined to her husband; and the idea of marriage suggests also the issue of the union. The former marriage to the law bore fruit unto death;

the new union with Christ is to bear fruit unto God. These further points are brought out by this second illustration from marriage as compared with the first illustration from the slave and master relationship; but for following the thread of the argument as a whole it is important to realize that both illustrations arise out of and are directed to the same question. This is made the more clear by the words with which St. Paul concludes this illustration drawn from the marriage relationship—"So then we serve in newness of spirit and not in oldness of the letter". The turn of the phrase recalls the first illustration taken from the master and slave relationship, but the conclusion sums up the answer, brought out by the two illustrations, to the one question—Are we to sin because we are not under law but under grace? Are we to act just as we will, free from all restraint, because we are no longer bound by a restrictive law but are under the guidance of the spirit? No, we are indeed no longer bound laboriously to try to conform to a series of restrictive regulations. We are no longer subject to that incubus. From that, the oldness of the letter, we are free. Now we are moved not by some external authority but by an indwelling spirit, by loyalty to that divine life which has been imparted to us, that infinite life which has become our life just in so far as the surrender of the exclusive self has been made. The living of the good life has become not conformity to an external authority but the expression of our own true self with all the freshness of a living personality.

And now having dealt with these various objections which he feels may and will be raised against his thesis, St. Paul is finally brought up against that difficulty which has for him been the greatest difficulty of all, the great wave which he has all the time seen coming towards him, with which he must grapple or be submerged. The language which he has been compelled to use has so associated the law itself with the universal failure of man to realize that life of communion with God for which he hungers that it almost seems as if the law itself were an evil thing. "What", he cries, "is the law sin?" Here, surely, is the root objection which made it so hard for St. Paul himself to accept the new revelation. All his highest aspirations and hopes, all that he felt to be best in life and in his own soul, was connected with that ideal which the law, with its teaching of the character of

God and what God requires of man, had given him. Anything which undermined that must be repudiated at all costs. To discredit that were to take away the one precious thing without which nothing in life could have value at all. And so, desperately clinging to the old, desperately he strove against the new.

It is in this mood that he grapples with the problem of the failure of the law. "Is the law sin?" Impossible. And yet it was through the law that we came to have any consciousness of there being such a thing as sin. For at the beginning whether of the race or of the individual there was a stage of living an entirely a-moral life, enjoying without thought of wrongdoing. Then came consciousness of the law setting up a standard and ideal of what human life should be and this made it impossible any longer to live the old a-moral life. Thus the law made us aware of wrongdoing, of sin, and in a sense proved to be to us not life but death. But the law itself, the ideal of the higher life, is a thing divine, "holy and righteous and good" (Ch. VII, 12).

But we have not yet reached the root of the problem. The question still remains—"If the law is in itself altogether good, why has it so utterly failed, why has its effect, instead of being beneficial, proved so disastrous?" "Did that which was in itself 'the good' prove death to me?" (Ch. VII, 13). It is by a searching analysis of the moral conflict which man, aspiring to the good life, finds in himself (a conflict which St. Paul describes as realized in his own experience), and by the deductions to be drawn from such experience that the failure of the law and the reason of this failure are finally tracked down and made clear. And when the inherent defect of the law and the whole method of approach connected with it has been exposed, then the need for the new method, the new revelation, can be recognized. Then the blessing of the new relationship to God, made possible for man in Christ, can be welcomed and embraced. The passage is so crucial, that it seems necessary to paraphrase the whole paragraph.

Did then, says St. Paul, that which was good prove my ruin? I can't believe that. No, it was sin—what happened, happened in order that sin might be shown to be utterly evil, which was shown by the fact of its using that which was in itself good and through it working death to me. No, it was not the good which proved death to me—that is impossible, for we know that the law

is of that order of pure spirit which is the very opposite of death—the law is spiritual; but I am of the animal creation, fleshly, and I am in the position of one who has been sold to a slave-master as his slave, a slave who consequently acts not as he wishes or thinks right but as his master orders. That this is so, is shown by the fact that the act which I perform I don't do understandingly—that is I don't do it because I appreciate the nature and consequences of the act and will that act as the act which I chose in all the circumstances. No; it is not what I wish to do that I do do; but the thing that I actually hate and abominate, that is the very thing I do. But if my will is against the thing that I am doing, the choice of action I am making, that must be because I recognize that the law, in opposition to which I am acting, is something that is "beautiful" and as such has my approval. Well then; if I am on the side of the law, it is not I, the real I, which perform the act but the overmastering force of sin which somehow has its home in me. "I can't help being aware that there does not dwell in me, that is in my animal nature, good"—It is in my power to will the good, to wish for it, to aspire to it—all this is of the part of me which is not my animal nature, the flesh—but in action, to perform that which I recognize as good and beautiful, is not in my power. For I don't do that which I will to do, which is something good; but, what my will is all against as being bad, that very thing I do in fact do. But if I will against a thing and yet do it, it has ceased to be the free act of the self and is, as has been said, the act of the overmastering force of sin which has its seat and dwelling in me.

So then St. Paul has at last discovered—and for him, and at that time, it was a discovery—why the law holding up before man the requirement of God, the ideal of what human life should be, had yet utterly failed to make man realize the ideal, had only made him conscious of his state of alienation from God. It was because of man's two-fold nature, partly partaking of the world of spirit and as such able to appreciate and be drawn to the ideal, and yet partaking of the nature of the animal creation and so sharing the passions and desires of the beasts. Moreover the downward pull of this lower animal nature was too strong for the upward trend of the higher spiritual nature and hopelessly enslaved it. And the law was impotent. Having presented the

ideal its work was done; it was powerless to enable man to attain to it. This was "the impossibility of the law" (Ch. VIII, 3), that which the law could not do.

So, then, St. Paul sums up the result of his experience: "I find that the law—why, the effect of the law is this; I will to do that good, the beauty of which I recognize, but the evil is like a slave-master standing over me and compelling me. Yes, this is seen to be so in that I delight in the law of God after the inner man, in that unseen part of me which is not of the animal creation; but I see another law established in my bodily limbs, and this other law or authority is at war with the law which my understanding approves and not only is at war with it but completely overpowers it and takes me prisoner, making me submit to this law and domination of sin which is established in my bodily members. O what a pitiable creature I am, not only torn between the two contending forces but utterly subjected to a dominion which I hate. Who shall deliver me from this body, which is this death to me? But there is a deliverance—Thanks be to God—through our Lord Jesus Christ. So then I myself with my understanding, that part of me which is not of the animal creation, am subject to God's law; but with the animal part of me I am subject to sin's law".

Thus has St. Paul reached the root of the problem and has realized with infinite relief that where the law was impotent the new revelation in Christ Jesus provides just that which was lacking, not a new ideal but the power to make the old ideal effective. The gospel is found to be "the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth". And in the wonderful eighth chapter of the epistle he shows how it is so and the new freedom which has been given to us, the freedom of the children of God.

"So then", he writes, "there is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus"; no longer the sense of being found guilty and being shut out from God. "For" (and here in one sentence is the solution of the whole problem) "the law" (that is, the compelling power) "of the spirit of life hath set us free" from the compelling power of sin and of death. Here is freedom (*ἐλευθερία*). We have all along yearned to realize our true self and all along we have felt that we are enslaved and prevented from doing so by the overmastering power of the worser part of

ourselves. And now we are free. How? Just this; that the spirit of God himself, which is the spirit of life, is imparted to us. We are inspired by it, and, just in so far as we submit ourselves to it, it works in us, that spirit which, appropriated and become ours, is the expression of our own best self, the true self of each of us. Just in so far as this is so, we are free, free from the control of sin and that state which is death. Thus is the law, that which held up the ideal, the way of the good life, before man, at once vindicated and superseded. The "impossibility of the law" (*το ἀδύνατον του νόμου*), that which the whole method of restrictive commands could not do, is now accomplished. The cure for the inevitable failure of the external ideal has been given to man by God himself having sent his own Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin and having thereby condemned not man, not even flesh, but sin in the flesh. And the end and purpose of all this is that the ideal of the law, that which the law aimed at, is to be actually accomplished and is accomplished in so far as we are walking (living our daily life) not after the flesh but after the spirit.

The contrast is then drawn out between those who are after the flesh or in the flesh and those who are after the spirit or in the spirit in their habit of mind or thought. He whose thoughts are thoughts of fleshly things is after the flesh and he whose thoughts are thoughts of the things of the spirit is after the spirit. And of these two conditions or habits of thought the one is death, not leads to, or is punished with, death, but is death, because it is enmity towards God and is in its nature rebellion against God; the other is life and is peace (verse 6). Those who are in the flesh cannot please God, cannot have communion with God (v. 8). But St. Paul hastens to add, "Ye are not in the flesh but in the spirit", if—and here is the whole crux of the matter; if what? If God's spirit is dwelling in you. Perhaps we may say, in so far as, if, and to the extent that, this is so. And from the nature of spirit this does not mean being, so to speak, side by side with our own spirit, our selfhood, but within it and permeating it. And, lest we should shrink from such a statement, he adds, (v. 9): If any man has not Christ's spirit, that man is not Christ's at all. To be Christ's means to have Christ's spirit permeating our spirit, our very self. If and so far as this is so, the immediate

result is that the body, the bodily part of us, all that lower nature to which sin appeals, is a dead thing, "a corpse", on account of sin, but the spirit, the highest part of our nature, is life on account of righteousness (v. 10). But if and so far as the spirit of God, who raised up Jesus from the dead, is dwelling in us, God will give life to these bodies, that part of us which is subject to death, so that from being a dead thing the body shall come to be living through "his spirit which indwelleth in us" (v. 11). To St. Paul, to whom the struggle between the flesh and the spirit, the desire for the satisfaction of the flesh, on the one hand, and the yearning for the free activity of the spirit, for communion with God, on the other, is so terribly vivid, the process of deliverance from the slavery to the flesh seems to involve something which he thinks of as a real death or dying, a dying to live, a dying to one kind of life and a rising into another kind of life. Formerly the body, the whole life of sense, did function as the obedient slave of lust and selfishness, of sin. At the end it will function as the true vehicle and expression of the spirit, the true self of the man. Intermediately it has ceased or is ceasing to do the first, and has not yet attained to the second. It is in this state that St. Paul speaks of the body as being "dead" or a corpse. The dying is the surrendering up of the separate exclusive self, losing this in the larger all-comprehensive self which is the Whole and is God himself. It is this vision or ideal of the life of God himself realizing itself in a unique way in the life of each one of us, so that our acting is the acting of God in us and yet is all the time we ourselves acting and expressing ourselves, this is the solution of the problem resulting from the failure of the law. Thus is the gospel found to be the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth.

But if there is the necessity for this dying in order to live, this obligation to refuse to indulge the immediate desires of the bodily life and of the exclusive selfish self, then the thought suggests itself—Are we not back in the old restrictive system of the law—"Thou shalt not"? No; we have not received a spirit of slavery again to fear. It is all the difference between a negative prohibitive system and the dynamic affirmation of life. We have passed from the ethics of law to the ethics of inspiration. To be actuated by the spirit of God is to be realizing the capacities of

our personal lives as sons of God. Sonship, leading on to heirship, a developing relationship of communion with and likeness to God, is the true destiny of man and of each personality. The solution of the problem of realizing our best selves is thus found in the fatherhood of God. The very utterance of the cry "Father", as we realize what it means and involves, is a sign of the Spirit itself bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God. And we know thereby that we are to be something closer, to attain to some more glorious relationship in the future. We are to be sharers in the glory (the perfection) of Christ. But this involves first sharing in his suffering. Here again is the necessity of dying to live, of absolute surrender of the exclusive self to God, so that it is lost, ceases to be at all as a separate self, a surrender which we find it so impossibly hard to make, but which being made would mean the finding of the self in the larger all-comprehending life of God.

The thought that we are to share with Christ in suffering that we may share with him in glory then leads St. Paul to speak of the sufferings of this present time and of the glory which shall be in the future. The two are intimately connected. "For I reckon", he writes, "that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared to the glory which shall be revealed toward us", and then he goes on to picture to us the whole creation, all inanimate nature, as reaching forward to a deliverance from the curse to which it was subjected according to the story of the fall as described in the book of Genesis. He represents inanimate nature as destined to share in the emancipation which awaits mankind when man's true relationship to God is realized. Then shall all creation share in the freedom of the glory of the children of God. The passage is remarkable for its extraordinary feeling of sympathy with the world of nature which is something akin to the insight of the poet of a later age. But our concern here is not with that aspect but rather with the light which the passage throws upon St. Paul's view of the life and destiny of man, of the meaning of the gospel as being "the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth".

St. Paul is comparing or contrasting the sufferings of man as he is with the glory of man as he is to be. We have a number of antitheses. On the one side sufferings, expectation, subjection

to frustration, the slavery of corruption; on the other, glory, the revelation or discovery of the sons of God, the freedom of the glory of the children of God. Now we have the first fruits of the spirit; that to which we look forward is sonship which is here equated with the redemption of our body. But the central idea of the passage and the fundamental conception as throwing light on St. Paul's philosophy of life and of his view of man's destiny, to attain which is salvation, is the antithesis of the present state of frustration to which man and inanimate nature are both subjected and "the freedom of the glory of the children of God" which is the destiny to which man may look forward and in which St. Paul holds that all nature may have its part. This passage especially throws light on St. Paul's use of the term glory as applied to man. Man's glory is not something external which is to be given to him, but consists in the state of complete fulfilment of his capacity, the perfection of his nature. And this is freedom, to be delivered from the sense of frustration, from that inability to fulfil our true function, which, for those who care, is perhaps the real tragedy of life. Conscious of this frustration in the present, St. Paul looks forward to the freedom of that perfect fulfilment of function in the future which is the realization of our true relationship as children of God. And it is noticeable that he speaks of our sense of frustration, our groaning within ourselves, even while we have the first fruits of the Spirit. We have as it were a first instalment of the Spirit, and that is our assurance that in gradually increasing measure we may be more and more filled with that Spirit until at the end that Spirit is the moving guiding power in all our doing and being. This it is to be indeed sons of God. This is the "freedom of the glory of the children of God".

This is the ideal to which St. Paul looks forward, the attainment of freedom, in the fulfilment of our true relationship to God which St. Paul speaks of as sonship—it is also "the redemption of our body", a phrase which recalls the despairing cry, "Who shall deliver me from the body, even this death?" Now he looks forward not to deliverance *from* the body but rather to the deliverance of the body itself from its subjection to the control of sin, so that this body instead of being a hindrance shall become the vehicle and instrument of the expression of the self.

All this is not now. Now, still subject to the sense of frustration, we groan within ourselves. Our deliverance is in the future. It is not something which we see actually accomplished here and now, but something which we may look forward to and must with patience wait for. But not only have we hope for the future to uphold us; already we have the support and comfort of the Spirit helping us in our weakness and perplexity. In our inarticulate yearning the Spirit himself is making intercession for us and God who searches the hearts of men understands the unexpressed longing of our hearts, the prayers we know not how to frame. And now St. Paul sums up in one sentence his conclusion. This we know—"that, for them that love God, God is working all things with them unto good, even for those that are called according to his purpose". This is the conclusion which St. Paul maintains to be a matter of certain and established knowledge. It is not, at least primarily, that in each occurrence of our daily life God turns our troubles and sorrows into blessings. The thought of St. Paul here is of much wider scope. God is directing the whole process of man's destiny to an end of good and this destiny is for all who love God, all who recognize that they are called, for all mankind, if only they will hear and respond to the call. And then St. Paul sets out the stages by which that destiny is to be attained. First of all, there is marked out for man that end which God, before man was at all, had already fore-ordained as his goal. "Whom, he fore-knew them he also fore-ordained to be conformed to the likeness of his Son, that he should be the first-born among many brethren". This is the destiny ordained by God for man from the beginning, that men should become like Christ, that being made partakers of his spirit men should be indeed his brethren, being truly sons of God. Then follow the stages by which this destiny is worked out. God, having fore-ordained the goal for men, calls them. "Whom he fore-ordained them he also called". He puts into the heart of man that divine discontent, that unsatisfied yearning which cannot rest till it find God and is brought into communion with God. Then it is that man becomes painfully aware of that sense of frustration, of that something in himself which prevents him from doing and being that which he feels he must do and be if he is to realize his true self. He is continually self-condemned. But God does not leave

him at this stage. He justifies him; delivers him from condemnation. "Whom he called them he also justified". This is for St. Paul the new revelation in Christ Jesus, to which the law and the prophets had borne witness, God's righteousness first imputed, and thereafter imparted, to man, by man partaking of the spirit of Christ through the absolute surrender of faith. So it is that for them that are in Jesus Christ there is no condemnation. They are set free from the domination of sin and of death. And so St. Paul looks on to the end when that destiny, of which he has spoken as having been fore-ordained by God for man, is fulfilled. He sees the whole process as though its completion were already accomplished. "And whom he justified, them he also glorified". Glorified — surely here we are right in understanding the term to be equivalent to "perfected". The glory of which St. Paul is thinking is the final fulfilment of man's destiny, when, completely surrendered to the indwelling spirit of God, man, freed at last from all hindrance, realizes the best of himself, fulfilling to the utmost each his unique personality and, to use the striking phrase of John Caird, "in every pulse-beat realizing and expressing the life of God". So at last man is perfected, glorified.

Thus St. Paul has completed the argument which has occupied this first half of the epistle. He has shown how it is that "the gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth". He adds, as it were by way of epilogue, in the form of interrogation and answer, the assurance that God is not against us but for us and that in all that we can possibly have to suffer we are more than conquerors through him that hath loved us, ending with that assertion of his absolute conviction that, come what may, nothing can come between, or shut us out from, that love of God which has been manifested to us in the person of Jesus Christ. "For I am convinced", he writes, "that neither death nor life nor angels nor principalities nor things present nor things to come nor powers nor height nor depth nor any other creation shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord".

INDUCTIVE REASONING IN SCIENCE AND IN THE PARABLES

By W. H. DEW

THOSE with a scientific training are frequently irritated by the way in which religious belief is often asserted without appeal to evidence or reason, even by the most revered teachers; the Sermon on the Mount, for instance, proceeds with a quiet sureness which is its own authority. The parables, however, are different; though much more than logical exercises, many of them sound an argumentative note. "What man of you, having a hundred sheep, and having lost one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it?"¹ From a simple fact of experience the hearer is invited to draw what (at least to the teacher) appears to be the obvious inference. The reasoning is from man to God, from the known to the less known. Here is something inductive, bearing some faint resemblance to scientific method. Science proceeds by experiment and

¹ For convenience, references are given here in the order in which the parables are mentioned in the text.

The Lost Sheep (Luke xv, 3-7; Matt. xviii, 12-14).

The Sower (Mark iv, 4-8; Matt. xiii, 3-8; Luke viii, 5-8).

The Unjust Judge (Luke xviii, 1-8).

The Unmerciful Servant (Matt. xviii, 21-35).

The Friend at Midnight (Luke xi, 5-8).

The Good Samaritan (Luke x, 25-37).

The Sheep and Goats (Matt. xxv, 31-46).

The Wheat and the Tares (Matt. xiii, 24-30; 36-43).

The Seed Growing Secretly (Mark iv, 26-29).

The Mustard Seed (Mark iv, 30-32; Matt. xiii, 31-32; Luke xiii, 18-19).

The Leaven (Matthew xiii, 33; Luke xiii, 20, 21).

The Lost Coin (Luke xv, 8-10).

The Prodigal Son (Luke xv, 11-32).

The Pearl of Great Price (Matt. xiii, 45, 46).

The Talents (Matt. xxv, 14-30).

The Wicked Husbandmen (Mark xii, 1-12; Matt. xxi, 33-41; Luke xx, 9-16).

observation, then draws the inference; and finally verifies this by further experiment. The parables are broadly similar; they begin with everyday life; then draw an inference; and on this the hearer is urged to make a further venture of faith. A careful comparison shows some striking resemblances, as well as big differences, between science and the parables when the latter are considered on inductive lines. In what follows, no attempt will be made to analyse induction in the abstract, but rather to notice the salient characteristics of the process in simple scientific practice and to point out how, after allowance has been made for the very different presuppositions of science and religion, these same characteristics can be seen in the reasoning required by the parables.

I.

Induction is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as "the process of inferring a general law or principle from the observation of particular instances". Deduction is the opposite, "inference by reasoning from generals to particulars; the process of deriving facts from laws and effects from their causes". Both are illustrated in Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood. He could not demonstrate the flow between the arteries and the veins directly, as the microscope of his day (1578-1657) was not sufficiently powerful to see the connecting capillaries; so circulation had to be an inference drawn from a succession of observations, each pointing to circulation as the explanation. He noticed that when the left ventricle of the heart contracts, the arteries of the body are dilated and yield a pulse. He also estimated the great quantity and velocity of the blood expelled from the heart, and argued that the only possible return route for such a quantity was via the veins. Again, the arrangements of valves in the heart and veins suggested circulation. This is induction, where we are always working with partial knowledge which points to something wider. On the other hand, the hypothesis of circulation, once accepted, covers all the observations, and it immediately explained the subsequent observations of Malpighi on the capillaries. This is deduction, where we begin with knowledge which *ex hypothesi* covers the whole system and use it to explain any single part.

Induction is the process of discovery, moving from partial ignorance to fuller knowledge; deduction is the reverse process by which that knowledge is made coherent and its details seen to follow by logical necessity from some general principle. Although the two may be thus distinguished, in practice they go on together; the mind moves from the particular instance to the general explanation and then back again to the original and other instances. More subtle logical analysis shows an intricate relation between the two processes.² For our present purpose, however, it is only necessary to note that the two are intimately involved in the gaining of any knowledge, although the one may be much more obvious than the other. The rise of science has led to a greatly increased emphasis on the inductive side and to a weakening of attention to inner consistency and logical necessity which was the chief concern of the older thinkers. This shift of emphasis is one great difference between the ancient and modern worlds.

In this respect the parables are modern; though they lead up to something wider, they begin with a particular instance. The method is similar to that of science which, unlike philosophy, does not deal with experience as a whole, but begins by breaking it up into certain selected incidents and concentrating first on these.³ The figures in the parables—the shepherd and his sheep, the sower and his seed, not to mention the unjust judge and the unmerciful servant—were all well known to the first hearers and their essential characteristics are repeated in every age.⁴ Moreover, by this fidelity to life the parables seek to win assent. The hearers recognized that if their own sons asked them for bread they would not give them a stone, and they themselves would help a friend who woke them up at midnight the moment they per-

² A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 53 ff. F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, vol. i, chap xi.

³ One reason for the late development of science was the pre-occupation of the Greeks with general ideas. Many of them were good observers, but they could never give their whole attention to a limited observation, they were too anxious to see it as an instance of a preconceived idea, instead of examining the fact fully before proceeding carefully from the particular to the general. See C. Singer in *Science Religion and Reality* (edited by J. Needham) p. 95.

⁴ cf. O. C. Quick, *The Realism of Christ's Parables*, chap. i.

ceived he was in dire straits. "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to those that ask him".⁵ The convincingness of the parable as a story is thus the starting point for the elucidation of its deeper meaning.

When this has been forgotten, the results have sometimes been fantastic. Many older commentators, following St. Augustine, identify the Good Samaritan with our Lord, the man with Adam, Jerusalem is the heavenly city from which man fell, the thieves are the devil and his angels, the Samaritan's beast is the flesh in which Christ deigned to come, the inn is the Church, and the inn-keeper St. Paul.⁶ Such procedure may be useful for illustrating the whole Christian scheme of salvation, but it cannot be pretended that the scheme is inferred from this parable alone. In such treatment the starting point is the general scheme, of which the parable is held to be a particular example, the reasoning is deductive, not inductive, and the method is that of allegory not parable. An allegory, such as *Pilgrim's Progress*, starts with certain great truths of the spiritual life and then proceeds to construct a story to illustrate them; in this way truth is conveyed even though the incidents are artificial and often of a kind most unlikely to happen in real life.⁷ The true parable is the opposite, the starting point is the life-like incident and the deeper truth is inferred from this.

Allegorical interpretation of the parables, however, is well established and persistent. One reason is undoubtedly the deductive habits of mind which have been prevalent until comparatively recent times. Another reason is the allegorical interpretation found in the gospels. We cannot be sure that this does not derive from Jesus himself; a few parables, such as that of the Sheep and Goats, appear to demand it. In most cases, allegorical interpretation is more likely to have been the work of the primi-

⁵ Luke xi, 5-13; Matt. vii, 9-11.

⁶ Augustine: *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* ii, 19. Quoted by C. H. Dodd, *Parables of the Kingdom*, pp. 11, 12.

⁷ A. T. Cadoux, *The Parables of Jesus*, cites the instance of Christian and Hopeful being three days in the dungeon of Doubting Castle before Christian remembers that he has a key.

tive Christian community. The tendency of allegory is to make Christ the centre of its interpretation: the good Samaritan of the parable becomes the Redeemer of mankind, the sower of the seed becomes the Sower of the Word, the shepherd of the syñoptists becomes the Good Shepherd of the fourth gospel. This is the outcome of devotion. It is doubtful whether any argument, even the argument of the parables, will convince men of the love of God without some more direct experience of "the Son of God who loved me and gave himself up for me".⁸ Hence the tendency of allegory to make Christ the central figure of every parable and its value in sustaining devotion. Yet this treatment is insufficient, for it misses the argumentative element which the parables are plainly meant to have, either for the purpose of preparing the mind for a more direct realization of the activity of God, or, alternatively, of correlating such a conviction, once it has been gained, with other experience.

Allegorical interpretation is also defective in that its instances, like all particulars reached deductively from some general inclusive proposition, do not give us any fuller knowledge of the truth they illustrate, although they often help to memorize it. The point-to-point correspondences in the gospel explanation of the Wheat and the Tares—the enemy as the devil, the harvest as the end of the world, and the reapers as the angels—really add nothing to the accepted doctrine of evil and final judgement. This exposition entirely misses the profound unity which underlies all living things—the humble plant, the human soul, and the Word of God—and the deep conflict in which they are all involved. Here, as elsewhere, the allegorical method, once it has decided on the "spiritual" meaning of the story, discards the actual happening itself as a mere outer husk; whereas in the parables themselves it is clear that ordinary sowers, seeds, soils and tares, no less than their spiritual counterparts, are all part of the Kingdom of God.

Inductive treatment of the parable of the Sower is complex. The starting point must be what actually happens in the fields, where the main result is a crop for harvest. The familiar allegorical interpretation, on the other hand, puts the emphasis on the

⁸ Gal. ii, 20.

danger of failure, whereas the point of the parable lies much more in the certainty of success. The climax of the story comes at the end, "And others fell into good ground, and yielded fruit, growing up and increasing; and brought forth, thirtyfold and sixtyfold and a hundredfold". The yield of wheat in England is considerably less than this, but there were rich cornfields, stretching southwards from the Sea of Galilee which may have justified these figures.⁹ Even if the figures are an exaggeration, it is an exaggeration of something real—the amazing extent to which the seed will multiply. The other Nature parables—the Tares, the Seed Growing Secretly, the Mustard Seed and the Leaven—all single out self-multiplication as the salient feature of life.¹⁰ In the Sower, attention is drawn to the way in which life overcomes all obstacles; even when defeated by poor soil or competition from other life, the remarkable fertility of the seed is sufficient to ensure a harvest. The conditions so deftly sketched in the parable are an epitome of the wider world of Nature, where life is often killed by the wrong environment, choked or preyed upon by other life, yet withal victorious and abundant whenever it obtains a real footing.¹¹ Man is the crown of this process, yet, because he is part of it, he cannot escape its hazards, even when he lives by the Word of God. But human life lived under the influence of God even if it fails in some places, will be successful in others, it is a living thing and capable of immense development once securely rooted. Also, because man is made in the image of God, there is some resemblance between his work and God's. Just as man takes advantage of the fertility of the fields in his small domain, so does God use the creative expansion of all life in his

⁹ The best wheat areas are Philistia, Esdraelon and Mukhneh east of Nablus. The fertility of the volcanic soil of the Hauran, South-east of Hermon, is prodigious, and famed throughout the Levant. See G. Adam Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, pp. 447, 82, 642. A return of a hundred for one is regarded in Genesis xxvi, 12 as not unknown though unusual. According to Herodotus two-hundred-fold was a common return in the plain of Babylon, and sometimes three. See R. C. Trench, *Notes on the Parables of our Lord*, p. 80.

¹⁰ I owe this point, also that of success in the Sower, to A. T. Cadoux, *The Parables of Jesus*, pp. 57, 155.

¹¹ cp. the tremendous "upward push" of life so vividly described in the writings of H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, etc.

much larger dominion, which extends beyond that which we know as harvest and maturity.

II.

Though the parables require inductive inference, their attitude to experience remains religious, not scientific. This is so even in the Nature parables. The nearest approach to an appreciation of natural sequence is in the Seed Growing Secretly—"first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear". The earth bears fruit "of herself", "automatically", but this is so only because the whole process is looked after so completely by God. There is no sense of natural events occurring according to some pattern or sequence of cause and effect, and doing so quite automatically. Religion explains the world as the outcome of the personal Will of God and everywhere dependent upon that Will; science regards the world as existing in its own right and proceeding by itself along strictly impersonal lines. The presuppositions of the first hearers of the parables were those of the religion of their forefathers, the personal, theistic interpretation of life given by the religion of Israel, and the purpose of the parables was to deepen and develop them. To those who cannot accept these premises, the parables prove nothing; there is no question of reaching a theistic conclusion from atheistic assumptions. The conclusions of the parables are merely a deepening of the personal presuppositions with which the hearers began, just as the metrical inferences of science are only a development of the implications of the impersonal outlook which is present from the outset in the scientific attitude.¹² No reconciliation of these apparently conflicting views can be attempted here. A good case can be made out of either, experience can be viewed from either angle. The fact that the scientific explanation developed later in history than the religious does not necessarily mean that the latter is less true; the two may be complementary. If our present contention is correct and the personal presuppositions of religion can be developed inductively in a similar manner to the impersonal ones

¹² Science and religion thus tend to concentrate their attention on different sets of phenomena, each selecting those which exhibit most clearly the kind of happening in which it is interested, although in principle any event can be viewed from either standpoint. Cp. O. T. Owen, *Church Quarterly Review*, October 1948, p. 64.

of science, then the personal outlook of religion should have something of the validity of the impersonal explanations of science.

At first sight the inferences from the parables seem much less reliable than those of science. The underlying argument of the parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Lost Son (the Prodigal) is simply: "If a human being takes such trouble over the loss of something belonging to him, will not God take at least as much trouble in seeking what belongs to him?" The reasoning is inductive, moving from the known to the less known, but what degree of probability, let alone of certainty, can be ascribed to a conclusion of this kind? Even if we grant that man and God can be compared at all, can an argument which appears to be drawn from a few simple instances be seriously placed alongside scientific inferences drawn from much closer similarities capable of exact measurement and based on countless experiments? To answer this we need to consider the process of scientific induction more carefully.

The method of science is only a refinement of that of everyday life, where we assume that similar situations have similar consequences; in *like* circumstances similar events are *like*-ly to occur.¹³ But experience shows that appearances are deceptive. The gathering of clouds does not always mean rain, countless other factors need consideration—the type of cloud, the direction of the wind, the time of day and so on. A countryman may take these in at a glance, but they are not obvious to the inexperienced. What the countryman does by rule of thumb, science does methodically, singling out the salient points with increasing precision.¹⁴ The pressure and temperature of the air are

¹³ cp. R. C. Trench, *op. cit.* p. 14, note.

¹⁴ Measurement itself is a device for dealing with similarities. The similarity between two objects may be confined to identical mechanical behaviour, though they may differ in everything else. Physics treats the objects as made up of identical mass plus something else which it neglects. If the masses are not the same, then the mechanical behaviour of the two will differ; but if the ratio between the masses can be measured, the mechanical behaviour of the two will be seen to be in some corresponding ratio, i.e., the similarity between the two motions, and thus between the two objects, is reduced to something precise and measurable.

measured, and when these are plotted over a wide area, it is found that similar distributions of these do result in similar types of weather, although the superficial signs may be dissimilar. This search for underlying similarities is a distinguishing mark of modern science. Ancient science had its observations, but these were superficial. The classification of metals as base or noble, for example, rested primarily on the observation that the commoner metals were affected by moisture or heat, while gold and silver were not. Centuries of blind groping were required to get further than this, much deeper probing was necessary before the foundations of modern atomic theory, even in its simplest form, could be laid. Similarly with ancient and modern physics. "In the Newtonian mechanics we think we have somehow got very near the real ground plan of Nature. We think the laws he enunciated are not only true but vital. I think the reason why the theories of the early Greek Physicists—all their talk of Hot and Cold and Moist and Dry—sound so thin and futile to modern ears, is that we feel they had not really got to the bottom of things. It is absurd to say that they had not any basis of facts to go upon and were merely indulging in idle speculation. I am certain they had lots of facts. They were obviously most alert and observant men with enough brains each to make half-a-dozen Fellows of the Royal Society. What was wrong was that they had not hit upon the important sort of facts. With Archimedes' work on Statics we feel that he is getting to the real point; the right ideas are beginning to form in his mind; he is 'getting warm' as the children say. With Galileo, who knew and extended Archimedes' work, we feel that at last the real discovery is coming. Yet how few and how rough his experiments in mechanics were; a school-boy could have done as well and as much. Of course, he could, if he had thought of it! . . . It was not simply what he observed but the way in which he interpreted, selected and classified his experience that mattered".¹⁵

When some such underlying characteristic has been discovered, it leads to inductive inference without further

¹⁵ A. D. Ritchie, *Scientific Method*, pp. 68-69. The argument is of course unaffected by later developments such as Relativity. These are the result of even deeper probings and could never have been made if Galileo and Newton had not taken the first big steps.

experiment. A multitude of experiments is usually needed to eliminate other factors and to make sure that some fundamental fact has actually been reached; but, once reached, it points by itself to a more general conclusion. When Galileo, in his experiments from the leaning tower of Pisa,¹⁶ found that the two lead weights fell together at the same rate, although one was a hundred times heavier than the other, there was no need for a great number of further experiments to prove that this would hold for similar weights of other substances. It was evident that he had discovered something which was true for all. In the same way, in his experiment with a bronze sphere rolling down an inclined plane, once he had hit on the relation that the distance travelled was proportional to the square of the time taken, and checked this carefully with his observations, there was no need to confirm this with other planes and with spheres of different material. Comparatively few instances sufficed to show that here was something characteristic of all motion under gravity. Scientific induction, in fact, is never drawn from a mere multiplicity of observations, but rather from a few instances which are seen to show clearly some characteristic of the underlying ground plan of the world.

Allowing for their different presuppositions, the method of the parables is similar. They take a close look at life and from its deeper similarities they draw their inference. The look they take is in the personal and religious direction, not in the impersonal and scientific, and they select the characteristic instance by insight alone, without the use of measurement. The instance is characteristic of some underlying reality of the personal world and the resemblances of the parable spring from this and are not accidental. The merchant seeking goodly pearls does not just happen to show some likeness to the religious man thirsting for God; both activities are the outcome of the same restlessness of the human soul, finding its outlet at different levels. The action of the man who hid his talent in the ground and that of the faithless Christian are both the result of the same underlying attitude which will never spend itself, while the ability to take five talents and gain

¹⁶ This example is given because it is so widely known, though it is now very doubtful whether Galileo ever performed the experiment. See H. Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science*, pp. 69-70.

five more springs from the same willingness to risk all which is necessary for every venture of faith. The treatment meted out to the heir by the wicked husbandmen and the hatred of the Pharisees for Jesus both arose from covetousness, even though the objective was a vineyard in one case and power over the souls of men in the other. In these and other parables the resemblances implied spring from some underlying reality common both to the parable and to the wider sphere to which it points. The same applies to the treatment of sin, which in the parables is usually treated as a debt. This contrasts sharply with the familiar figure of sin as a stain. However apt the latter description may be for those who feel acutely the guilt of sin, it remains just a metaphor. There is no objective relation between sin and, say, an ink-stain; both may raise similar feelings of misery in the mind, but the resemblance goes no further. A debt, on the other hand, shows close resemblances to sin. Both derive from personal relations and from an obligation one person owes to another. Also, the recognition by the debtor of his duty to pay, combined with the fact that very often the default is due to circumstances outside his control, corresponds very closely to the central paradox of sin—our accountability to God for our actions, combined with the lack of any real responsibility for the inherited weakness which continually mars them. Something, however hard to define, underlies these close resemblances. Both debt and sin spring from moral elements in our nature which can recognize the sense of obligation, combined with impersonal circumstance arising ultimately because the individual belongs to a wider group and must share its weaknesses and tragedy.

Parables like the foregoing, where human activity at different levels is seen to spring from the same fundamental tendency operating in each, lead us to search for some common underlying characteristic even when the comparison is between man and God. In one sense, man and God can have nothing in common, man is utterly dependent on his Creator. But Christians believe that God has bestowed upon his creature a certain likeness to himself, that man is made in the "image" of God, although this is often hidden and distorted by sin. The shepherd who took such care of his sheep was showing this likeness, and on this assumption as to the nature of Man, the similarity between his action and that of

God himself is inherent and not accidental. It is thus a characteristic or typical instance similar to others from which inductive inferences are made. It would not be vitiated if it could be shown that all shepherds do not behave in this way. All men are believed to possess the divine likeness, though only some may show it openly. In point of fact, most men do take trouble over what belongs to them in very much the same way as the shepherd, and perhaps even more women resemble the one who swept the house diligently until she found the lost piece of silver. All fathers, however, do not forgive their sons as rapidly as the prodigal was forgiven; anger, pride and self-righteousness easily smother the simpler and deeper impulse to forgive. But on occasions when this finds its outlet it is at once recognizable as something characteristically God-like and the mind moves with ease and conviction from this particular expression of the divine image to the infinite love of God himself. A parable such as these is thus far removed from reasoning which draws its inferences from a few instances chosen haphazard; it is based on insight into some deep underlying characteristic of human nature. Moral and religious considerations necessarily enter into the judgement which regards these instances as characteristic, whereas the typical instance needed in scientific induction is selected on much simpler grounds. But allowing for the very different presuppositions of religion and science, the inductive processes involved in the parable and in science appear to be essentially similar. The inferences made in the case of the parable may therefore be expected to possess something of the same kind of validity as those drawn in science.

The degree of certainty attaching to induction has proved difficult to estimate, even in science. Induction moves from a narrower to a wider sphere, and the latter cannot be known with the precision of the former. Strictly, inductive inference can give only probability, not certainty, though the probability may be high. Deduction, on the other hand, is very different. If the general postulates with which it begins are true, then any particular which follows from them must of necessity be true also. The only problem is whether the particular instance does follow from the assumptions. If it does, then it is true for certain; if it does not, then it falls outside the scope of the postulates, and nothing

whatever can be said about it. Deduction thus gives either definite proof, or else blank ignorance. Induction gives something in between. Intricate analysis shows how it can split up the "doesn't follow" of deductive inference into a number of alternatives and say which of them, on the evidence, is the most reasonable, sometimes giving a numerical value to the probability.¹⁷ The parables, with their very different personal presuppositions, do not lend themselves to such metrical treatment, but the underlying principle still holds: the inferences drawn from them have a real degree of probability, they are neither absolutely certain nor completely ungrounded, but somewhere in between. An inference like that from the parable of the lost sheep has a probability of its own, just because it is made inductively. (For the believer, the conclusion that God loves each creature is already certain, but that is a matter of faith; we are here discussing its validity solely as an inference.) To accept it is thus not an act of sheer credulity. The point is of importance, as the parables are often regarded as stories for immature minds and seldom quoted as serious sources for Christian doctrine.¹⁸ Their theistic presuppositions must admittedly be accepted in the first place as an act of faith, but the events to which the stories call attention increase the likelihood that these assumptions are true. Unlike the allegory, the parable goes some way towards proving what it illustrates.¹⁹

¹⁷ cp. H. Jeffreys, *The Theory of Probability*, chap. i.

¹⁸ They are referred to in O. C. Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, pp. 31f, 165, but there is no reference, at least in the indices, in any of the following (the list is not meant to be exhaustive, merely being that immediately available to the present writer, but it may be taken as a fair sample of works in which such reference might be expected): E. J. Bicknell, *Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles*. A. Farrer, *The Glass of Vision*. K. E. Kirk (editor), *The Study of Theology*. J. Oman, *The Natural and the Supernatural*. A. Richardson, *Christian Apologetics*. F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*. N. P. Williams, *Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*.

¹⁹ This sense of proof has often been felt, e.g., "the parable or other analogy to spiritual truth appropriated from the world of nature or man, is not merely illustration, but also in some sort proof. It is not merely that these analogies assist to make the truth intelligible, or if intelligible, present it more vividly to the mind, which is all some will

Considerations of probability are usually by-passed by the practising scientist, who prefers to test his conclusions (or some of their consequences) by further experiment. This appeal to experiment is of the essence of science, but no such direct test can be made in the religious sphere. Individuals do sometimes quote events in their lives which prove to them the reality of God, but the instances seldom convince outsiders, who can always advance considerations pointing in the opposite direction. The possible factors affecting a concrete personal situation are far more complex than those affecting a scientific experiment, where the latter are deliberately reduced to a minimum. Moreover, something essential to the religious relation is destroyed by deliberate experimentation. Experiment is out of place even in relation with human persons. From their past actions we may infer the love of others towards us, but any attempt to test it by postulating in advance certain specific acts which it must do for us is foredoomed to failure. The only way to test love is to respond to it, not to make further experiments on others, but to respond to it ourselves, and when the personal relation is with God our response must be fuller obedience to his will and increased dependence on his grace.

This is the reaction the parables are intended to provoke. "Go and do thou likewise", said Jesus after the story of the Good Samaritan. By doing so we become convinced of the truth of the parable to an extent which is not possible on logical grounds alone, though these are always involved. In consenting to go and do likewise we acknowledge that the parable has a wider reference than the original incident, we are prepared to act on the assumption that it reflects the true pattern for all human life, and the satisfaction which results from such action is taken as an additional ground for believing the fundamental inference of the parable to be true. In the same way, one of life's bigger deci-

allow them. Their power lies deeper than this, in the harmony consciously felt by all men, and which all deeper minds have delighted to trace, between the natural and spiritual worlds, so that analogies from the first are felt to be something more than illustrations, happily but arbitrarily chosen. They are arguments and may be alleged as witnesses . . ." R. C. Trench, *op. cit.* pp. 12, 13.

sions, made at great cost but found inwardly to be infinitely repaying, is a strengthening and confirmation of the wider inferences to be drawn from such parables as the Pearl of Great Price and the Hidden Treasure. The primary inductive inference of the parable is thus reinforced by an activity which is more than purely logical. This need not always take the form of outward action, it may be an inward restlessness of soul. If in such a mood we identify ourselves with the prodigal who longed for his father's house, we recognize that his condition and ours is typical of all sonship, and the inner peace which comes from repentance such as his is taken as evidence that forgiveness is of the essence of fatherhood whether human or divine. Similarly, we gain a deeper understanding of the parable of the shepherd as we learn to identify ourselves with the sheep, including ourselves among the many lost creatures of God, who are never really lost because they are for ever his.

The parables thus receive a measure of confirmation through their practical application, but this is indirect, the by-product, as it were, of our response to their challenge. Such feelings of assurance, moreover, cannot have the finality of experimental proof, yet in one sense the parallel between science and the parables is close. In each, inductive reasoning tends to issue in some activity other than the purely logical, just because its inferences are not absolutely certain they seem to require something else to complete them. In science this is experimental proof, in religion it is moral response.

III.

Science and the parables thus show some close resemblances. Both of them break up experience into limited instances, both draw their wider conclusions from deep underlying similarities, and both need some form of activity to complete their inferences. This close correspondence in method between science and the parables suggests some fundamental similarity between the worlds with which they deal. No one can doubt that the world of science is a real world, however much the description of it may alter as science develops; the greatly increased grasp and control of Nature deriving from scientific knowledge are the strongest

possible indication of a world showing regularity, coherence and pattern. The analogy with the parables suggests that the personal world has structure also. The parables themselves are stories, like any other life-like story they bring into clear focus some aspect of life only half recognized in its daily incidents, but the peculiarity of the parables is that they seize upon those aspects which spring from some underlying pattern. A great deal of our life does not appear to arise in this way, it seems quite chaotic, yet some of it shows signs of order. The pattern is not of a kind which can be imagined neatly, in some spatial and geometrical fashion, as so often in science. Order and coherence in the sphere of persons can only be imagined, in fact, by means of stories about persons; but it is order, none the less, cosmos not chaos.²⁰ A conclusion of this kind does not lend itself to tangible experimental proof, but the fact that it is reached inductively is significant, inductive inference having some degree of probability, however slight. Moreover, the close correspondence of the method of the parables with that of science, where inferences can be experimentally tested, is ground for hope that the world with which the parables deal is one which has a similar reality and coherence, and that the feeling of assurance which comes from moral obedience to their teaching is not misplaced.²¹

The close resemblances also suggest a common origin. It has often been remarked that science arose within a Christian civilization.²² Among other factors, it needed the strong Hebraic sense of fact and history. This pragmatic element, and the practical inductive type of reasoning that goes with it, are strongly marked in the parables. It could not flourish in the atmosphere of the early and medieval Church, with its deductive habits of

²⁰ cp. O. C. Quick, *The Realism of Christ's Parables*, p. 19: "To those who question (the parables) further, the mystery of the Kingdom begins to be revealed. But always, because the parables embody universal principles of a divine order, there are further treasures waiting for those who can dig lower still. And the full significance can be grasped only by the mind which is itself divine".

²¹ To some minds, conscious that ideas alone are purely logical, the very intractability of induction when considered logically is an indication that it deals with a real world.

²² e.g., A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, chap. i.

mind, but it was recaptured with the rise of science. After four centuries of development in that impersonal world, its salient characteristics stand out with tolerable clarity and it is now possible to distinguish them at work in the personal sphere in which this type of reasoning originated. This everyday world of persons in some ways unites the spheres of religion and science. On the one hand, religion knows a whole world of interior experience which faith interprets as communion with the unchanging and eternal; at the other extreme is the outer world, originally the world of the senses, but becoming increasingly abstract as science advances. Between these two worlds, and uniting them, is the concrete world of everyday. The fact that this world yields in some measure to inductive treatment is an indication of pattern and structure. Its order is only present in some degree and is difficult of apprehension, greatly different from the order of the medieval or Elizabethan cosmos. That settled world, with its order ascending upwards through the spheres, has now passed away, the resemblances and differences on which it was built were too superficial. Yet the very inductive discipline which undermined it has shown a more objective type of order. In the impersonal world this is the order continually being discovered by science, in the personal world it is the underlying pattern which in every age gives rise to resemblances of the type found in the parables.

THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY OF FATHER BENSON¹

By **GEOFFREY CURTIS, C.R.**

As the last great Anglo-Catholic Congress to be held before the second war began at Stamford Bridge, a small group of priests, including one who was (I think) the last survivor of the Guild of St. Matthew, gathered as William's guests in his sequestered monastery at Glasshampton. The subject of the larger gathering was the Holy Eucharist: that of the smaller one Holy Baptism. The motto of the movement which promoted the larger gathering had been from the beginning, "It is the Mass that matters!" The smaller group, though the Eucharist was, I hope, their life, found themselves isolated in their eagerness to put the need of a fuller apprehension of the prior sacrament in the first place. The development of the Anglo-Catholic movement since those days has convinced me that their anxiety was right. The concern of this little gathering with Baptism was not merely a practical concern, though parochial experience makes ever clearer its radical practical importance. Nor was it merely theological, though the whole logic of the Christian life in grace (quite apart from the emphasis thrown by the New Testament on Holy Baptism, its crucial significance and manifold vital implications) makes clear the primacy of what Father Benson used to call "the major Sacrament". Their impulse was in a deep sense a religious one: what might nowadays be called an existential one—the quest of God and the discovery of their own vocation in the perplexing conditions

¹ Address to the North Yorkshire and South Durham clergy, March 22, 1949; shortened with a view to publication in this *Review*. The author had been asked to speak of Father William of Glasshampton. He asked, however, and obtained permission to speak of Father Benson of Cowley, perhaps the strongest spiritual influence in Father William's life.

of the life of our Church. They would have called themselves "Evangelical Catholics". This was the result partly of upbringing—none of them had been brought up Servants of the Sanctuary; partly of a certain interpretation of the Anglican Church. In so far as it was an interpretation of its more recent history, they held that the Church of England was the predestined meeting place and mating-ground in Western Christendom of two streams, the Sacramentalist and the Evangelical (not, be it noted, the Catholic and the Protestant) which, though complementary, had flowed apart elsewhere. These two streams had both been operative in the Tractarian movement. But the former, however much indebted to the other, had dominated until there had been a blessed convergence of the two streams through the ministry and teaching of certain great men who were several of them to the fore in the famous London Mission of 1869,² e.g. Canon Body, Mr. Bodington, Mr. Trigg and Bishop George Howard Wilkinson. Above all, though he was essentially a son of the Oxford Movement, those streams seem to reach the unity of a single great river in the teaching of Father Benson of Cowley.

In the eventful confluence of these years the convictions typical of each of these kinds of Christian were shown to be not incompatible or disharmonious but capable of mutual enrichment. And so a clear monition of the Holy Ghost was conveyed to each. To the Evangelical came the call to carry their favourite principle of the givenness of grace and of man's utter need of it one stage further on the road of childlike faith till they should find in Holy Baptism and Holy Communion an expression even more absolute and more efficacious than they had conceived possible, of their own precise conviction of man's utter dependence upon God. To the Sacramentalist came the challenge to provide a more faithful, a more complete and a more inward interpretation and dispensation of their heritage, in particular a worthier stewardship of the Sacrament of Baptism. The twofold call had been, so we

² The outcome of a wonderful conference at Cowley held by invitation of Father Benson and attended by Fathers Benson, Prestcott, Grafton, O'Neill: Messrs. Bodington, Body, Wilkinson, Rivington, Randall, Moore, Smith, Herbert, Furse, Parnell, Lowden and Machonochie.

imagined, more faithfully responded to by Evangelicals. That great new charter of Scriptural Catholicism, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* of A. N. Ramsey, had not then been written. If the Evangelical current in its own channel had been so thin as to be generally far less visible, it had been partly through assimilation, partly because powerful tributaries had flowed thence to revitalize the other riverbed. That there had been, and still is, a real failure on the Catholic side, I am convinced. In particular we have not yet repaired inadequacies in our interpretation of baptism. Valuable crusades are going forward, both north and south of Trent, to safeguard and render worthier the administration of that Sacrament. And important theological and liturgical investigations have taken place with regard to the relation between Baptism and Confirmation. But the vital question of the moral and mystical significance of Baptism, of which Father Benson is the *doctor propheticus*, has not really been broached. In this matter we have lamentably, as Professor Ramsey wrote to me lately with regard to an important book on the Ministry, failed to detect and reveal the Evangelical roots of the Catholic system.

It was Father Benson who brought this crux home best to some of us. "By Baptism", he wrote, "we receive the Christian character, the gift and the substance of Christ, to be the formative, life-giving substance of our own being. By it every faculty of our nature is fed with the corresponding faculty of the Body of Christ. So much is this the case that we are incapable of feeding on Christ in the Lord's Supper until we have received the supernatural faculties of Baptismal life". "For Western Christendom, the Holy Eucharist has so entirely overshadowed Holy Baptism that the food of our life is made to be a gift greater than the life it sustains".

To St. Paul's question, "Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?" the honest answer of thoughtful Western Churchmen would be, "No. I did not know that in baptism I had died with Christ and had been buried with him crucified and had risen again through his resurrection". But Father Benson, not only in his illuminating commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and in his book on St. John vi, *Bible Teachings*, but in all his preaching, direction and writing insisted that this process described by St.

Paul as wrought by baptism is no metaphor but a *fact* upon the apprehension of which all true progress in the Christian life depends. Yet it is still possible, is it not, to hear sermons and read fresh exposition on baptism in which the Passion is not mentioned. The sacrament is, indeed, deliberately treated by one recent influential theologian, Canon Quick, as related particularly and primarily to the Incarnation in the same way as the Eucharist is to the Atonement. "What he did for human nature as a whole at the moment of his holy incarnation, that he does for every individual at the moment of baptism". This seems to me to misrepresent seriously the teaching of the apostolic Church and our Lord's own intention. For St. Peter, St. Paul and St. John we are begotten again in baptism as a consequence of the Passion, the Death and the Resurrection of the Incarnate Son of God who died for our sins and rose again for our justification. It is surely the realization of the significance of the atoning death of Christ as the meaning of our baptism which alone can ground the Christian life surely in a supernatural death to self and lead to its new creation in a personal relationship, theocentric and self-renouncing, with the Lord Jesus. This conversion of the soul through the placarding before it of Christ crucified and through the appropriation of its baptismal union with his Passion and his victory alone can imbue the soul with the sense of its utter dependence upon Grace and give it that penitent love which is the source of its joy and of its selfless assurance. All this which the adult catechumen in the primitive Church learnt in the natural course of his entry into and life in the Church, the Christian baptized in infancy most frequently fails to learn. He must be shown, by gradual training, the meaning of what he has undergone, and his realization must be more profound, vivid and definite than a thorough knowledge of the Prayer-book catechism can provide. Despite the ministry of Bishop George Howard Wilkinson and of Father Benson we have not yet learnt the necessity of the *appropriation* of our baptism. The Red Sea still uncrossed we invite the chosen people to enter forthwith into the enjoyment of the land of milk and honey. It may be that the diffidence or disinclination of some to do so is the result of this great omission. Is it not true that the sacramental system, if we do not pass to it over this threshold, suffering thus a sea-change

in the Blood of Christ, can become a discipline of precept and practice that belongs to the old rather than to the new covenant? Does mere frequency in the use of the sacrament of confession really ensure the full appropriation of baptism, the daring realization of its crucial meaning?

The great conflict with regard to justification and the quest of righteousness, fought and won by the apostle of the Galatians against the Judaites, the Nomo-Catholics of Jerusalem, is not one which has no significance for ourselves. Why does it loom so large in the New Testament? It is given a central place in the Acts of the Apostles. Enshrined in the great Epistle to the Romans, as well as from another angle, in that to the Galatians, it has found in the former letter its place at the opening part of the doctrinal portion of the New Testament as a warning that even the most venerable of God-given traditions, most faithfully observed, may stand as a barrier between the soul and God if we ignore that it springs from and points to a deeper source, the Christ himself, and that its own character is secondary, its nature transitory, and that it aspires after its own supersession. "God forbid that I should glory save in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ whereby the world is crucified unto me and I unto the world".

Surely the letter to the Galatians also which constitutes, along with its theological development in the letter to the Romans, the charter of Christian freedom, is set within the canon of Scripture to ensure that Catholicism shall never be less than Evangelical: that rules and precepts, even the Christ-given arcana of worship, however august, shall never replace Christ himself as the Christian Way. It is to the other dread possibility above all else, the possibility of having a righteousness of our own, that we die at baptism; for baptism means death as well as resurrection. The Catholic ascetical and liturgical system, with its scaffolding of ecclesiastical canon-law developed on the great foundation of Jesus Christ crucified out of the crucial and Evangelical crisis sealed in baptism, has provided a God-given representation and interpretation of Christ the Way in relation to the racial, social and cultural conditions in which his body has had to live. But its merely external observation must always engender or stimulate legalism and pride in a mind insufficiently

surrendered to the Redeemer himself. Such a mind—and who has not sometimes discovered the Pharisee in himself?—is characterized by emulation, restlessness, scepticism, a sense of frustration curiously compounded with complacency—the self-gratulation of one who is conscious of having conformed perfectly with all the rules. Indeed, the Catholic ethos and code of life, including the sacramental system, which we watch developing in the later part of the New Testament (especially in the Pastoral Letters) are secondary elements in the form of the Church. If given the first place, there is here all the inadequacy, all the danger, of the Jewish legal system. But Holy Baptism, if scripturally interpreted as it was by Father Benson, stands as the drawbridge of the castle of the Truth of Salvation: given its full Dominical meaning, it ensures that personal devotion to our Lord Jesus Christ, saving, ruling and indwelling us, comes first and controls all. *Adoremus in aeternum Salvatorem*. This is, of course, the Catholic temper as well as the Evangelical. But we sometimes give it very inadequate expression. And perhaps within Catholicism, just because it is the all-inclusive Best, there will always be, by the law *corruptio optimi pessima*, the struggle delineated by a recent writer between “Christianity according to the Spirit” and “Christianity according to the flesh”. Perhaps New Testament critics are right in thinking that it was this phenomenon of what is in the strictest sense eidolatry, in his own environment, which formed the background for the fourth evangelist’s reproduction of our Lord’s great eucharistic discourse at Capernaum. But long before they so analyzed, Father Benson found this challenge to penetrate through Form to Reality at the heart of our Lord’s teaching in St. John’s Gospel as well as of St. Paul’s baptismal doctrine. Father Benson’s *Bible Teaching* and his doctrinal commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans rendered, and still render, to his disciples the life-giving shock and stimulus that others were to gain from Kierkegaard, Karl Barth and P. T. Forsyth, without these needing to suffer that disturbance of their mental and spiritual equilibrium which is often caused by the shrill or seismic voices of sectarian prophecy. Nor could any of those who sat under Father Benson be left glorying because they were good Catholics; only with awe-

struck, grateful penitence as sons of the Resurrection whose names might still be found written in the Book of Life.

II.

We think of the Father Founder of Cowley as of one exalted almost beyond human stature among the ranks of the giants of Catholic spirituality. There is truth here, but do not let us forget that, a thorough-bred Anglican, he lived in more senses than one the *unitive* life and could touch many who would have been frightened by Bishop Frank Weston and other great Anglo-Catholic leaders . . .

The Founder of the Society of St. John the Evangelist was indeed a Christian mystic, the deep fruitfulness of whose life was grounded especially in a full apprehension of the meaning of Holy Baptism. I need not say that I know of none whose love for our Lord in the Holy Eucharist exceeded his. But his eucharistic teaching and devotion had this baptismal basis. It was this basis with its implicit demand for conversion to the person of the Saviour which, I believe, gave him his understanding of Evangelicalism. "People", he wrote, "can *study* mysticism just because they look upon it as a thing of the past. The early Evangelicals *lived* but did not study it; (so we think) they are beneath contempt!"

You might well ask me to define the term "mystic". The task bristles with difficulties. Few words have been more diversely used. I could supply you with a diverting bouquet of definitions. But time permits me only to mention two contrasted notions of mysticism. Mystical religion can be defined as religion characterized by its non-reliance upon divine revelation—religious intuition standing on its own end in the fashion of the rope-trick. Dr. G. L. Prestige has so defined it, and remarks "there is no real trace of mysticism in the Bible and that the loss of it would have caused no irremediable injury to the Christian experience (as a whole) which [its inclusion enriched". It is necessary for us to show awareness that the mysticism can be thus defined. But you will forgive my preferring the normal usage observable in the writings of Christian scholars who have made a special study of the subject, e.g. von Hügel, Dean Inge, Evelyn

Underhill, Abbots Butler and Chapman, and Bishop Kirk. Let me quote the broad interpretation given by Bishop Kirk which would have been more acceptable than that already indicated to Father Benson himself: "I use the word *mystic* and *mysticism* throughout to denote a type of religious thought which believes personal intercourse with the divine to be possible to man (whether it advocates sacramental methods or not) as distinct from what Johannes Weiss calls Lord-Slave Religion in which God (Christ) and the believer are strongly differentiated, and the only relationship conceived to exist within them is that of God commanding and man obeying or disobeying". (K. E. Kirk, *Vision of God*, p. 27). In this sense the Christian religion is intrinsically mystical.

But we shall do well to investigate the use of the word *mystic* in the theology of the Oxford Movement. Its use is varied, but characteristic is the tract by John Keble which has as its title "On the mysticism attributed to the Early Fathers of the Church". In speaking of the mysticism to be found in the early fathers, Keble means a sense of the symbolic or sacramental character of nature to which he had himself given expression in *The Christian Year*. "Nature", he wrote, "is a Word of God in which all Christian Revelation is written for him who understands how to read it". The philosophy of Bishop Butler, his "*Analogy*", on the one hand, and the romanticism of Wordsworth on the other, had made this patriotic conception and sentiment congenial to Keble. This vein of thought has no special claim to be classified as mystical: it does not touch the depths of mysticism. But it has rich exemplarization in the Bible and shows itself there and elsewhere as often in tendency towards the deeper mystical experience: it harmonizes perfectly, and indeed is one with Christian mysticism in so far as the mystic comes to accept or to divine, as Wordsworth never did, that nature itself has need of redemption. Father Benson had a deep sense that the earth as well as the heavens declare the glory of God. But he could put the converse truth very pungently. "Nature, as we now see it in its fallen, ruinous condition, hides God's love. It is Christ, in his personal manifestation as struggling with the evil of the fallen world, who really makes manifest to us that God is Love".

But mysticism had found deeper levels in the Oxford Movement before Father Benson began to write. It was, of course, Edward Bouverie Pusey at whose feet Richard had sat at Christ Church who was the *doctor mysticus* par excellence in the earlier years of the Oxford Movement. Dr. Pusey not only nurtured his mind and soul with the writings of the other mystics, patriotic and medieval, but lived independently in their world; so that his experience (as known, for instance, in the great sermons written to be delivered at St. Saviour's, Leeds) begets metaphors and expressions which mark him as deserving, Dr. Brilioth has remarked, a place with the greatest mystical writers. Both Dr. Pusey and Father Benson are essentially Biblical mystics. The mysticism of both, like that of all the greatest mystics of the Church, is Christocentric without being Christoterminal. Both have a deep conviction of the fact, springing from the Truth of our Regeneration, of the indwelling of God himself in the sanctuary of the baptized soul. Both are ever aware that, as a consequence of this, sin after baptism has a heinous quality which does not attach to the sin of the unbeliever. In all this they are in striking contrast to John Wesley whom Professor Hodge has lately been putting forward as the *doctor asceticus* whose teaching the Church of England needs to absorb in order to perfect her system. But there is this difference between Pusey and Benson. Pusey teaches emphatically that every sin after baptism so weakens the effect of the grace of baptism that he who has once fallen from this grace can nevermore reach the same position as he who has kept the white robe of baptism unspotted. Conversion he describes as a slow process which can only partly restore the health engendered by baptism. Benson shared the severity of all the great Tractarians with regard to the hatefulness of sin. "The Blood of Jesus", he said, "can cleanse the foulest sinner, but it cannot extinguish the flames of Hell". But no writer known to me is more eloquent and inspiring on the radical and complete character of the restoration and recreation effected in the sinner turned penitent by the Precious Blood of Christ.

A deep conviction of the plenitude of the victory of Christ is at the root of Benson's theodicy. "God did not create the world by a mistake. People are often ready to think that after all it was a mistake, a misfortune; so that if God had really known

all from the beginning, he would not have incurred the misery which belongs to creation, he would not have allowed such circumstances as would make the Passion necessary. We must reject all such dreams as blasphemy. God does not merely get out of evil by a wonderful device, leaving the evil as a thing that had better not have been. God comes to triumph over evil and therefore we must regard it not merely as antagonistic to God, but as subservient to him". But quite apart from his attitude on such apologetic issues his whole conception of the Christian life is grounded in, and governed by, his conviction of the operative sovereignty of the victorious Ascended Christ. I know no theologian to be compared with him for profundity and eloquence in the exposition of the moral and mystical meaning of the Resurrection and the glorification of the Saviour. He writes most movingly of the Passion, and this not only with the inspired insight issuing from the depths of his life of self-surrender and sacrifice but in places also with a first-hand vividness which a Katharine Emmerich cannot approach. (See, for instance, his meditations on Gethsemane in the Final Passover.) But all is permeated and controlled by his consciousness of the glory of the risen Christ. None valued better than he the sacred logic indicated in the paradoxical order of the Pauline prayer: "That I may know him and the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of his sufferings". He could not but feel that the serenity and the joy and the power and the humility seen in the early Church had been sapped later by the inversion of these mysteries from their experimental into their natural order. Here are one or two passages which reflect his mind on this great question:

"We cannot use our privileges in Christ aright if we do not constantly bear in mind the glory wherein he dwells. The forgetfulness of this seems to be the great weakness of modern Christianity. People look to Christ upon the Cross in such a way as to forget their union with Christ upon the Throne of Glory. Faith cannot be a true and living faith unless it be faith in a *living* Saviour truly capable of strengthening us amidst the infirmities of earth for the accomplishment of the work of God. This exaltation of Christ to the right hand of power is a truth containing for us the most important consequences. Our religion

will be entirely different according as it has for its central point Calvary or the Throne of God. The Throne of God must be for us an abiding reality, so that we are always to be living in immediate connection herewith”.

“Through this aperture of the Cross we must see Jesus at the right hand of God and all the blessed gathered about him, waiting for us in their joy: that as they were crucified for the love of Jesus, so we may also pass through many tribulations into the Kingdom of Heaven. So shall the number of God’s saints be made complete”.

“It is for us to live in contemplation of his sovereignty on earth and in Heaven. ‘Weep not for the Lion of the Tribe of Judah hath prevailed’. It is the joy of Heaven (already ours) to see Jesus, the strength of the Martyrs, our strength. We must not allow ourselves to be blinded by the degenerate unbelief of the world. In this royal consciousness we must live and suffer and die to earthly power—*live* as Sons of God”.

The second coming of his victorious Lord in glory became more and more the absorbing centre of Father Benson’s devotion. This gives his mind an intense interest in the history and in the present conditions of this world, yet an interest which is rooted in the world invisible and eternal. His loving eagerness to share in the Passion of our Lord had left (owing not only to the generous austerity of his self-discipline but to the providential response to his deepest aspiration after sacrifice on the part of God himself) heroic marks upon his life. But the realization of the victorious reign of Christ and the expectation of his coming formed in Richard Benson’s soul a second opening as it were of generosity and of sacrifice.

III.

Something needs to be said of Father Benson’s interpretation of Holy Scripture. The word “mystic”, which we have been examining, is to many minds associated neither with an intuitive approach to God nor with a discernment of the divine revelation of Nature, but rather with a certain sort of scriptural exegesis—the so called mystical interpretation of the Bible. The habit has grown up lately of saying that this has nothing to do with mysticism proper. Thus, Dr. Inge seems to dismiss it as “fanciful

symbolism above all else alien to the true spirit of mysticism". Father Benson regarded this mode of interpreting Holy Scripture as being, like the discernment of God in nature, so prominent in the psalter, an essential characteristic of Christian mysticism. "One cannot study any part of scripture", says Father Benson (and he would give to study the sense of a patient costly effort), "without feeling more and more the intense vitality of Divine inspiration which breathes through every part" and this perception is certainly due in him to a gift which is rightly called mystical. He is "all eyes before and behind", looking everywhere eagerly for his Love. This awareness of Christ tabernacling in every book of the Bible gives him a unique sense of the unity of Holy Scripture. His divination of this unity is quickened by a delicate sense of what might be called the morphology of metaphor or of simile. He delights to trace the great types, similes, analogies and metaphors which are the stuff of scriptural revelation, to watch them gradually developed and enriched until they find their entelechy and their consummation in the Dominical sayings, gestures, acts, especially in the parables and Sacraments of Messiah, the Incarnate Son of God. It has been said that his interest in mystic numerology impaired his insight into scripture; that it was an unfortunate moment for his theological development when this ardent scholar of Christ Church, trained contemporaneously in theology and in mathematics, first opened Dr. Milo Mahan's book, *Palmoni or the Numerals of Scripture*. Some knowledge of Rabbinic exegesis had already made some of us doubtful as to the justice of this adverse judgment. And now when we study Dr. Austin Farrar's book on the Apocalypse, *A Rebirth of Images*, or Dr. Loenertz's commentary on the same book, we grow more doubtful. One may indeed come to marvel that the founder of the Society of St. John the Evangelist had developed a mentality so akin in its delight in the sacred mystery of numbers, as in so much else, to the seer whom generations have been brought up to refer to (as if in reverent but timid contradistinction from the apostle) as St. John the Divine. This unusual interest of Father Benson had special play in his greatest work, his devotional commentary on the Psalter which has the life-changing title, *The War-Songs of the Prince*

of Peace. Yet the insight it gives the expositor is used by him with real reserve. And the outstanding value of the book remains even if we maintain that the writer has been in this respect led astray. Father Benson shows us here the psalms, the Prayer-book both of the ancient Church of the older Israel and of the Catholic Church of Christ, as the "prayer of God"—the Eucharistic supplication and worship of Jesus Christ himself. Father Waggett has well summarized its purport: "The Psalms are the anthology of God, the flowering of His Redemption, of our Eucharist. They are the inspired utterance of the covenant between God and man which was made perfect in the Incarnate while yet he abode alone. The same covenant extended to us finds in the same words its utterance in and by us, and the unison of words produces, by the Spirit, in those who now use them progressive conformity of the members to the Head".

The Psalter is given to us by God to be "the proper instrument of all true devotion"; and this true devotion is "in the fellowship of the Incarnate Word". "The words with which we approach God", writes Father Benson, "in mattins and evensong and on many other occasions, are not words of human invention, but have been given us by God himself. They were used by our Blessed Lord when he was himself taking part in the Temple services. We know also that they formulated his own private devotions; so was it in his very last utterance upon the Cross . . . We ought to see that we offer them to God with all the outward perfection of sacred song and all the inward perfection of intelligent love which belongs to a worship in which the Spirit of Christ is still pouring itself from the lips of his Body the Church". Father Benson finds in the Psalter a "continuous epic of the Redeemer's kingdom" though one "lyrical in form" and consisting of "separate odes". No book can do more than this great work of Father Richard Benson to train us in the use of the Psalter, "the school in which all the saints have been trained": so that it may become, to use his own words, "the living fellowship with God which belongs to those whom Christ has taken into union with himself that in us he may speak continually to the Father by the Power of the Holy Spirit".³

³ See Waggett, Philip, S.S.J.E., *The Holy Eucharist*.

Father Benson did not use the word "mystic" or its cognates very freely. But when he does so, it is in a comprehensive, but very definite, sense wholly different to that of Dr. Prestige and closer to that of the Bishop of Oxford and the other modern scholars to whom we have referred.⁴ Evelyn Underhill used frequently the term *Christ-mysticism*, an expression which for Dr. Prestige would seem a contradiction in terms but which seems a valuable term with most wholesome significance. Father Benson, along with his great masters, St. Paul, St. John, St. Augustine and Edward Bouverie Pusey, was a Christ-mystic: and his mysticism was grounded in Holy Scripture. "Mysticism", he himself writes, "develops a wonderful form in the Word of God. The loving intelligence finds therein a true creation of Divine poetry which lights up the whole volume of inspiration with new power. The various parts of Holy Scripture spring into new signification by combination in setting forth the eternal mysteries of the Incarnate Word. Passages rise into clear lustre which, but for the glow of heavenly interpretation, would seem to be dull and purposeless in the Divine volume. When the voice of God is heard speaking mystically in Holy Scripture, then the events through which it speaks rise altogether beyond the sphere of mere earthly narrative or accidental illustration. The life of God which holds all the parts of Holy Scripture in such marvellous unity of teaching, gives to each detail a manifestation of beauty and meaning. As some beautiful melody may be made to express varied sentiments by tenderness of touch and variety of accentuation, so the same passage of Holy Scripture will speak with varied signification to the reader according to the needs of his position when reading. The voice of the loving Father speaks to each and all. Human sentiments lose this vitality in the transmission of a mere manuscript, but the words of God live for ever with the Spirit of God by whose power they were originally formulated. But then the Holy Scripture must be read in the power of the same spirit wherewith it was written".

Father Benson's *Meditations and Spiritual Readings* show the same richness and acuteness and profundity of mind as his

⁴ A vigorous and eloquent affirmation that the Christian religion is essentially mystical is to be found in the preface of his fine volume of sermons, *Redemptions*. It is the best introduction to his theology.

wonderful commentaries. Here he is able to speak even more intimately. All centres in burning devotion to the Incarnate Word of God in the range and depth and tenderness of which he has been surpassed by no other writer in our own language. At times he has given lyric expression to this devotion in verse which curiously combines a certain stiffness of poetic technique with strange intimate power. He has a special devotion to the heart of Christ. It would cause surprise in some quarters, but none to the speaker, if some successor of Henri Bremond should issue an anthology of moving passages on the Heart of Christ from the writings of Richard Meux Benson.

"As a great master of the spiritual life", writes Father Lucius Cary, S.S.J.E., "Father Benson stands in his own great simplicity outside the region of . . . modern questions and controversies. The devout reader would look in vain in his teaching for definitions of contemplation whether infused or acquired, or for instructions on states of prayer. It was not that he was unfamiliar with the writings of the great masters from St. Bernard to the Spanish golden age and to the *Ecole Francaise*". But the "immediacy" of his approach led him to drink from no other fountain later than that of St. John. Father Cary thinks that had Father Benson written a treatise on the spiritual life, he would have been found to stand between St. John and St. Bernard, sharing the former's distrust of human impulses and emotions but sharing the latter's ardent devotion to the person of our Lord. There is, however, yet another name which I am sure that Father Benson's spiritual writings of whatever kind must always recall. That is the name of St. Augustine of Hippo. It is not only that he must have from the beginning studied and pondered the works of the great doctor of grace even more than those of any other of the fathers who were always his great guides in his study of the Bible. It is that his own devotional writings are a perfect example of that contemplative meditation or meditative contemplation which Père Cayré in his fine work *Contemplation Augustinienne* regards as the prayer par excellence of that great theological contemplative whom he expounds and praises there. It is noticeable, by the way, that at a certain stage in the development of the life of prayer Father Benson's meditations, profoundly intellectual as they are, are simply an extinguisher,

hindering by their discussions the progress towards the simplicity of contemplation. But you will find that many a trained contemplative in our Religious houses has returned to them to find there most satisfying nourishment.

IV.

The theology of Father Benson is in the truest sense mystical theology. It is remarkably unlike what usually monopolizes that description. "Few things are stranger", writes Father Waggett, "than the practical separation of the great tradition of mystical theology from the currents of dogma and canonical discipline. For truth, for command, for form, we go to scripture and the great creeds and liturgies. For the science, and still more for the art of spiritual experience, for skill and method, we turn to a stream of teaching which seems strangely to have been most replenished precisely in those places and times for which scripture was a sealed book and the Church's utterance in an unknown tongue". Mystical theology is a phrase that has been used to describe an analysis of particular phases of spiritual life: or sometimes even to indicate a certain type of imageless prayer which occurs in these latter phases. The Eastern orthodox theologians protest strongly against this segregation of mystical theology from dogmatic and systematic and biblical theology. And in the West we are beginning to realize the disaster of such departmentalism of thought and life.

"If we do not think", says Dom Illtyd Trethowan, "of theology to-day as the 'science of the saints', it is because we have ceased to think of it as one supreme science which bears on the whole of Christian living. Theology has tightened, in one sense, since St. Augustine, but at the cost of parcelling out its riches. It has formed hard lumps which hang loosely together. What is called mystical theology is no longer pervasive, and moral theology functions in a certain isolation from supernatural metaphysics. For St. Augustine knowledge and love are intertwined. St. Augustine's love 'bursts into theology because his love is penetrated by intellect' (Cayré)".

The world to-day has a hatred of abstract ideas, a hatred evident in the philosophical world in Logical Positivism, in the world of literary and aesthetic opinion in Existentialism. The

children of such an age who lack religious satisfaction can find it only through a theology which can show them how to prove upon their pulses every article, every doctrine and every principle of its faith. They must thirst for the experimental theism of the saints—mystical theology, as Professor Lossky has said, is the only existential theology. Yet if it is to be worthy of the name, such a mystical theology must find utterance *in medio ecclesiae* through men who speak with something of the urgency, the wisdom, the consistency, the authority and the certitude of the great fathers of the Church. Father Benson better than any more recent theologians can help us to recover the Voice to which men will listen: for he stands above many of the differences that have separated Christians from one another and from those that have divided the Christian mind from its own self.

CHANGES AT ST. MARGARET'S, WESTMINSTER, 1761

By KATHARINE A. ESDAILE

THE iniquity of oblivion has long scattered her poppy on the names of William Rusted and Samuel Peirson; yet, as the subjects of a prosecution and the inspirers of an interesting defence of the place of ornament in English churches, they may be considered the proto-martyrs of the cause which was later to bring trouble on the Camden Society, the *Ecclesiologist* and *Tracts for the Times*.

Their answer to their prosecutors is to be found in the pages of *The Ornaments of Churches Considered, with a Particular View to the late Decoration of the Parish Church of St. Margaret Westminster*, 4to, 1761, a vindication of church restoration supported by a wealth of historical allusion, moderate in tone, and crushing in effect. It is of its time in that its praise of Henry VIII's "Genius" for the "great and arduous Work" of Reformation should have been warm enough to dispel all its opponents' fear of Popery; yet it is far before its time in its fairness in admitting the possible misuse of what it defends and in quoting in full the orders for the absolute destruction of "the more conspicuous Monuments of Superstition and Idolatry" at the Reformation without ignoring the abundant evidence for "the general good ends to which Images may be subservient in admonishing Men of the holy Lives and Conversations of those whom they represent".

As to the authorship, the British Museum copy contains a couple of MS. notes, the latter signed G.S., which explain the whole matter.

(1) "Published by Thos. Wilson D.D. Rector of Saint Margaret's & Prebend of Westminster, & Rector of St. Stephen Walbrook who wrote the introduction. The Body of the Work by the learned W. Hole B.D."

(2) (on p. 142) "The introduction, this section [VII] & most part of the appendix came from the pen of Dr. Tho. Wilson, P. of Westr. &c. who was the Editor of this very ingenious performance".

Dr. Hole, Archdeacon of Barnstaple and Canon of Exeter (d. 1791), was the father of the poet and antiquary Richard Hole; Wilson, in his later years a politically-minded divine, is best known as an ardent follower of Wilkes, a correspondent of John Leland and an admirer of Ossian and of Catherine Macaulay, the Republican historian. One of the scandals of 1777 was caused by Wilson placing a statue of her actually within the altar-rails of St. Stephen's, Walbrook; and scandal did not cease when the Bishop of London ordered it to be removed. Friendships more remote from the tenor of the volume before us it is hard to conceive; but it is clear that in 1761 Wilson's opinions were still largely coloured by those of his saintly father, the bishop, and it is as the bishop's son, not as the friend of Wilkes, that he comes before us at St. Margaret's. "The Religious Uses of our Sacred Edifices" were forgotten indeed when Mrs. Macaulay's statue was intruded upon the Holy of Holies. Was it by Wilson's influence, we ask, that Wilkes, of all men, afterwards held the position of churchwarden of St. Margaret's, Westminster, that very building which, in 1758, its rector was concerned to catholicize, defend and beautify?

The book is dedicated to Speaker Onslow, who "almost as soon as he took the Chair of that honourable House, became the Friend of St. Margaret's and recommended the Case so effectually near Thirty Years ago, as to procure, at that Time, a large sum of Money for the Repairs of it". During the years 1735-9, in fact, the sum of £5,500 was voted out of Parliamentary funds for restoring the church, the tower being rebuilt and the whole building "handsomely ceiled". But much more was needed, and in 1757 a second Parliamentary Committee having been appointed "for carefully inspecting into the State of the Church", another £4,000 was voted "for its repairing and beautifying". The pavement was taken up "in order to new vault it for repositing of Corpses" and "the East end being found to be very ruinous, it was taken down and rebuilt in the modern Gothick, so as to be

answerable to the rest of the Church". The old pews were replaced and the East End of the nave was "wrought into a circular Sweep ending at the Top in the Form of a Semi Cupola, diversified with Squares of Gothick Work; and towards the Extremity of the Cupola, above the Window, is placed a Glory, and on each side the Window, about the Middle of the Sweep, is formed two hollow Niches, adorned with Pilasters, &c. in Gothick Work. Under the Window, and around the Sides of the Altar is decorated and ornamented with Gothick Sculpture, wrought in Plaister of Paris. Directly under the Window is placed in a square Moulding *Our Saviour at Emaus* [sic], represented in Bass-Relievo, and well executed by Mr. Alkin, of *St. Ann's, Westminster*, from the famous Painting by Titian".

I suspect this was by Collins of Westminster who made lovely plaster reliefs at Warwick and at Magdalene College, Cambridge, both of sacred subjects and both altar pieces.

Such a thorough-going Gothicizing of a parish church is probably unparalleled at the time, and one would give something for an adequate reproduction of the Gothick pilasters and sculpture wrought in Plaister of Paris in this surprising apse. The Gothick squares of the ceiling were presumably quatrefoils; but here, as at Strawberry Hill, Gothic is conceived of as decoration, not construction, and the work was carried out at a time when Walpole had hardly done more than begin his alterations.

Meanwhile, a piece of luck befell the parish. In 1758 the churchwardens "were casually advertised that an ancient Window of Stained Glass, originally intended as an Ornament for Henry VII's Chapel would be disposed of. The *COLOURING* the *EXPRESSION*, and the *GENERAL BEAUTY* of this Piece, they found, were universally admired by the most critical Judges; and from the historical Representation of our Blessed Saviour's Crucifixion contained in it, the greatest Propriety was deemed to arise for placing it over the Communion Table. Whilst therefore some Persons of considerable Rank had been disappointed in their Desires of purchasing this Window for adorning their private Chapels, the Opportunity of procuring it for the Parochial Church of the Commons of *Great Britain* was eagerly embraced. The Persons to whom the Trust of laying out the Sum granted by Parliament was committed, had the Pleasure to find that the Voice

of the Public concurred with their own Judgments in approving the Choice they had made of this Ornament. It was indeed thought to crown all their other efforts in beautifying this Church". An appendix gives the detailed story of the window :

"The Magistrates of *DORT* in *Holland* being desirous of presenting *Hen. VII* with something worthy to adorn his magnificent Chapel then building at *Westminster* directed this Window to be made, which was five years in finishing, King *Henry* and his Queen sending their Pictures to *Dort*, from whence their Portraits in the Window are delineated.

" King *Henry* dying before the Window was compleated, it fell into the Hands of an Abbot of *Waltham* who placed it in his Abbey Church, where it remained until the Dissolution of that Abbey by *Henry VIII*, A.D. 1540. To preserve it from being destroyed, it was removed by *Robert Fuller*, the last Abbot of *Waltham*, to a private Chapel at *New-Hall*, an ancient Seat belonging to the *Butlers*, Earls of *Ormond*, in *Wiltshire*; which afterwards came into the Hands of *Thomas Bullen*, Father of *Ann Bullen*, *Hen. VIII's* Queen". Queen Elizabeth's Earl of Sussex was the next owner of New Hall; the first Duke of Buckingham bought it from his family and the second Duke, who buried the window during the Civil War and replaced it in the chapel after the Restoration, sold the place to General Monk. Its next owner, *John Olmius*, "who was presumed" to have purchased it of Monk's heirs, pulled down the chapel but preserved the window, "cased up in Boxes", until Mr. Conyers, hearing of the fact, "bought it for his Chapel at Copthall, and paid Price the glass-painter a large sum for repairing it. There it remained until his son *John*, building a new House, at some Distance from the old Seat, had no further Use for the Window, and sold it to the Committee appointed for the repairing and beautifying *St. Margaret's*, A.D. 1758", for £400.

It is a curious fact that, while Horace Walpole heard of Conyers' purchase of the window "for only a hundred pound" (letter to George Montagu, July 20, 1749) he seems to have taken no interest in its final destination, since it is not mentioned either in the letters or in his own editions of the *Anecdotes of Painting*, though one would have expected some notice, both of the new Gothick apse and the new glass at *St. Margaret's*, from one who

was at once an M.P. and the most notable antiquary of his day. But he seems only to have heard of Conyers' purchase at second-hand, and alludes to the figures as "Henry the Eighth and one of his queens"; a story which may conceivably have inspired the remark in Muirhead's *Blue Guide* that Henry, embarrassed after his divorce by the "inconvenient window" sent it to the Abbot of Waltham to be out of the way.

The royal portraits are usually stated to be those of Prince Arthur, eldest son of Henry VIII, and Katharine of Aragon; but the difficulty that a Prince of Wales could not be represented wearing a royal crown has obviously occurred to the compilers of the *A.M.C.* volume on West London, who only state that they are "said to represent" those two persons. The story here given that they are Henry VII and his Queen is infinitely more convincing, and it can hardly be doubted that it is the true one.

To understand what follows, the reader must compare the plate given by the churchwardens in Appendix III with that in the *A.M.C.* volume showing it as it is at the present day, when the five lights are surmounted by ten lesser panels, two above each. In 1758 the window was round, save for a cusp at the top, and the five main lights were surmounted by five panels only, arranged in roundels of diminishing size, the central and largest being thoughtfully provided with a cusp to fit neatly into that on the stonework of the window above it. The six Angels with the Emblems of the Passion, at present placed singly, must have been grouped in couples in the three central roundels, the outer and smallest circles being occupied, as we find from the text of Appendix III, by what are now arranged as separate panels, the white and red rose over the moon to the left, the pomegranate over the sun to the right. Sun and moon, we are told, "allude to the preternatural Manner of the Darkness (the Sun not being eclipsed, the Moon at full) at our Saviour's Crucifixion;" as for the heraldic badges, they surely settle once for all the identity of the royal persons represented. "We have", says Dr. Wilson, "A White Rose within a red one, to signify that the *House of York* was united with the *House of Lancaster*, in the persons of *Henry* and *Elizabeth*", a pomegranate "to signify the Houses of *Lancaster* and *York's* Descent from the Royal House of Spain", *via* John of

Gaunt. It is then Henry VII and his Queen, not Prince Arthur and Katharine of Aragon, who kneel below.¹

But the royal portraits, after all, are only incidents in the main design, and as that design represents the Crucifixion we, like the churchwardens of 1758, may well be "not a little surprized to find that the *Eastern Window* should be an Object of Censure, and the Foundation of a Prosecution in the Ecclesiastical Court". The most material Parts of the Articles and Objections exhibited against William Rusted and Samuel Peirson, Churchwardens of St. Margaret's, Westminster, are quoted from Appendix V:

"That they have in Defiance of the Laws, Canons, and Constitutions Ecclesiastical of this Realm, erected, or caused to be erected, several new Ornaments in the Parish Church of *St. Margaret's, Westminster*.

"That they have altered, or caused to be altered, the antient Form of the Fabrick of the said Church.

"That they have set up or caused to be set up, or suffered to be set up, a certain painted Glass in the great Eastern Window, over the Communion Table in the said Church, whereon is represented by Delineation and Colours one or more superstitious Picture or Pictures and more particularly the painted Image of Christ upon the Cross; And that they had not a License or Faculty from the Ordinary of the Place for so doing".

The answer to the earlier charges was easy enough. A Parliamentary Committee had reported that the pavement was sinking, the pillar insecure, the East end very ruinous, "and the great Window and Altar decayed", and "as the East End of the Church was built with Rubble and soft Stone, it could not be repaired, but must be taken down and rebuilt and a new Altar and Window must be made". The opponents sniffed Popery in the alterations. "Who", asked the churchwardens, "were the Papists?" "THE COMMONS OF GREAT BRITAIN IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED! A name and character which, wherever known, hath Authority bestowed on it". As to the obnoxious window, "the Officers of *St. Margaret's* being ordered to bring their

¹ The Queen's head, however, is modern, the original head being "leaded into one of the north windows in Henry VII's Chapel". A.M.C. *West London*, p. 102.

Accounts to the Bar of the House of Commons, the first Article was the Money laid out on the EASTERN WINDOW, which in Conjunction with every other Particular specified in the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons met with entire approval".

To account for the charges at all we must remember that it was only thirteen years since the '45; that a Bishop of London had refused to allow a monument to a pious and generous Lord Mayor to be erected in St. Paul's, or indeed any monument whatever, on the ground that such things were Popish; that even though George III was urgent for the project, another bishop, nearly twenty years later, refused a spirited offer by the leading artists of the day to paint St. Paul's at their own expense, for the same reason; and that even Horace Walpole, "the central figure in every account of eighteenth century medievalism", seemed, in Mr. Kenneth Clark's phrase, to think that "a Gothic Cathedral was a trap to catch converts to Popery". It was the business of the churchwardens, then, to prove that their Gothic was not Popish, their window not superstitious, or, in the language of the preface, "to obviate the Exceptions urged against it, and to show at large the Propriety and Lawfulness" of their proceedings. Had the principles enunciated in *The Ornaments of Churches Considered* taken hold upon the English Church, such a storm as greeted the doings of the Camden Society and the publication of the *Ecclesiologist* eighty years later would have been impossible.

The introduction sets forth "most convincing Reasons for decorating the Edifice which is called by the august Title of the *House of God* with every Thing that can raise our Ideas of his Majesty and Power", the absurdity of the argument from the Danger of Idolatry; and the desirability on every ground of the "Religious Use of those elegant Arts" of painting and sculpture. A remarkable passage quoted from Archbishop Wake (d. 1737) in his *Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England* tells us that "Pictures of our Saviour and the blessed Saints" might be "rendered truly the Books not the Snares of the ignorant", and bids us "respect the Images of our Saviour and of the blessed Virgin. And as some of us now bow down toward the Altar, and all of us are enjoined

to do so at the Name of the Lord Jesus; so will we not fail to testify all due Respect to his Representation". This testimony to the ritual observances of certain Hanoverian prelates might profitably be brought to the notice of ecclesiastical extremists to-day, whether those to whom the eighteenth century is anathema, or those who scent Popery in every act of outward reverence.

The main body of the book consists of a series of Sections on Temples; on art under the Mosaic dispensation, and on David and Solomon as builders of the Temple; on the arts and ornaments of churches under Constantine; on the state of Christian Churches till the Reformation; and on the Reformation itself, this last, by the way, furnished with a telling quotation from *The Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man*, published by authority of Henry VIII: "The Image of our Saviour hangeth on the Cross, and is painted on Walls and Windows, as an open Book to the intent that, besides the Examples of Virtue which we may learn of Christ, we may be also many ways provoked to remember his painful and cruel Passion, and also consider ourselves, when we behold the same Image, and to condemn and abhor our Sins, which were the Cause of his so cruel Death . . . Pictures and Images may be set in the Church, and might not be despised, but to be used reverently, though we be forbidden to do any godly Honour unto them. These lessons should be taught by every Curate to their Parish".

There follows an equally commonsense sentence from the Homilies, those sturdy Protestant compositions: "Men are not so ready to worship a Picture on a Wall, or a Window as an embossed and Gilt Image"; and if the authority of Laud might be suspect in the eyes of those on the look-out for Popery, those from such sound Hanoverian prelates as are quoted in Appendix IX most certainly were not. The churchwardens had established their case to the hilt when they could prove the "Legitimacy" of their alterations at St. Margaret's from Wake and Tenison, Barlow, Stillingfleet and Butler.

The support of Calvin himself is more unexpected: "*Quia Sculptura et Pictura Dei dona sunt, purum et legitimum utriusque usum requiro; ne quae Dominus in suam gloriam et bonum nostrum nobis contulit, ea non tantum polluantur praepostero*

abusu, sed in nostram quoque perniciem convertantur". So much for Calvin, coming out on the side of human freedom, unwilling to forbid what might indeed be abused, but might also be innocent; and since our churchwardens state that "Ornament and Instruction are all we contend for", and that "large historical Paintings were to be preferred to single Figures, because Adoration has at no Time, nor in any Place, been paid to them", what more could be said? Ornament and instruction are lawful by the laws of Henry VIII; there is stained glass even in Calvin's Swiss churches, as travellers have reported; and the comparatively little left in England is "owing to the impious Rage of the Puritanical Faction, and not to the cautious Prudence of our Reformers". Appendix X is, in fact, devoted to an interesting and to-day really valuable "Account of the most remarkable Stained Glass Windows remaining in English Churches or Chapels", and as much of this has now disappeared, the information is worth condensing.

Westminster Abbey. Two large painted glass windows (only two!). That "on the North Side" represents Christ, the Apostles and the Evangelists, "at full length, and as big as Life, with the Symbols of their several Martyrdoms and Sufferings. It was placed there A.D. 1722".

Large West Window: Figures of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; Moses and Aaron; and the Patriarchs of the Twelve Tribes of the Jews; "with Ornaments and Decorations. Under which is the following Inscription:

Favente GEORGIO Secundo reiterata Senatus
Munificentia feliciter instaurata

A.D. 1735"

One fancies the editor smacking his lips as he copied this inscription: what could the prosecutors say after that?

The Chapel at Winchester College: "The East Window is painted with the Genealogy of Christ, and has been celebrated in an elegant poem written by the Rev. Dr. Lowth, Prebendary of Durham". To quote the bishop's couplets on the Crucifixion which follow would be sheer profanity to-day. Dr. Lowth would never be a poet.

Queen's College, Oxford: "Some finely painted Windows" given by Robert Langton in 1542; left at the Reformation; re-

moved for safety in 1642 and replaced after the Restoration. "The Nativity, over the Altar-piece, was erected by Price, in 1717".

Lincoln College: "Many fine Windows, also taken down in the great Rebellion, and replaced at the Restoration"; representing the Nativity; the Baptism; the Lord's Supper; Christ on the Cross; the Resurrection and the Ascension, with their Old Testament anti-types.

Merton College: "The East Window, which is extremely elegant, contains the Nativity, Baptism, Last Supper, Crucifixion, Resurrection and Ascension. It was given to the College by *Alexander Fisher*, a Fellow of this House, and put up in 1702".

Wadham College: The famous Crucifixion Window, "painted in 1620 by *Van Ling*, a Dutchman, and said to have cost 1500 l."

University College: More *Van Ling* windows "on the North and South sides"; "the East Window from *Luke* ch. ii ver. 6 to 17, was painted by *Henry Giles* of York, in 1687; and was the Gift of Dr. Radcliffe".

Balliol College: "There are two Windows in the Chapel painted by *Van Ling* in 1639. In the Eastern Window, which is by another Hand, is the Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of our Saviour".

Cambridge: "The Paintings on Glass in this university of any Note, are to be found *only* in *King's College*, and *Peter House* Chapels". The first are too famous for quotations to be necessary, but that at Peterhouse, with the Crucifixion and the Twelve Apostles, "was put up in the Year 1539", and the writer adds that owing to Puritan proclivities of Cambridge, "it is to be presumed that these fine Windows were buried under Ground, during the Civil Wars, and put up again at the *RESTORATION*".

Then follows a detailed and enthusiastic account of the Fairford windows, and the work concludes with the following paragraphs:

"It is remarkable that all the Windows we have here mentioned have been put up since the Restoration; or replaced after they had been taken down, and preserved from the Violence of

the Puritans. How long since the Reformation they were painted, the Dates will discover.

“The elegant Reader has undoubtedly observed with Pain the irreparable Destruction of Ornaments of this Nature by the Fanatic Rebels, and has wished that the few Monuments which have escaped their Rage, of an Art no longer remaining in its former Perfection, may be cautiously preserved. [This alludes to Appendices VI and VII (numbered VI by accident) which consist of extracts from contemporary accounts of the Puritan destruction of painted glass all over England.]

“In a Reign, which we hope will be distinguished by superior Taste, it would surely be displeasing to see a Prosecution succeed, so little a Friend to the fine Arts, as it can only arise from mistaken Opinions, or needless and ill-grounded Fears”.

The churchwardens of St. Margaret's practised what many bishops preached, and if their Gothic was not ours, they did their best, and as pioneers of the Gothic Revival they have never had their due; and at least where the window was concerned they were on the side of the angels. *Requiescant in pace.*

The sequel was all that could be wished for. The window stayed where it was, and the new reign was not disgraced by the success of a frivolous and ill-judged prosecution. But we have still to see in what light the volume before us can be regarded as one of the pioneer works of the Gothic Revival, and our first step must be to turn again to the plate in Appendix III. We have, alas, nothing to show us the circular sweep and cupola, diversified with squares of Gothick work, or of the Gothick sculpture wrought in Plaister of Paris, but we can see the stucco panels with their copper plates finely enamelled with the texts of Scripture, some explaining the subjects of the window and the relief below, and the others bearing the Creed, the Lord's Prayer and the Ten Commandments. There are five pairs of them, two trefoil headed and footed, so to speak, three with a sort of cusp above, repeated but inverted below. All these are Gothick, but the panel by Mr. Alkin of Westminster, a master I have not met with elsewhere, has a plain square moulding. There was excellent work of the class being done at the time, witness the exquisite plaster reliefs of sacred subjects by William Collins, already referred to as at St. Mary's,

Warwick, an altar piece still, the other at Magdalene College, Cambridge, executed for the chapel, but banished by nineteenth-century taste to the college library. The first is an Annunciation, the second the Appearance of Christ to St. Mary Magdalene; was there, is there, another eighteenth century example of a Last Supper as a reredos at St. Margaret's? The nineteenth century preferred Leonardo's to Titian's; but ecclesiologically it is highly interesting to find the subject used for the purpose in the reign of George II. Where is that relief now, and was it on copper plates, or on the stone itself, that the remaining texts were cut? For immediately below the window runs the legend: "To the Jews a stumbling Block & to the Greeks Foolishness. But God forbid y^t I should Glory save in the Cross of y^e L^d Jesus Christ;" and below that, dividing the window and its texts from the relief and its appendages, is a second: "This Altar Piece and Windows were purchased and placed here by the Bounty of Parliament 1758".

"Early in the 19th century the Apse was removed and the E. wall rebuilt on the old site" (A.M.C., *West London*, p. 101); we have still to see what the nineteenth century did for the window. It is set in a flat wall, destitute of mouldings of any kind, more debased, perhaps, than anything that eighteenth-century Gothic can show. Take away the glass, and holes in a flat wall would be left; better the Gothic of 1758 than cardboard scenery such as this.

Let us now turn to the history of Church ornament, and study Section IV. We no longer attribute Collegiate Foundations to the period of the Heptarchy, but there is real insight, combined with much absurdity, in the following passage: "As to the Architecture made use of by the *Saxons*, it was doubtless in their native Gothic Stile: Many of their Churches were constructed solely with Wood, and where the Walls were built with other Materials, it doth not appear they knew the Art of raising Vaults and turning great Arches with Stone; hence when particular Elegance and Magnificence were requisite, they were necessitated to have recourse to foreign Artificers . . . The Churches of *Peterborough*, *Hexham*, *Litchfield*, and *Rippon*, are particularly taken Notice of for the Greatness of the Expence and Exquisiteness of Art bestowed on them". A footnote adds that "about the year 655 was founded the Cathedral of Peterborough, one of the

noblest Pieces of Gothic Architecture in the Kingdom. It is curiously adorned, for the Age of it, with a great Variety of Imagery”.

A couple of pages later we find a quotation which really marks an epoch in the history of the rediscovery of Gothic, to the effect that “round-arched Buildings, with a particular Form of Mouldings, and without Ornaments, was the Fashion of the Conquerors Age, and the oldest Norman Architecture; and that the pointed Arch succeeded and brought with it the Ornaments added in after Times: which last may be called the New Norman Architecture”. Gothic is defined further on in the note as “with pointed Arches, and a Variety of little Ornaments”. Who was the “worthy Person” who gave Hole these observations? He really deserves the credit usually given to Carter as a pioneer of scientific inquiry into Gothic art.

Section IV then proceeds to develop Gale's theme and in the *Monastican Anglicanum* of the importance of monasteries as centres of architecture, to admire the “sect of excellent Artificers who flourished in France” about the beginning of the eleventh century; and it even goes so far as to suggest that Edward the Confessor, with his love for French Customs, “probably made Improvements on the Saxon Architecture; the *Normans* doubtless brought with them their own Artificers, and their own general Plan of Architecture”, which included the “use of Caen stone and of cruciform churches”. More of its time is the suggestion that “in the two subsequent Centuries indeed, some few Alterations appear to be made in the Mode of erecting and adorning Churches”, which may either have been “due to the taste of the principal Architects” or “to the expeditions which were then made into the Eastern Parts of the World”. One thing is certain, however, “in the general Structure of these Churches”, in spite of their “Multiplicity of Superfluous Ornaments”, a “most extraordinary elegance and uncommon Beauty were displayed. In our own Country the Church of *New Sarum* may be particularly mentioned, which hath been judged to be one of the best Patterns of Architecture in that Age. A late accurate Surveyor of it remarks that when this Pile was first finished, the delicate Marble Pillars, the Ornaments of the Windows, and Choir, with the beautiful Arcade, Pavement, &c. must have had a most venerable

Appearance, and could not fail of exciting the Admiration and charming the eye of every Beholder". Now if there is one word more than another which seems inappropriate to a newly finished building it is the word venerable; every student of illuminated MSS. knows how white and glaring the cities represented in their pages appear; yet so strong a hold had the belief in the inherently romantic quality of Gothic obtained by 1761 that a brand-new cathedral in that style is bound to have affected its contemporaries as it affected Horace Walpole—that is, in Walpole's words, "to infuse sensations of romantic devotion". Dr. Hole shared this Strawberry doctrine before that doctrine had been fully worked out by its creator, and we are not surprised to find the editor, Dr. Wilson, reprinting almost the whole of Bishop Warburton's famous note on Pope's Fourth Epistle as Appendix VII, even if its doctrines are not wholly consonant with the more advanced views expressed in Hole's text.²

Warburton's views need only a brief summary. The architecture of the Holy Land was a debased Græcian, and our Saxon (=Norman) a bad copy of it; our Norman (=Early English) came from Spain [Hole's more advanced view made the Taste of the Principal Architects of the Age precede the Saracenic theory]; a Gothic cathedral was based on an avenue, "the Stone-work in the Window representing the Branches, the stained Glass the Leaves of an opening Grove". The extract ends with the illuminating passage: "Such then was the *GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE*; and it would be no Discredit to the warmest admirers of *Jones* and *Palladio* to acknowledge it has its Merits".

On pp. 137-8 we have the moral, then, as almost ever since, implicit in the consideration of Gothic architecture, "When we consider that those who in all Ages have done Honour to Humanity, have ever recommended by their Admonition and Practice, the Care of religious Fabrics, it may reasonably be hoped that the Spirit of decently adorning them, which at present appears to be lost, will again revive . . . The Fabrics appropriated to the Purposes of Religion can never be entirely neglected, till a total Disregard to Religion first prevails . . . it will be diffi-

² It is, however, quite possible that Hole was using the word "venerable" in its original sense of "inspiring veneration", without reference to age.

cult to conceive that a general Reformation can take Place, till the Temples of the Deity are restored to their proper Dignity, and the public worship of God is conducted in the Beauty of Holiness". Remove the capitals, and nine readers out of ten would assign this passage on the time of the Oxford Movement; and when we read (p. 136) that "should the attempts which are now carried on against the Eastern Window of *St. Margaret's* be attended with Success, and a Decision of the Court be obtained in their Favour, a Foundation would then be laid on which other Prosecutions might be commenced, and the Law then finish what Puritanical Faction began", so that it is important (p. 138) to obtain "what appears to have been the Opinion of the Church of *England*, and has been indisputably her Practice since the Reformation", we have the true Keble touch. To judge by his practice at Hursley, however, it is to be feared that Keble would have swept away the Gothick of *St. Margaret's* as mere eighteenth-century nonsense, and have substituted for it some imitation of the New Sarum style in the firm belief, which he would never have ascribed to the despised eighteenth century, that it "had a most venerable Appearance, and could not fail of exciting the Admiration and charming the Eye of every Beholder". Such were the ideals behind the restoration of *St. Margaret's consula Wilkes*.

MINISTRY TO THE SICK IN HOSPITAL

Some Theological Questions

By G. B. BENTLEY

ENGLISHMEN, it seems, are always loth to define the ends of activities they engage in. Perhaps this is an outcome of pre-occupation with sports and games, which, as William Temple once observed, "you have got to take mystically, or not at all". To require a reason—an ulterior motive—for playing football or golf is to spoil all: worse, it is not cricket. But when the activity in question is not a game or a sport, but some necessary function of social or personal life, indifference to ends may have very serious consequences. Had there been a more general understanding of the true ends of industry and finance, for instance, and of their relation to the final end of human existence, society would not present the problems it does to-day.

This questionable trait in our character may account for the fact that few of those who speak or write about the work of hospital chaplains trouble to examine the end a hospital exists to serve. Yet, since a hospital is manifestly not an end in itself, but simply and solely a means, we cannot hope to understand what it is without first discovering what it is for; and unless we understand what it is, we cannot determine the function of a chaplain in it. Nor is that all. Whenever Christians neglect to define, in the light of the revelation of man's destiny, the true purpose of an institution, the door is thrown open for the entrance of purely secular definitions. In the matter of hospitals this consequence may already be discerned.

According to the conventional way of thinking, a hospital has healing as its end: it exists to cure disease. But on closer

examination some formidable objections appear. In the first place, are we to say that a hospital has wholly failed in its purpose if a patient dies, or is discharged uncured? Is a hospital for incurables a contradiction in terms? Is it quite outside the function of a hospital to alleviate pain or other symptom of a disease which defies medical science, or to ease by skilful nursing or other means the last days and hours of the dying? Obviously "healing" does not cover the manifold services which hospitals render to the sick. In the second place, even if "healing" did adequately describe the services rendered, it still would not give us a clear picture of the hospital's *Sitz im Leben*. For that we need to know also to what more ultimate end the art of healing is directed. If the purpose of a hospital is healing, what is the purpose of healing?

One clear and coherent answer to such questions has emerged in our time, though mercifully it has not so far won much of a footing in this country. In the totalitarian view the end of a hospital is most certainly healing; and the end of healing is the good of the ruling class: it is for physicians, surgeons and nurses to restore to usefulness those whom disease has incapacitated, in order that they may again be serviceable to the State. The corollary is that those who cannot be successfully restored may properly be "liquidated", unless there is reason to think that observing the course of their disease, and making experiments, will benefit medical science.

Given the premise that man exists for the sake of the State, it is difficult to quarrel with the logic of this opinion. That is why it is so illuminating. It shows that in answering the question "What are hospitals for?" the decisive factor is bound to be the doctrine of man and of man's end which a society entertains. We cannot discern the true end of a hospital unless we rightly conceive the nature and destiny of the men it is intended to serve. Now as soon as we bring the light of the Christian doctrine of man to bear, we see that there cannot be the slightest justification for regarding hospitals as repair shops for patching up and restoring to usefulness damaged "workers" or "manpower". Men are the creatures of God, made by him in his own image and for himself: they exist for God, not for the State; they must never

be treated merely as means to any temporal end. Consequently, in so far as "healing" will serve to describe a hospital's work, it is healing the sick for their own sake—because they are unique "persons", each "known of God"—and for God's sake—because he created them to become his children—not for the sake of anything else.

We have already noticed, however, certain *prima facie* objections to calling the end of a hospital "healing" simply; these are greatly reinforced by Christian doctrine. For sickness has a special significance in Christian eyes. It can be confidently affirmed, without prejudice to theological questions which are to be considered later, that upon those who experience the mystery of sickness, and are thereby denied most of the normal outlets for active conformity with his "signified will", God acts with peculiar intensity after the mode of his "will of good pleasure". The very passivity of the "patient" throws into relief the battle raging in and about him between the spiritual hosts of Michael and the dragon. In such a context the question whether the sick man will be healed or not is seen to be, though of real, yet of subordinate import. Certainly "healing" cannot suffice to express all that a man in this situation has the right to expect from those who have the care of him. The end of a hospital is to co-operate with the divine action in and upon the sick—nothing less than that; and the prayer that matches the ministry which the end demands is "Thy will be done in them".

But (someone will say) does not God will healing? Surely his purpose for men is health, not sickness; therefore healing must be the end of the hospital's co-operation with his action. The answer to this seems to be: "It depends on what you mean by 'the will of God' on the one hand, and by 'healing' on the other". First of all, the term "will of God" is far from being univocal: we have already used the distinction between his "signified will" and his "will of good pleasure"; now we need a distinction between his "primary" will and his "secondary" will. In the realm of the "signified will" theologians distinguish a "primary" law of nature, corresponding to the primal order of creation, and a "secondary" law, which matches our fallen world. Thus Hooker:—

Those Laws of Reason, which (man retaining his original integrity) had been sufficient to direct each particular person in all his affairs and duties, are not sufficient but require the access of other laws, now that man and his offspring are grown corrupt and sinful.¹

Among those "other laws" we may instance the whole aspect of justice which is known as "vindictive". Again (to take an example from the hospital) whereas the primary law of nature forbids mutilating a man by cutting off his leg, the secondary law not only permits but directs a surgeon to do precisely that, if the leg is gangrenous and nothing else can save the body as a whole.

In other words, the law of the "signified will" is realistic: taking account of the circumstances of human life, it often commands, not that which is positively good by the standard of the order of creation, but that which is relatively good, the lesser evil. Now it seems that an analogous distinction may be discerned in the realm of the "will of good pleasure". There the "primary" will of God is most assuredly health. He created man to be healthy, just as he created him to be immortal; and it is by envy of the devil that both disease and death are entered in. Yet, since the potentiality of these evils was inseparable from the nature of his creation, and since it would be self-contradiction in the Creator to refuse, so to speak, to "recognize" effects proceeding from a freedom of choice which he has himself bestowed, there is a sense in which we may say that God, by his "secondary" will, wills sickness.

It is crucially important, though, to see in what manner he wills it: not by way of passive acceptance of an inevitable evil, but actively, redemptively and victoriously—in fact, in the same manner as he willed the cross of Christ. "Him, being delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye by the hand of lawless men did crucify and slay".² The crucifixion was the work of "lawless men" and "the rulers of this world";³ yet it happened by "the determinate counsel" of God. The victory of God's kingdom is seen precisely in this: that he takes

¹ *Eccl. Pol.* I. x. 13.

² Acts ii, 23.

³ I Cor. ii, 8.

into account, and incorporates into his own plan, the worst the enemy can do, and overrules it for good, transforms it into a means of redeeming grace. So it is with sickness. God takes this work of the devil, weaves it into his plan, and uses it as occasion demands to correct, detach, purify, to unite with Christ crucified, and to extend through the suffering of Christ's members the redemption which was wrought by the suffering of Christ. Therefore the sick man can by faith receive his sickness at God's hands—receive it with thankfulness even—and so receiving it participate in God's victory and redeeming action. He is "laid up", but not "on the shelf": his sickness is not a meaningless lacuna between periods of "useful" living, but the vocation to a different, but by no means less fruitful, job of work.

At this juncture those whose statement, "God wills healing", gave rise to this discussion will complain, not without justice, that we have so far shown no signs of understanding their meaning. Of course it is true (they will say) that God uses sickness and turns it to good: what we mean is not that sickness is outside the scope of divine Providence, but that in our approach to the sick we can be sure that God wills their recovery and approves our efforts to obtain it. Have we not seen already that the surgeon who amputates an affected limb acts conformably with the "signified will"? The whole development of medicine and surgery rests on the assumption, surely justifiable, that to pursue healing is always right; and the example of our Lord, both in his own miracles of healing and in his commissioning the disciples to heal, shows that to attack sickness by supernatural means is equally in accordance with the will of God. "Ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, to have been loosed from this bond on the day of the sabbath?"⁴ The ministry of healing, natural and supernatural, is part and parcel of the dispossession of "the strong man armed" by the one who is "stronger than he".⁵ Therefore we may say with full confidence that God wills healing. If healing is not obtained, then the failure is ours: our unbelief, or other defect, has put obstacles in God's way, even as the

⁴ Luke xiii, 16.

⁵ Luke xi, 21 f.

unbelief of his own country prevented Christ doing there any mighty work.

Much of this argument is unquestionable. Nevertheless there are considerations pointing to a different conclusion. Besides healing the sick our Lord also raised the dead; yet we do not conclude from that that God wills that no man should die. The new creation has overcome death, not abolished it. Surely the same is true of sickness, which is the gateway of death. Further, it happens often that in conditions which, to our eyes at any rate, seem most favourable to the divine action God does not in fact heal. It seems dangerous, therefore, to generalize about God's will in this matter. In particular cases it may be vouchsafed to individuals to know that he wills healing, and to seek it with full assurance; but in general the only justifiable attitude, both for the sick and for those who minister to them, is self-abandonment to Providence—firm belief that with God all things are possible coupled with readiness to take whatever he may give.

There are others, however, who, while accepting what has just been said, would preserve the truth of the affirmation "God wills healing" by giving "healing" a wider connotation. Stressing the unity of body and soul in man, they insist that the cure of physical or mental disease does not by itself constitute healing, which is "the restoration to harmonious working of the whole being".⁶ Further (their contention is) there are cases in which persons who are not "cured" may nevertheless be said to be "healed". For instance, a man is operated on unsuccessfully and goes blind; he is anointed, but his sight is not restored. Yet, though he is not "cured", he may receive grace to accept his disability with entire self-abandonment and to triumph over it. If so, the "harmonious working of the whole being" is achieved in him. A supernatural "wholeness" descends upon his physical defect and transfigures it: he is "healed". Even death can be represented in this light. A sufferer may accept death at God's hands as the "healing" ordained for him. Rightly understood, then, healing is undoubtedly what God wills, and the true end of a hospital.

This account of the matter has the great merit of calling

⁶ *The Priest's Vade Mecum* (ed. T. W. Crafer, 1945), p. 5.

attention to an essential and significant element in the Christian understanding of human life. The "wholeness" which man can hope for in a fallen world is formal rather than material: his vocation is not to the full and unimpeded actualization of all natural potentialities or to the fruition of all natural good; it is to suffer loss with Christ, to die with him and rise again in a resurrection which transfigures yet does not remove the print of spear and nail. Not only is it better to enter into life maimed than to go whole to destruction, but (we may make bold to say) no man can enter into life at all without suffering maiming in some respect or other. Consequently there is real value in the conception which treats as "healed" the man in whom a supernatural "wholeness" has overcome an uncured disability.

At the same time it cannot be overlooked that to use the word "healing" so is to use it, not in the sense which is commonly assigned to it and in which it is applied to the end of medical science, but in a Pickwickian sense that is apt to elude the uninitiated. Misunderstanding has been caused, for example, by describing a function of the hospital chaplain as co-operation with the medical staff in the work of "healing". If we take "healing" in its esoteric sense, this description will serve. A priest may properly be called "physician of the soul"; and the chaplain's methods and the methods of physicians and surgeons, different as they are, may be seen as complementary and together directed towards producing "wholeness" in the patient. But in practice people inevitably tend to understand "healing" in the narrower and more usual sense, with the result that the chaplain's ministry comes in the end to be conceived as subordinate to that of the physician or surgeon. One has heard it said by those who stress medical-priestly co-operation that it is for the priest to clear the way for the effectual application of medical remedies by attacking spiritual maladies which are beyond the doctor's reach. That is a disastrous confusion of values. No one would deny that (for instance) priestly absolution may have the effect of removing obstacles to what the physician is trying to do; but to treat absolution as a means to that end is indefensible. In view of the possibility, and indeed likelihood, of such misunderstanding it seems best to interpret "healing" in the usual sense and, as we have suggested, to define the end

of a hospital in some such words as "co-operation with the divine action" rather than as healing simply.

Within the comprehensive ministry of the hospital the various specialists, with their own specific ends, have their proper parts to play. The function that expresses most fully and characteristically the end of the hospital as a whole is nursing. It is through its nurses that the hospital ministers most directly and continuously to the sick as persons; and therefore it is primarily through its nurses that it must achieve co-operation with what God is doing. The end of medicine and surgery is more restricted, and may conveniently be described as healing in the ordinary sense of the word, although it includes relieving the sufferings of those who cannot be healed. (Perhaps it should be observed in passing that it is particularly important to insist on this end in days when "euthanasia" and various surgical violations of natural law are freely advocated.) Then there are all the other specialisms, too numerous to mention, each contributing directly or mediately to the common ministry. But where does the chaplain come in?

Since few trouble to examine the nature and end of a hospital, it is scarcely surprising that the function of the hospital's chaplain is often misconceived. The prevalent notion is that the chaplain exists to provide "spiritual ministrations": that is, to furnish to those who want them the instruments and consolations of religion. The end of the hospital being conceived, albeit obscurely, as "healing", the purely "spiritual" business of the chaplain is naturally regarded, not as integral to the real work of the hospital, but as superimposed upon it: he is tolerated, or even welcomed, because on the whole he makes people happier and improves morale; but he remains supernumerary.

All this admirably illustrates the truth that in proportion as in any society men fail to relate their own proximate ends to the final end of man they must also fail to make sense of priests in their midst. If, for instance, nurses appreciated the full purpose of their own vocation, they could never be content to abandon "spiritual ministration" to the chaplain; for they would see that their own ministry was not confined to the flesh, and, seeing that, they would begin to understand the chaplain better. The proper word by which to distinguish the chaplain's function is not

“spiritual” but “priestly”. He is there to make, in every department of the hospital’s life, the priest’s contribution. It is manifestly beyond our present scope even to begin to draw out all that that implies; but, squeezing as much of the matter as we can into a ridiculously inadequate nutshell, we may say that the work of a priest is first to prepare, and then to offer, the sacrifice of the community in which he is set. That is to say, he has first, by the exercise of his pastoral office, to interpret to his people the meaning and purpose of their life and to show them how their end is to be achieved by union with Christ’s self-oblation; and then, by exercise of his liturgical office, he joins with them in the eucharistic consummation of that union.

In a hospital the pastoral part of the priest’s function has a twofold direction: towards the “active” members of the community on the one hand, and towards the “passive” members—the patients—on the other. In the former direction, it is for him to interpret the hospital to itself, so that all may perceive, and according to their several vocations and ministries pursue, for the glory of God, the true end of the community. This is the hardest task of all. Then, in the latter direction, he has both to interpret to the sick what God is doing in them, in order that they themselves may co-operate, and also in part to mediate sacramentally (this is the context of “the ministry of healing”) the divine action. In view of what has been said, there is no need to labour the point that all this is part and parcel of the hospital’s work, not something superimposed upon it. Finally, when he takes up his liturgical office, both strands of his pastoral work are knit together in the one sacrifice, wherein all the life of the hospital, “active” and “passive” alike, which is capable of being offered is gathered up and laid upon the altar, to the glory and praise of God.

INFERENCE IN NATURAL THEOLOGY

By D. J. B. HAWKINS

DOM Illtyd Trethowan has recently taken me to task in these pages for my conception of natural theology as expressed in a review of Mr. Mascall's excellent *Existence and Analogy*.¹ Since my debate with him on this subject has continued in various places since 1946, it might well be supposed that everything had been said on both sides, but I should like to take the opportunity of offering a few precisions. For the question is too important to permit a polite agreement to differ.

Fr. Trethowan says that our natural knowledge of the existence of God is not due to an inference or, at least, not due to a *sylogistic* inference. He defines the nature of *sylogistic* inference in this way: "The whole point of sylogistic reasoning, I take it, is to show that two premisses, when once their truth has been grasped, produce the required conclusion when held together by the mind". This would seem to me to be a description of real inference in general, for what the logical textbooks describe as immediate inference from a single proposition is merely the reformulation of whole or part of the meaning of that proposition in a different sentence. This point, however, is not of great moment, for Fr. Trethowan says also that he prefers to abandon the language of inference altogether.

Here we may dispose equally of two other points which, in the context, are of minor moment. My suspicion that he thinks somewhat ignobly of inference is confirmed by his description of an inferential process as acting "as a sort of no-man's-land or buffer state between" God and creatures. He could not have expressed more neatly the attitude of mind which I conjectured to

¹ cf. Dom Illtyd Trethowan: "Do We Infer God's Existence?" in *The Church Quarterly Review*, April-June 1950, pp. 100-110, and my review in the previous number, Jan.-March 1950, pp. 224-7.

be his, and which regards inference as dividing rather than uniting. Inference is not a buffer but a bridge and a moving bridge at that.

Moreover it is somewhat disturbing to find him asserting that "it does not appear that [indirect] knowledge can arise except on a basis of previous experience". I cannot believe that he really thinks all major premisses to be either tautologous (analytic) or inductive. Is not the nature of the *a priori* synthesis at the heart of any serious theory of knowledge? Yet it is a curious fact how many thinkers in how various ways try to evade the problem which Kant formulated so exactly and solved so wrongheadedly. While many Thomists try to hold that all *principia per se nota* are, in some Pickwickian sense, analytic, their opponents are often at one with them in maintaining that such propositions are, in a clearer but more obviously inapplicable sense, tautologous. That both sides are mistaken should be evident; it is only if we are capable of apprehending the objective truth of synthetic *a priori* propositions in the precise Kantian sense that inference escapes being either trivial or uncertain. It is fatal for the metaphysician to try to bypass logic, however arid logic may seem to him.

These points, nevertheless, are of minor importance, for Fr. Trethowan's formulation of the process which he describes as *not* being syllogistic corresponds completely with a process which I should describe as being syllogistic. When we infer infinite being from finite being, we are noticing both that the finite entails the infinite and that the finite exists. Such existential inferences are common enough in ordinary thinking, although in ordinary thinking they are usually no more than probable. When I infer from the presence of heavy clouds in the sky that it will probably rain, I am aware both of the probable connexion between heavy clouds and future rain and of the actual presence of heavy clouds. If I merely noticed the clouds without thinking of the connexion, I should not draw the conclusion; if I remembered the connexion but did not look at the actual state of the sky, I should be equally without ground for any further assertion. It is evident that the recognition of an entailment or probabilification and the observation of a fact are distinct premisses for logical analysis.

In the case of the inference of the infinite from the finite,

Fr. Trethowan objects that the existence of the finite is too obvious. Yet it would be logically possible to be a sceptic in the existential order and to doubt the existence of anything while admitting that, if finite things existed, an infinite being would exist. It is also logically possible for a pantheist to admit this entailment in the abstract while denying that any finite thing "really" exists. And there are plenty of people, the "agnostic friends" to whom Fr. Trethowan refers, who acknowledge the existence of the finite without seeing that this entails the infinite. That there are two premisses in the argument seems undeniable for analysis, although they do not need to be explicitly distinguished before the logician takes over.

Here at last, however, we come to what I now suppose to be the genuine source of difference. For, in spite of all this, whose evidence Fr. Trethowan is at least as capable of recognizing as myself, he denies that our natural knowledge of God is inferential. How is this possible? It is possible on either of two theses, both of which Fr. Trethowan appears to accept. For, if the very notion of infinite being could not be formed on the basis of an experience of finite being but presupposed some acquaintance with real infinite being, the inferential process would be, at the worst, a waste of time and, at the best, the recognition of an entailment between two factors already known to exist. This is, I think, what Fr. Trethowan is maintaining when he says that "the 'entailment' cannot be apprehended unless we are already apprehending the realities between which it holds". This is, of course, the Cartesian view, according to which we have a positive and underivative idea of infinite being whose source can only be the real infinite being itself. It is cognate also with a current interpretation of the Anselmian argument, according to which our notion of infinite being, when adequately considered, commits us to the belief that such a being exists. It is altogether opposed to the Thomist opinion, according to which the concept of infinite being is derived from an experience of finite being and, apart from inference, gives us no ground for asserting that infinite being exists. The invocation of these honoured names shows that the opposition is not merely between Fr. Trethowan and myself but between two sharply distinguished conceptions of the nature of metaphysical thinking.

The second thesis which permits Fr. Trethowan's conclusion is that the alleged two premisses of the argument to the existence of God are not really distinct. To this he alludes in his penultimate page, when he refers to Dom Mark Pontifex's theory of being. According to Fr. Pontifex the existence of finite things not only entails but, on final analysis, turns out to mean their being created by God who is pure Being. In opposition to Fr. Trethowan's suggestion that I have "not yet seriously envisaged" this doctrine, I may say that I have not only seriously envisaged it but deliberately rejected it. It seems to me just obvious that we can say, and can understand, that finite things exist without even the most implicit reference to the existence of God. Otherwise I should find my "agnostic friends" altogether unintelligible. That existence, although analogous, is an intrinsic and not a merely relational character seems to me undeniable.

I do think, however, that these two final points are those that matter. It is upon them that depends the decision whether our natural knowledge of God is, or is not, inferential. Whenever and wherever Fr. Trethowan resumes this debate, I hope that the discussion will turn upon the meaning of existence and the source of our notion of infinite being. There lies the difference, and thence proceeds the decision whether Thomist natural theology is adequate or a new approach is required. Fr. Trethowan has not yet shaken my belief that St. Thomas was in the right on these questions. I will not take up his point about the practical value of the different approaches in relation to our "agnostic friends", for I lament with him that in our present intellectual climate they seem singularly indifferent to either approach, but I will express a hope that the Subject of this debate will take a kindly view of our human inadequacy in his regard.

REVIEWS

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By
ROGER LLOYD. Vol. 2. (Longmans). 18s. 6d.

THE second volume of Canon Roger Lloyd's impressions of the Church of England in the twentieth century does not disappoint the expectations aroused by its predecessor. The initial volume (published in 1946) was described in the author's preface as being "not a history, as historians understand the word", but rather "a Meditation upon an Historical Theme." The sequel likewise makes no pretensions to be regarded as "a work of formal history": "it is rather a series of pictures of a great Church at work, and variously expressing the faith by which it lives, during twenty years of peculiar difficulty. These pictures are selective samples, drawn here and there from a vast and crowded canvas of great complexity, and they make no claim to being exhaustive."

The first volume covered the years 1900 to 1918: the sequel is concerned with the years between the wars, 1919 to 1939. Its leading topics are the climate of opinion (or what our fathers would have called the *Zeitgeist*); the theological counter-revolution, and its impact on the Church's life; Christian Socialism and Christian sociology; the clergy and their work, in town and country and cathedral, and the ancillary ministries of the laity (Church Assembly and Lay Readers); Lambeth and Unity; Foreign Missions and the Younger Churches.

Precisely because the treatment is avowedly selective, the volume fails to achieve a real unity. But this matters less than might have been expected, and, with so foreshortened an historical perspective, is probably inevitable. Thus, for example, the chapter entitled "In the Sphere of Doctrine" is really complete in itself: after some preliminary remarks on "Liberalism", it gets going with Dr. Major's lectures at Harvard on *English Modernism* in 1925, plunges back into the maelstrom of the Girton Conference of 1921, and rides triumphantly to its predestined goal with Hoskyns' epoch-making essay on "The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels" in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (1927). Canon Lloyd's estimate of Hoskyns' influence on Anglican theology is not excessive, although he does not seem fully to appreciate that Hoskyns at Cambridge was fighting what might almost be described as a lone battle against heavy academic odds: for it does sometimes happen that a prophet is not without honour, except in his own Faculty.

Again, the portraits of individual heroes, such as Basil Jellicoe of Somers Town, Charlie Bond of Alton (Hants.), Hugh Lister of Hackney Wick, and James Andrew Halliday of Newcastle, are vivid and compact: while the chapter on "The Witness of the Cathedral" falls neatly into shape around the revered names of Archbishop Benson and Dean Bennett of Chester. (It will be noted that the author does not rigidly confine himself within the limits of his period: he also goes back to Kikuyu, and there is even an excursus on the religion of John Locke.)

Apart from admirably executed details such as these, it has to be said that Canon Lloyd's pages contain much useful information about matters and incidents which most of us remember only vaguely, and which it is convenient to have put into such clear perspective. There are some inspired inclusions (the Bible Reading Fellowship, the Student Christian Movement, the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius). There are also some curious omissions. The advent of Religious Broadcasting, and the elevation of St. Martin-in-the-Fields to the status of what someone has aptly described as "London's Sacré Coeur", are indicated only incidentally in a paragraph about Dick Sheppard on p. 15, and neither of them figures in the index. Vernon Storr and the A.E.G.M. are not even mentioned. The previous volume paid a notable tribute to the work of Percy Dearmer in connexion with St. Mary's, Primrose Hill, and with the *English Hymnal*: but in the second volume one looks in vain for any reference to Dearmer's influence on the ceremonial of Westminster Abbey, or (whether we like it or not) to *Songs of Praise*. From this it may be inferred that the author has his blind spots: and it may also be thought that the space devoted to "the Christian Social Movement" in its various aspects is slightly disproportionate. The comparative neglect of the Prayer-Book Crisis and of the constitutional and disciplinary questions which it precipitated is more patently deliberate, and may perhaps be justified on the basis of the author's terms of reference: but it is something to which a reviewer is obliged to call attention. There is also one surprising slip: Professor Donald Mackinnon is not in holy orders (p. 108).

Canon Roger Lloyd is rightly proud of his vocation as a priest of the Church of England, and his tone is refreshingly exuberant. Yet is it true that these "very crowded" twenty years were "exceptionally crowded" (p. 18)? What is the standard of comparison? Again, when the author inquires: "Has there been any other period of twenty years in the history of the Church of England quite so distinguished by men and women of the first rank of achievement?" (p. 17), the historian may find it difficult to answer the question in the confident affirmative that seems to be expected. It is true, indeed, that in these forty years from 1900 to 1939 the

distance travelled by the Church of England is "really astonishing" (p. 315). It is also true that the two decades from 1919 to 1939 were years of busy and bustling activity, in which the Church was propelled forward by one "Movement" after another (even Archbishop William Temple had something of that passion for "Movements" which was so typical of his generation); and, as Canon Lloyd himself remarks, "the superabundance of Commissions, Reports, Calls, Challenges, Appeals, Surveys and Plans together constituted that deadly over-stimulation which in the end only produces a dull resistance on the part of those whom it is intended to stimulate" (p. 159). It has been shrewdly observed that the Church of England instinctively dislikes being "revved up" and stubbornly resists the process. Canon Lloyd says the same thing from another point of view when he insists that the authentic genius of our Church is pastoral rather than either sacerdotal or prophetic. "The Anglican Church is essentially and fundamentally pastoral. It cannot be said too often, for nobody will ever understand Anglicanism who ignores this basic fact" (p. 23). And it is by its fruits that it is known. "Our real heroes are those whose names can never be known, the ordinary parish priest, the Sunday school teacher, the member of the Mothers' Union, the sidesman, and most of all the small band of the faithful who make the congregation at the Eucharist on weekdays. On their continued and utterly obscure fidelity the entire worldwide Anglican Communion of Churches ultimately rests. If that were everywhere withdrawn for only one generation the Church would collapse and no amount of specially gifted leadership by those in places of eminence and authority could save it" (p. 22).

CHARLES SMYTH.

THE CITY OF GOD. By J. H. S. BURLEIGH. pp. vi and 226. (Nisbet). 12s. 6d.

It is not at all unnatural that our present discontents should lead to a renewed interest in St. Augustine's great theodicy the *City of God*, and Professor Burleigh reveals a true instinct in offering to the general reader, and even to the scholar, some guidance to help him in his reading of this monumental and diffuse masterpiece. To this end his work seems quite admirably adapted. It starts with a consideration of the predicament of St. Augustine's time, and follows it up by an analysis of St. Augustine's spiritual and intellectual pilgrimage, his attitude to Holy Scripture, his general doctrinal approach as illustrated by the *City of God*, and finally his contribution to political and sociological study and to the philosophy of history.

The author wears his genuine learning very lightly and has not fallen a victim to the cult of the footnote—always a mark of the pedant. A fuller bibliography would have been much appreciated by at least one of his readers instead of the reference to Gilson's work. Where, however, he does quote authorities they are well selected and sometimes surprising. One does not expect, for example, a reference to Professor B. Farrington in a work by a theologian, though the reference is apt and the criticism fair and penetrating.

It would virtually need a whole army of reviewers to do justice to the many-sided character of this important book, and it is not surprising that in the assessment of a writer so many-sided and voluminous as St. Augustine there are interpretations which are at least disputable. He begins, for example, with the question whether St. Augustine shows any trace of living at the end of an epoch. The Sermon *de excidio urbis* and the basic design of the *de civitate Dei* itself suggests that he did, but Professor Burleigh, while adding some important qualifications to such a view, decides in the opposite sense. The qualifications are important but it appears rather a *tour de force* to make them overthrow the real weight of evidence. No one has done more than the author to show that for St. Augustine the Fall of Rome, though not politically as important as it might at first appear, had a symbolic importance quite out of proportion to its material effect.

Professor Burleigh does much to support the view that the conversion of St. Augustine was not, as is often supposed, a conversion to Neoplatonism rather than to Christianity, yet he never tires of stressing the significance of the Platonic elements in his essential thinking. His doctrine of God is "fundamentally Neoplatonist" (p. 113). "Moses is made to speak, if not Attic Greek, at least a modified form of Platonism" (p. 97). He seeks to explain the relatively small part played by the Bible in the earlier stages of his theology with the noteworthy suggestion that Christian education worked up to, rather than started, from the Bible. There is a clear tension between the Platonism and the Biblicism of St. Augustine. The situation is clearly complex and it is sometimes to be wondered whether Professor Burleigh has really got his own mind clear on the matter.

His judgement is perhaps not quite reliable when he gets outside the immediate range of his subject. On page 114 he argues, for example, that "for St. Augustine as for the Patristic theologians generally the Doctrine of the Spirit was perplexing and theoretically unnecessary". There is, of course, a measure of truth in this, but there is often a danger in emphasizing this to the exclusion of the surprising twin fact that it is precisely to the Patristic theologians that the Catholic formulation of the doctrine is primarily due.

One does not canonize an embarrassment. Nor is it easy to accept the view that the Greek Fathers dissolved eschatology into allegory. Doubtless the Greek approach is dominated by mysticism, but it never so far took control of the situation as to cut one of the significant painters which tied them to Hebrew and earlier Christian concepts. Despite the objections of Dionysius and the suspicion of Eusebius the Apocalypse did get into the Canon and the eschatology which it enshrines *par excellence* was never wholly abandoned.

There are a number of misprints: p. 53, "postively" for "positively": p. 75, *De Quantitatae Animae* for *de Quantitate Animae*, "Cassiciacum" is surely right for the retreat of St. Augustine; "Hernshaw" should read "Hearnshaw", and even if it is disputable whether the interesting lay Donatist theologian should be called Tichonius or Tychonius, consistency even in *rebus dubiis* is a virtue. A delicious misprint on page 76, *de cavitae Dei*, adds a monstrous new attribute to the divine galaxy! But such blemishes apart, Professor Burleigh has put not only the general reader but the whole scholarly world greatly in his debt. Whether or no the Augustinian specialist will find anything really new in content or in interpretation in his work may perhaps be considered doubtful.

H. E. W. TURNER.

RETROSPECT OF AN UNIMPORTANT LIFE. By HERBERT HENSLEY HENSON. Vol. III. (Geoffrey Cumberlege. Oxford University Press). 25s.

THESE last published words of Dr. Henson are among the most impressive that he has left. Every reader of this book will be grateful to him for having persevered, amid all the difficulties of war-time conditions and advancing years, and despite his own misgivings about the project, in bringing to completion these memoirs which will certainly rank among the most distinguished of twentieth-century autobiographies. This third volume covers the last phase, between his retirement from Durham and his death. Only a fortnight before he died he was writing letters about it to the publisher; he did not live to see it through the press. Thus it does embody his final reflections as he looked back on a long, active ministry lived at the very centre of affairs. Just because it deals with the last phase there is a certain pathos about this volume. The reader is all the time conscious, like the author, that the clouds are gathering round the setting sun. But also, perhaps because of the circumstances, there is a more intimate personal touch about it than about either of its predecessors. If we hear less about public events or matters of high ecclesiastical policy, we learn much more about Hensley Henson. The man himself

will not let us go. The more he learns the more glad will the reader be if he enjoyed the privilege of knowing him. To my mind this volume is certainly the most fascinating of the trilogy. I find it extremely hard to lay down.

The war broke out within a few months of his settling into the new home at Hintlesham. He had thus to adjust himself to retirement in a nightmare world of storm and stress. The journal records the course of the war-years from the private rather than from the public side—from this point of view it has some of the same interest as the autobiography of Richard Baxter. (I hope he would have been pleased with the comparison!) One startling interlude there was, in his recall to a Westminster canonry—so nearly a brilliant shot by Mr. Churchill—which would have brought him up-stage again. Before he had fairly started at the Abbey, he had to resign on oculist's advice. This caused him much pain of mind, for it seemed like the end of his ministerial life.

After that, the journal shows him at Hintlesham, meeting the disabilities of age (of which failing eyesight was the most grievous) with unflinching courage, humour and serenity. It delights us as before with his comments on men and affairs, and his penetrating judgements. For the outward man may have been decaying, but the *vivida vis animi* is unimpaired. There are still the incomparable phrases, still the darting, devastating criticisms. Take this, after listening to a sermon: "So long as there is a welcome provided for these appeals to emotion, to the sensitive self-accusation of peccant adolescence, to the fears of the morbid and aged and to the quick sympathies of the benevolent, such preaching of the Gospel will continue. But it is hard to believe that it can permanently satisfy the virile, the thoughtful and the educated" (p. 331). That, from a man in his eighty-third year!

What gives this volume its special interest is that here, perhaps for the first time, Henson allows the reader to come close to him, and unveils something of his inner life. It ends with a *Confessio Fidei* in the form of an open letter to a padre which reveals a depth of spirituality and of personal consecration to discipleship which may surprise all but his intimate friends. One passage describes the arrangement of his book-shelves, the rows of D.N.B., the Loeb Classics, the standard works of ancient and modern history—"a not wholly inadequate illustration of the life and thought of civilized man; and in the middle I set the Crucifix which proclaims with luminous significance the Judge and the standard of his judgement. I desired to place about the Crucified the earliest Christian creed, *Jesus is Lord* At the end of a long life, when I think over my personal religion it is still the Crucifixion that fills my vision". (There is strangely little about the Resurrection). So, again, when he asks what had been the compass bearings through his long spiri-

tual odyssey he returns back to the same answer. "The finality of Christ's revelation, the unchanging appeal of his example, the unfailing power of his Passion, the Divine paradox which he himself embodied—this is the sum and substance of the Gospel as I have understood it and desired to present it". One could fill pages with extracts from this document, perhaps the most important he wrote, and in the same class with Newman's *Apology*. All ordination candidates ought to study it.

One takes leave of him with enhanced respect. Whether anyone agrees or disagrees with his opinions is not the real question. The real question is about the man. He emerges as certainly a great man. I am grateful to have been allowed some contact with him. And the final impression left by the three volumes is to strengthen confidence in the Church of England. A Church that can breed such independence of mind, inwardly fed by such a devout spirit, has every right to be proud of its tradition. No other Church could have nurtured him—or retained him. He may have had words with his mother from time to time, but his fundamental loyalty never wavered. "One thing I can say with conviction, viz., there is no other Church now standing in Christendom to which I could transfer my allegiance".

RUSSELL SOUTHWELL:

AUTHORITY IN THE APOSTOLIC AGE. By R. R. WILLIAMS. (S.C.M. Press). 8s. 6d.

THE problem of authority is at the heart of all our difficulties in regard to the reunion of Christendom. Where is authority to be found? The fundamentalist points to the inerrant Scriptures, which, however, he allows to be interpreted only in terms of a Plymouth Brethren orthodoxy—otherwise the interpretation is "not sound". The Roman Catholic looks to the Pope, who "when he speaks *ex cathedra* . . . is endowed with that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer has willed that his Church . . . should be equipped." The followers of the Tractarians look for an infallible authority in the Creeds and the Councils of the undivided Church. And, on the other hand, Dean Inge—one of the few writers who has been able to get away with the same stock of epigrams in every book and article he has written—has never ceased to tell us that religions of authority are giving place to religions of experience and that we must look only to the apostolic succession of the mystics for our guidance.

A study of the problem of authority in the Apostolic Age is therefore timely, and we are grateful to the Principal of St. John's, Durham, for a work which, if it lays no claim to be an exhaustive study, yet provides us with useful guidance on the subject.

In his introduction Mr. Williams rightly points out the difference between two kinds of authority—on the one hand, “purely moral authority, based on prestige, age or wisdom”, which wins consent and allegiance through its own intrinsic worth, and, on the other hand, “the right to exercise power, absolute or delegated, in some definite sphere” (p. 9). Nevertheless, in the long run the latter kind of authority depends on the former.

In his first chapter the author studies the situation revealed in I Corinthians as giving us a cross-section view of the life of the early Church and notes five main grounds of appeal to which St. Paul makes reference: (1) The experience of the Corinthians at and after their conversion. (2) A general stock of knowledge and accepted practices. (3) The Old Testament. (4) St. Paul's own status and relationship with the Corinthians. (5) The moral welfare of the Church (p. 12).

His second chapter, “The Authority of History”, is exceedingly important. Traversing the ground now made familiar to us in Professor Dodd's writings, he points out how “the doctrine of the apostolic church and that of the sub-apostolic age was controlled by an historical tradition” (p. 24). “Primitive preaching . . . was a setting forth of certain events . . . in the light of the conviction that God had been at work in those events in a unique way, and that all men must now adjust, re-orientate their lives in the light of this conviction” (p. 29). The *kerygma*, “the announcement of historical events which had recently taken place, set in the light of Old Testament prophecy and of the Easter faith”, is in fact for the Christian an ultimate. The Israel of God was reconstituted in the response of men to its proclamation; and by the truth or falsehood of “redemption history” Christianity stands or falls.

Hence comes the authority of the Scriptures and the Creeds. The “written *corpus* was of great value . . . because it made the *paradosis* in a sense contemporary with each successive age So the core or quintessence of the Bible itself came to be selected, taught and transmitted in the classical Christian Creeds” (pp. 40-41).

Mr. Williams devotes two chapters to the Authority of the Ministry, seeking to disentangle the evidence for four successive periods—60, 80, 100 and 120 A.D. It would have been valuable to have from a former chairman of the A.E.G.M. a full-length discussion of the historical conclusions of *The Apostolic Ministry*, but perhaps that would have enlarged the book unduly. None the less, it is interesting to note his conclusion that “the evidence of the New Testament lends some support to the idea of an historical succession of ministers in the Church and this is not unrelated to the importance of preserving the apostolic witness clear and undiluted” (p. 73). “The authority of Christ through his ministry acts, in our view, not legally—after

the manner of that of the Jewish *Shaliach* or plenipotentiary—but . . . *morally and practically*” (p. 138).

Two chapters are devoted to the Authority of Dynamic Happenings—the author rightly points out the close association of *dunamis* and *exousia* in the early Church—and to the Authority of Common Practice. Finally Mr. Williams emphasizes the fact that all these authorities were thought of as secondary; they were the means by which the authority of the living Christ in his Church was exercised. But “no one channel could be regarded as monopolizing the right to mediate Christian authority. The right, if it lay anywhere, lay in the whole Church and then only in so far as the whole Church was obedient and responsive to the Spirit” (p. 113).

The author appends two essays, one of which gives a useful account of writings in the last half-century or so on the subject of Authority, while the other deals with the contemporary situation. Mr. Williams considers the claims of the Scriptures, the Church and the Ministry to bear ultimate authority and recognizes the limits of them all. “In the Christian Church, Christ, eternal Word of the Father, incarnate, crucified, risen, enthroned, is the source and sanction of every kind of binding authority. The thinking of the Church is subordinate to the authoritative, revealing and saving action of God in Christ, recorded in the Scriptures, summarized in the Creeds, dramatized in the Sacraments. The organized life of the Church is subject to the authority of its recognized forms of government. These are not exclusively clerical, but the ministry has a unique and definite place in the leadership and government of the Church” (p. 141). Mr. Williams frankly recognizes, however, the limits imposed on the Authority of the Church by the fact of Christian disunity. “In the present divided state of the Church”, he continues, “this can only be made real in the various autonomous groups which exist. The theological authority which might attach to the judgement of the Church as a whole, cannot come to fruition during the present state of universal schism.”

It is good indeed to see Liberal Evangelicalism recovering the insights of Biblical theology and developing a strong doctrine of the Church.

C. KENNETH SANBURY.

THE ADMONITION CONTROVERSY. By DONALD JOSEPH MCGINN. (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick). \$6.50.

BIBLICAL CRITICISM AND HERESY IN MILTON. By GEORGE NEWTON CONKLIN. (King's Crown Press, Columbia University, New York: Geoffrey Cumberlege). 14s.

DR. McGinn's conspicuously useful volume consists of text (pp. 149-539), introduction (pp. vii-ix, 3-147), notes (pp. 541-566), and

index (pp. 567-589). The text is an abridgement of the literature of the Admonition Controversy by which the Elizabethan Settlement was disturbed: it consists of selections, carefully arranged, from *An Admonition to the Parliament* (1572), Whitgift's *Answer to a Certain Libel* (1572), Cartwright's *Reply to an Answer* (1573), Whitgift's *Defense of the Answer* (1574), and Cartwright's *Second Reply* (1575) and *The Rest of the Second Reply* (1577).

The *Admonition to the Parliament* of 1572 was the first open manifesto of the Puritan party; and it marks the point at which puritanism began to be a hostile force, determined to do away with the existing system of polity and worship in the English Church (Frere and Douglas, *Puritan Manifestoes*, 1907, p. vii). But the Admonition Controversy has been overshadowed by the fame of Richard Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, and Whitgift's abilities as a controversialist have in consequence been underrated, while the tendency has been to flatter Cartwright at his expense.

The Admonition Controversy was essentially a literary duel between these two protagonists, and the outstanding merit of Dr. McGinn's introduction—which aims to present “an objective analysis” of the background of the Controversy, its main issues, and its two chief contestants—is that in it the author demonstrates, with chapter and verse, Cartwright's inferiority to Whitgift as a controversialist. Cartwright's scholarship was slipshod and inaccurate: Whitgift's was meticulous and exact. Cartwright's prose style was turgid and involved: Whitgift's, in comparison, was direct and lucid. Careless in quotation and loose in logic, Cartwright depended largely on the use of “similitudes” as a method of argument. He was also inconsistent and eclectic in his appeal to the authority of “the Primitive Church” as the basis and justification of the Presbyterian system. The Lady Margaret Professor was outclassed by the Master of Trinity, and Dr. Scott Pearson, the biographer of Cartwright, himself pays tribute to Whitgift's “lucid and impressive defence.”

In the historical sections of the introduction, Dr. McGinn is less sure-footed. When he speaks of “three hundred of the fellows” of St. John's College, Cambridge (p. 15), it can only be supposed that he is confusing “fellows” with “chaps”: and the use of the word “vestment” to describe an undergraduate's surplice has by now become a little misleading. It is a more serious criticism that, while conversant with the Admonition and Marprelate Controversies, he pays little heed to Hooker, and almost ignores Bancroft. His notes are scholarly, but a short bibliography would also have been serviceable. The main value of the book, however, lies in the critical examination of the literary controversy between Whitgift and Cartwright, and in the skilfully devised abridgement of it.

Dr. Conklin's somewhat technical and philological study of Milton as a Biblical critic is a notable contribution to the debated question of the poet's religious opinions. Though not a specialist, Milton had a competent knowledge of Hebrew. The purpose of this book is to vindicate his claim to originality, or at least to independence, in his theological findings, and to argue that his doctrinal heterodoxies may have derived largely from his method of Biblical criticism rather than from Patristic, Renaissance, or Rabbinic sources. This is particularly illustrated by discussion of Milton's "materialism" (his denial of creation *ex nihilo*) and "mortalism" (his belief that the soul dies with the body and sleeps in death until the day of judgement). Milton's theory of interpretation was Puritan, and his exegetical method admittedly philological. Dr. Conklin's introductory chapter, which provides an outline sketch of the Biblical scholarship of the Renaissance and of the seventeenth century, is not the least valuable section of the book.

CHARLES SMYTH.

INTRODUCTION TO BERDYAEV. By OLIVER FIELDING CLARKE.
Pp. 192. (Geoffrey Bles). 15s.

THERE must be many people who, while acquainted with the name of Nicolas Berdyaev, have hesitated to plunge into his works. Others, having started (let us say) with *Freedom and the Spirit*, may have given up the venture in despair. Finally there are those who have joyfully devoured each book as it appeared in English yet have felt that to understand him properly they needed to know more about his life and background. Each of these classes will find much to help them in Mr. Clarke's "introduction" to a great thinker. Most valuable to the last will be Part I of the book which contains chapters on Russia's Destiny, Russian Orthodoxy, Currents in Russian Literature and Berdyaev's Life and Times. Part II is rather for the beginner. In seven chapters it attempts to summarize his teaching on Freedom, God-Humanity, the Christian Philosophy of History, Ethics, War, Revolution, Sex, Communism and Capitalism and to assess his place among modern Christian philosophers.

A prodigious attempt truly! In not much more than a hundred pages what can one hope to give of a writer of such erudition, so deep and so copious, so unfamiliar in his language and outlook, so challenging and paradoxical in his thought? Yet Mr. Clarke has succeeded marvellously in his task. He is content for the most part to let Berdyaev speak for himself, and no one surely is more quotable. The ice (so to speak) is thus broken, and the reader who has never met this writer before can hardly fail,

before he ends the book, to feel his fascination and desire a more intimate acquaintance. He will never become a disciple of Berdyaev. No one could be that, for he stands and wished to stand alone. But he will learn to love and revere this voice that shakes him from the lethargy of preconceptions with home-truths half-forgotten and he will be a better Christian afterwards and (what Berdyaev would have liked much more) a better man.

As one example of this astonishing gift for shaking us up, I cannot refrain from quoting from *The Destiny of Man*: "Moral consciousness began with God's question, 'Cain, where is thy brother Abel?' It will end with another question on the part of God: 'Abel, where is thy brother Cain?'" That scarifies our "Christian" Pharisaism as nothing else could do, and it is a fine illustration of all that Berdyaev has to say about "The Ethics of Redemption". Nor was his a doctrinaire gospel of love: he practised what he preached. Exiled by his own countrymen, a Christian by atheists, he never thought of condemning them as "wicked": for him the only good is that which lies in Christ beyond "good" and "evil."

There is, however, one flaw in Berdyaev's theology which one finds hard to understand—his doctrine (borrowed from Jacob Boehme) of the "Ungrund" and what he calls "meonic freedom". Rather surprisingly Mr. Clarke takes sides with him over this, and the reason may be that he has not sufficiently thought it through (cf. pp. 123 and 180). Briefly, Berdyaev contends that man has freedom not because it has been given him by God but because he draws it from the fathomless abyss which is "prior to being". This freedom he must use "creatively", and there is in fact an Ethics of Creativity which even transcends the Ethics of Redemption. It was (apparently) this freedom which (so Berdyaev avowed) brought him to Christ, and might also take him away from Christ (p. 180). There seems to be a confusion here, which Berdyaev never attempted to resolve, between the "freedom of the will" of which we are conscious as human beings and the true freedom with which Christ has set us free. Actually the former would be far better called "indeterminacy", the ability to react in different unpredictable ways to different stimuli. Certainly it is untrue to say that man in his natural state is free. He is the very opposite, a slave chained and in darkness, awaiting redemption. Most certainly also it was not my freedom that brought me to Christ, it was the Father who drew me. To say otherwise is to turn the Gospel topsy-turvy. This is why one feels (I think) that Berdyaev is always unsatisfactory when he comes to deal with man's creativeness. He is thinking here of artistic not spiritual creativity, and the result is that on this subject he is at his most "aristocratic". These gifts are only for the few not for the mass

of mankind, and he could never reconcile this with his universal love of and respect for man.

To say this, however, is merely to deepen the fascination of Berdyaev as one of the most striking human personalities of our day. Those of us who never met him yet loved his books will always long to introduce others into his rare and bracing company. If Mr. Clarke's book performs this service for us, as it richly deserves to do, we shall remain ever in his debt.

W. J. PHYTHIAN-ADAMS.

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